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This study examined media coverage of the 2016 presidential election to identify whether Trump 
voters were framed as deviant as defined by Daniel Hallin’s Sphere Theory (1986). In a content 
analysis of 384 reports produced in the last six weeks of the election by national and local 
outlets, this study found that journalists framed Trump voters as outside the political norm 
through the use of delegitimizing cues. Previous scholarship (Luther and Miller 2005; Robinson 
et. al. 2008; Taylor 2014; Billard 2016) has defined delegitimizing cues as frames that signal 
negativity to the news consumer. Using a coding system and a qualitative examination of the 
media reports, this study operationalized deviance through the identification of six delegitimizing 
cues applied to the Trump voter. The conclusion was that the media framed Trump voters using 
delegitimizing cues that differed from the coverage of Clinton voters and signaled deviance to 
the news consumer. 
Hallin defined three spheres of normative practice for journalists: consensus, legitimate 
controversy and deviance. Each sphere has different normative practices and goals. According to 
Hallin’s theory, most political coverage falls into the sphere of legitimate controversy. This study 
suggests that when journalists were confronted with voters considered a threat to democracy, 
normative practices shifted and coverage of the Trump voter moved into the sphere of deviance. 
This framing then contributed to a misunderstanding of the electorate by the media.  
 An examination of  differences in national and locally-based reporting in this study 
found that local media framed voters in a more nuanced manner. In addition, local media reports 
included details suggesting that political polls were an inaccurate descriptors of local voters.  
Also included in this dissertation is a summary of the media debate that followed the 
2016 election and suggests political reporters were unaware of the shifting roles and practices 
during the campaign.  
Finally, this study suggests that framing voters as deviant contributes to the polarization 
of the U.S. political system. It aims to analyze the media coverage of the 2016 voter with the 
goal of illuminating current practices and suggesting improvements in the relationship of the 












AMERICAN JOURNALISM AND THE DEVIANT VOTER: ANALYZING AND 















Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the  
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  












Professor Sarah Ann Oates, Chair 
Professor Ira Chinoy 
Professor Mark Feldstein 
Professor Frances Lee 










© Copyright by 







To my husband Jim, above all. Thank you for seeing the world differently than anyone else.  
  
To our children Madeleine, John and Charlotte who each contributed their unique talents and 
were an essential part of the workforce that was required to get this done. What a moment to see 
each of you as scholars, researchers and, occasionally, as therapists. 
 
To Stephanie, who blazed the way, Will, Yvette and Liz – I can’t imagine my path here without 
you.  
 
Finally, to my one-of-a-kind parents, Hank and Micheline Buchanan, who taught us the value of 
education and sacrificed to make sure their children loved to learn. Thank you both for living a 






 This dissertation would not exist without the knowledge, strength and spirit of Dr. Sarah 
Ann Oates. Funny and unbelievably accessible, Sarah embodies the true spirit of academia. 
Thank you for all you have given me. 
 
 This project also owes a huge debt to each member of the committee: Dr. Ira Chinoy, Dr. 
Mark Feldstein, Dr. Frances Lee, Dr. Irwin Morris. Each was a teacher and friend to me. Over 
time, you all made room for this dissertation as you moved through life. I hope you can see the 
imprint of your generosity in this study.  
 
 Thank you to Maggie Saponara, brilliant researcher and friend. And also to Dr. Linda 
Steiner, who always encouraged a rigorous standard. I hope you will smile when you see Carey 
on the final pages.   
 
 Finally, this dissertation owes a thank you to the Philip Merrill College of Journalism at 
the University of Maryland for the opportunity to pursue this degree. It is a beautiful place to 
become a scholar.  
iv 
 
Table of Contents 
 
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................................................... II 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................... III 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................................... IV 
TABLE OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................................... VII 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 
THE LENS OF SPHERE THEORY .......................................................................................................................................... 5 
EXPANDING SPHERE THEORY TO VOTERS ............................................................................................................................. 7 
THE STATE OF ELECTION COVERAGE ................................................................................................................................... 9 
NATIONAL AND LOCAL REPORTING .................................................................................................................................. 11 
GOALS OF THIS STUDY ................................................................................................................................................... 12 
Research Questions ............................................................................................................................................ 13 
THE SCOPE OF THIS DISSERTATION ................................................................................................................................... 14 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................................. 19 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERARY REVIEW ..................................................................................................................... 21 
THE CASE FOR SPHERE THEORY ....................................................................................................................................... 21 
PARTISANSHIP AND POLARIZATION IN THE MEDIA .............................................................................................................. 25 
DEFINING SPHERE THEORY ............................................................................................................................................. 27 
HALLIN’S SPHERE THEORY ............................................................................................................................................. 28 
Legitimate controversy ...................................................................................................................................... 29 
Sphere of Consensus .......................................................................................................................................... 33 
SPHERE OF DEVIANCE ................................................................................................................................................... 35 
AGENDA SETTING ........................................................................................................................................................ 36 
Intermedia Agenda Setting ................................................................................................................................ 38 
FRAMING ................................................................................................................................................................... 39 
CONTENT OF THE 2016 MEDIA ELECTION COVERAGE ......................................................................................................... 41 
Issue Coverage ................................................................................................................................................... 42 
Negative Bias ..................................................................................................................................................... 43 
Informing the Public ........................................................................................................................................... 44 
Narrative Driven News ....................................................................................................................................... 46 
Shrinking Soundbite ........................................................................................................................................... 47 
Indexing ............................................................................................................................................................. 49 
Sphere Theory and the Election ......................................................................................................................... 50 
Vox Pop .............................................................................................................................................................. 51 
Role of Social Media ........................................................................................................................................... 53 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................................................. 54 
CHAPTER THREE: METHODS ............................................................................................................................... 57 
WHY NEWSPAPERS? ..................................................................................................................................................... 57 
Local New outlets ............................................................................................................................................... 59 
NEXIS UNI KEYWORD SEARCH ........................................................................................................................................ 61 
WHAT THIS STUDY MEASURED ........................................................................................................................................ 64 
OPERATIONALIZING DEVIANCE ........................................................................................................................................ 66 
v 
 
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS ........................................................................................................................................... 68 
MEDIA IDENTIFICATION OF DEVIANT FRAMING .................................................................................................................. 70 
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE EXAMINATION ............................................................................................................... 71 
BUILDING THE CODING SHEET AND QUANTITATIVE MEASURES ............................................................................................... 72 
Negativity ........................................................................................................................................................... 74 
Vox Pop .............................................................................................................................................................. 75 
LOCAL NEWS COMPARISON ........................................................................................................................................... 76 
FUTURE RESEARCH ....................................................................................................................................................... 77 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS ................................................................................................................................... 79 
FINDINGS EXPLAINED ................................................................................................................................................... 82 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS .......................................................................................................................... 83 
DEVIANCE AND DELEGITIMIZING CUES ............................................................................................................................. 84 
CATEGORY ONE: SOCIALLY UNACCEPTABLE ....................................................................................................................... 87 
Category Two: Uneducated ............................................................................................................................... 92 
Category Three: Race ......................................................................................................................................... 97 
Category Four: Insults ...................................................................................................................................... 104 
Category Five: Conspiracy Theories ................................................................................................................. 109 
Category Six: Odd Behavior, Clothing or Speech .............................................................................................. 113 
THE VOTER IN GENERAL .............................................................................................................................................. 116 
Measurement One: Lack of Issue Coverage ..................................................................................................... 117 
Measurement Three: Voters as a Source ......................................................................................................... 119 
Measurement Four: No Good Choice ............................................................................................................... 123 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................................ 126 
CHAPTER FIVE: LOCAL MEDIA RESULTS ............................................................................................................ 129 
METHOD ................................................................................................................................................................. 135 
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS .............................................................................................................................................. 137 
Sample Size ...................................................................................................................................................... 138 
COMPARISON OF DELEGITIMIZING CUES ......................................................................................................................... 139 
Delegitimizing Cue One: Insults ........................................................................................................................ 139 
Delegitimizing Cue Two: Support for the Candidate of Choice is Socially Unacceptable ................................. 141 
Delegitimizing Cue Three: Conspiracy Theories ............................................................................................... 144 
Delegitimizing Cue Four: Unusual Details ........................................................................................................ 146 
Delegitimizing Cue Five: Lack of Education ...................................................................................................... 148 
Delegitimizing Cue Six: Race ............................................................................................................................ 150 
DESCRIPTIONS OF THE VOTER ....................................................................................................................................... 154 
Politicians as sources ....................................................................................................................................... 154 
QUALITATIVE RESULTS ................................................................................................................................................ 159 
More Biographical Details ............................................................................................................................... 160 
Evidence of widespread Trump support ........................................................................................................... 162 
Sense of community ......................................................................................................................................... 164 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................................ 165 
CHAPTER SIX: MEA CULPA ...................................................................................................................... 168 
DESCRIPTION OF THE POST-ELECTION DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................... 169 
LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................................................................... 172 
METHOD ................................................................................................................................................................. 173 
RESULTS .................................................................................................................................................................. 175 
DESCRIPTION OF THE ANSWERS OFFERED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE MEDIA ............................................................................ 178 
Problem 1: Reliance on the Polls ...................................................................................................................... 178 
Problem Two: Normative Practices .................................................................................................................. 180 
Problem Three: Out of Touch with the Electorate ............................................................................................ 182 
vi 
 
Problem Four: Unthinkable .............................................................................................................................. 184 
Problem Five: Newsroom Diversity .................................................................................................................. 188 
Problem Six: Lack of On the Ground Reporting/Budget Cuts ........................................................................... 189 
Problem Seven: Reduced Local Media ............................................................................................................. 190 
Sphere Theory .................................................................................................................................................. 192 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................................................ 193 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 195 
SPHERE THEORY AS A LENS .......................................................................................................................................... 197 
THE VOTER ............................................................................................................................................................... 198 
CYCLE OF DELEGITIMIZATION ....................................................................................................................................... 203 
Deviance as an Attention Seeking Tool ............................................................................................................ 204 
NEGATIVITY AND POLARIZATION ................................................................................................................................... 208 
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA ............................................................................................................................................ 211 
APPENDIX A: CODING FORM ............................................................................................................................ 216 
APPENDIX B: SOURCES FOR MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS .................................................................................. 220 
APPENDIX C: MEDIA CHART ............................................................................................................................. 223 






Table of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Hallin’s Sphere Theory …………………………………………………………….   29 
 
Figure 2: Journalism Practice: Understood Through Sphere Theory ………………………..    33 
 
Figure 3: Graph of News Reports Suggesting Candidate of Choice is Socially Unacceptable ……..   87 
 
Figure 4: Graph of News Reports including Education as a Descriptor  …………………….   93 
 
Figure 5: Graph of News Reports Including Race as a Descriptor  ………………………….   98    
 
Figure 6: Graph of News Reports that Include Voter Insults ………………………………...  105 
 
Figure 7: Graph of News Reports that Include Voter Conspiracy Theories  …………………  110 
 
Figure 8: Graph of News Reports that Include Odd Descriptors  ……………………………   114 
 
Figure 9: Graph of News Reports that Described Issues Important to Voters  ……………… 117 
 
Figure 10: Graph of News Reports that Include Professional Political Observers as a Source  ……..   120 
 
Figure 11: Graph of News Reports that Include More Political Observers than Voters …….   121 
 
Figure 12: Graph of News Reports that Imply the Election Offered No Good Choice  ……..   123 
 
Figure 13: Graph of Local/National Comparison of Trump Voters Insulting Others ……….   139 
 
Figure 14: Graph of Local/National Comparison of Trump Voters Reluctant to Announce Support ………. .   142 
 
Figure 15: Graph Local/National Comparison of that Include Trump Voter Conspiracy Theory ……. 146 
 
Figure 16: Graph Local/National Comparison of Trump Voters Described Using Unusual Details ………146 
 
Figure 17: Graph Local/National Comparison of Trump Voter Education Level  …………… 148 
 
Figure 18: Graph Local/National Comparison of Trump Supporters Identified by Race ……………… 150 
 




Figure 20: Graph Local/National Comparison of Political Observers/Voters ……………….   154 
 
Figure 21: Graph Local/National Comparison of Voters Places after Political Observers …..  155 
 
Figure 22: Graph Local/National Comparison of “No Good Choice” ……………………….  157 
 
Figure 23: Problems Identified by the Media in Election Coverage ……………… ………..   176 
 












The 2016 presidential election presented a challenge for political journalists who 
understood their role as an integral part of the U.S. democratic system. On the one hand, 
journalism practice requires the media to provide balanced and objective information. The 
constitutionally-protected role of the media is to inform the electorate about the campaign so 
voters can understand the issues and candidates and then cast an informed vote. On the other 
hand, Donald Trump’s campaign operated outside the political norm and the thousands of 
supporters who showed up at his rallies were often openly hostile of the media. Trump insulted 
his opponents, appeared unversed about policy issues, faced scandal after scandal during his 
campaign and rallied his supporters using language many identified as racist. Many journalists 
labeled Trump and his supporters a threat to the U.S. democracy. Facing the deadline pressure of 
a presidential campaign, the media struggled to understand their role and the best practices of 
election coverage. They missed the likelihood of Trump’s election, but more importantly, the 
media missed the chance to establish a conversation about the issues driving his support. 
 At the heart of the challenge was a concept that scholars have studied for decades -- the 
role of the media in a democratic election and the normative practices associated with that role. 
Members of the media who were outraged by Trump and his supporters urged their peers to stop 
covering him objectively and instead sound an alarm that this election could threaten the U.S. 
system of democracy. However, professional practice urges objectivity, fact-gathering and 
source-based reporting. To political reporters assigned to cover the presidential election, 
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abandoning objectivity sounded like a betrayal of their profession. As Schudson (1995) once 
defined it, these practices are the “hallmark” of contemporary journalism and differentiate the 
professional media from anyone one else witnessing the campaign. 
On election night 2016 as results rolled in, many members of the media publicly 
recognized that the choice of the electorate was much different than they had reported during the 
campaign. Hillary Clinton was not going to win the election as most major media outlets had 
predicted because Trump’s support was registering in surprising corners of the country. At nearly 
11 p.m. EST, the Associated Press called Florida and then North Carolina for Trump. As the 
night wore on, Trump won more states that the media had predicted Clinton would carry: Iowa, 
Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Michigan. These were not traditional swing states. Even in states 
that supported Clinton there were unexpected pockets in the political landscape. In Minnesota, 
Illinois, and New York some counties flipped their support away from the Democrats by more 
than 20 percent, meaning counties that had voted Democratic in 2012 were voting for Trump in 
large numbers. This type of support signaled that a majority of Republican voters and a 
significant number of Democratic voters had sent Trump to the Oval Office. These voters were 
part of a political movement that could not be dismissed as a fringe element of the American 
population, as the media had nearly uniformly portrayed Trump supporters throughout the 
campaign.  
Journalists recognized something had failed during their election coverage and they 
began a public self-examination centered on one question: how did we miss this? The morning 
after the election journalists Anna Palmer, Jake Sherman and Daniel Lippman wrote, “We were 
all wrong. That seems obvious, right? But we were more than wrong. We were laughably 
oblivious. The entire Washington political-media complex completely missed the mark. Not by 
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inches or feet, but by miles.”1 For several weeks, television and news outlets devoted time and 
space to the coverage of the election and their big miss. The media was not alone. Scholars such 
as Graber and Dunaway (2017) described the coverage of Brexit and the Trump election as a 
moment when the media was out of touch with a large portion of the electorate: “(j)ournalists 
from both countries are marveling at their failure to anticipate the depth of discontent felt among 
broad swaths of the public” (p.152). Just weeks after election day, a collection of media scholars 
published an analysis of what went wrong. In that roundup, public policy scholar Short (2016) 
wrote: “Trump’s stunning electoral win demonstrates not so much the strength of his candidacy 
but the depth of despair felt by about the country’s direction. His win is the equivalent of a 
scream of resentment, an articulation of alienation and a symbol of a deep crisis of legitimation,” 
(p.102). 
Journalists struggled to understand their role, and therefore their normative practices, in 
the 2016 election. Many scholars have suggested that the media should have been more proactive 
in identifying Trump as deviant during the election. By following standard journalism practices 
of balanced coverage and objectivity, they argue, the media normalized an abnormal candidate 
and potentially accelerated his campaign. McNair (2016), for example, argues that covering 
Trump with objectivity normalized fascist politics and he criticizes the media for bestowing 
respectability on Trump’s politics. “(T)he slide into fascism will simply become another news 
story, another ‘he said/she said’ performance of balance, legitimized by the fact that this is what 
democracy delivered” (p.12). Mazzoleni (2016) is more forgiving but makes the same point. 
“How could the media ignore such a bizarre presidential hopeful? That’s point. They just 
 





couldn’t? So they covered his triumphant march toward the nomination, using the horse race 
frame, the one that they are long accustomed to,” Mazzoleni wrote (p. 21). Patterson (2016) 
identified many trends in the election coverage but highlighted false equivalencies as one of the 
most important. Patterson argues that the media “reported all the ugly stuff they could find, and 
left it to the voters to decide what to make of it.” Baym (2016) is more pessimistic. Journalism 
no longer stands separate from politics, he argues. Baym calls this discursive integration and 
defines it as a “deep blending” of politics, news, entertainment, commerce and marketing. 
Because Trump proved to be good for television news ratings, “commercial television news is 
structurally incapable of providing pushback,” (p.1). 
This study holds that all of these arguments are valid criticisms of the election coverage 
of 2016 (and there are many more.) However, they do not fully explain the media coverage of 
the Trump voter. Understanding the coverage of the voter through Sphere Theory, the risk of 
covering the voter as deviant becomes clearer. Raising an alarm about voters that threatened 
democracy, journalists missed an opportunity to explore Trump’s support on a more granular 
level. There was a mystery in the 2016 campaign that went largely unreported: why were so 
many voters attracted to a candidate who violated the central tenets of the behavior and character 
of presidential candidates? Understanding the coverage through the lens of Hallin’s Sphere 
Theory, it is easier to unravel the mystery of why the media did not recognize the scope of 
Trump’s support. If Trump supporters were identified as deviant, then the role of journalists was 
no longer to objectively understand and report. The role of the journalists shifts to identifying the 
deviance and protecting democracy from the effects of this deviance. This dissertation suggests 
that understanding the Trump voter as deviant was an understandable and logical response by 
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political journalists but that it also contributed to a misunderstanding of the political landscape in 
the 2016 election. 
The Lens of Sphere Theory 
 
At the heart of  Hallin’s Sphere Theory lies an understanding of the shifting professional 
practices assigned to the different roles a journalist fulfills in a democracy. Many scholars have 
recognized and defined the role of the journalist in a democratic society. This study relies on 
Hallin’s 1986 definition that identifies three areas of practice: the spheres of consensus, 
legitimate controversy, and deviance. Aiming for objectivity is the comfort zone of the 
professional journalist. Yet objectivity is not central to all the roles that the media fulfills. In 
stories that support community values, normative practices and newsroom rituals encourage the 
reporters to present only one side of the story: the heroic fireman, the patriotism of the military, 
the love we feel for pets. It would be jarring and upsetting for the reporter to seek two sides on 
these topics and sources. In Sphere Theory, these stories fall into the sphere of consensus. 
Similarly, the reporter also puts aside objectivity when raising an alarm about impending danger 
or deviant behavior. When a source claims aliens are talking to him, this source would be 
covered as deviant (or ignored).  Hallin (1986) used the example of war protestors early in the 
Vietnam War. Bucking the patriotism many felt and government sources encouraged, these 
protestors were framed as deviant and outside the norm. Similarly, investigative reporting 
doesn’t always seek balance or neutrality. It aims to shine a spotlight on misconduct, a breach of 
trust or a failure of justice. Finding corruption or illegal behavior, the journalist does not shift to 
find sources that argue in favor of this behavior. They aim to root out those responsible. These 
types of stories fall into Hallin’s sphere of deviance, where practice does not include pursuing 
multiple perspectives in a source-based report but focuses on raising an alarm. 
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 Finally, the goal of objectivity lies in a third role, the arena where debate is legitimate 
and encouraged. Topics that fall into this area include political debates, elections and 
controversy. This type of journalism is the most familiar for the media and the news consumer. 
Hallin defined this type of journalism as the sphere of legitimate controversy and described it as 
the “stuff of democracy” (p. 117). This is where practices taught in journalism school are 
applied: the inverted pyramid is used, it is source-based and factually driven, journalists seek 
alternative perspectives and pursue a range of opinions about issues facing the democracy.  
Hallin developed Sphere Theory to explain journalistic approaches to coverage of the 
Vietnam War, which changed in tone and practice over time. It holds that that members of the 
media employ different normative practices depending on the perception of the news event he or 
she is covering. This model recognizes that the role of the journalist is not simply the transmitter 
of information. It is also the defender of community values and the alarm bell when confronted 
with threats to democracy or community. Hallin identified that journalists shift into and out of 
these spheres, each with different normative practices.  
In the weeks following the election, media scholar Matt Carlson (2016) suggested that 
coverage of Trump did not fall into the sphere of legitimate controversy, as campaign coverage 
usually does. Instead Carlson argued that journalists were covering Trump supporters as deviant 
and applying the normative practices associated with this sphere. “(J)ournalism does not respond 
well to unorthodoxy; it is regimented and orthodox, driven by patterns that make possible the 
unending crush of news stories” (p.11). Instead, Carlson argued that the media covered Trump as 
they would cover a threat to democracy, as something deviant where “objectivity is supplanted 
by shared loathing” (p 11). He suggested that the role of the journalist shifted during the 
campaign coverage, whether the media realized it or not and that many journalists viewed Trump 
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as so far outside the sphere of legitimacy that the rules of political coverage no longer were 
required and were very difficult to apply. In the sphere of deviance, as defined by Hallin, 
journalists abandon neutrality and “play the role of exposing, condemning or excluding from the 
public agenda those who violate or challenge the political consensus,” (Hallin, p.117). Carlson 
suggests that Trump’s unorthodox candidacy, which blurred the lines of deviance and legitimacy 
for many, was an inherently difficult news event to cover because the rules of practice for these 
two spheres are very different. Carlson called for future scholarship using Hallin’s theory to 
understand the difficulty of covering Trump during the 2016 election.  
Expanding sphere theory to voters  
 
 Building on Carlson’s observation, this study uses the lens of Hallin’s Sphere Theory to 
examine coverage of the Trump voter and suggests that the difficulty the media faced during the 
2016 presidential election stemmed from shifting roles and practices as they moved from the 
sphere of legitimate controversy to the sphere of deviance. Campaign coverage has traditionally 
fallen squarely in the sphere of legitimate controversy. Normative practice in this sphere is the 
pursuit of objectivity through fact gathering and source-based reporting, according to Hallin. 
This study identifies that journalists did not stay in this sphere when covering Trump supporters. 
Based on a content analysis and qualitative reading of media campaign coverage during the last 
six weeks of the 2016 election, this study finds that journalists often framed Trump supporters as 
deviant. When confronted with sources that fall into the sphere of deviance, Hallin suggests, the 
media will put aside neutrality and use language that marks the source or event as a threat to the 
community. This study argues that journalists often shifted from the sphere of legitimate concern 
to the sphere of deviance while covering the election and the normative practices they employed 
shifted with them.  
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 Research using Hallin’s sphere of deviance traditionally has focused on the coverage of 
war protestors (Luther and Miller 2005, Murray et. al. 2008, Taylor 2014). This is a natural 
outgrowth of Hallin’s initial research on the media coverage of the Vietnam War, which found 
that protestors were often labeled deviant in the early years when patriotism and optimism 
defined public sentiment. Luther and Miller built on Hallin’s study and examined media 
coverage of protestors during the 2003 U.S.-Iraq war. They found that when the media covers an 
event or source that falls into the sphere of deviance, journalists employ frames that signal the 
deviant nature of the subject. Luther and Miller called these frames “delegitimizing cue words,” 
(p. 3). Taylor studied the shifting nature of political issues and identified times when topics or 
sources moved from legitimate to delegitimized or in the reverse direction. Journalists signaled 
changes in legitimacy through “subtle lexical choices” (p. 48), Taylor found. 
 Billard (2016) expanded the realm of this application to examine media coverage of 
transgender people. Billard operationalized the concept of delegitimizing language used to signal 
deviance with the development of a list of legitimacy indicators. Using the National Lesbian and 
Gay Journalist Association Stylebook and GLAAD2 media reference guide, Billard developed a 
set of nine “Legitimacy Indicators” to measure “the various aspects of respecting the self-
identifications and human dignity of transgender individuals.” (p.5) The study found that 
coverage of transgender people in major national newspapers was “extremely limited” (p.1).  
However, the coverage that did exist nearly universally contained language identified as 
delegitimizing. Some of the legitimacy indicators that Billard measured included whether the 
media used the name a transgender person identified with or chose to use the name given at birth, 
 
2 Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation, a media organization formed in 1985 to protest coverage of HIV 




whether the author uses slurs such as “tranny,” “she-male” or other transphobic term,  which 
pronoun the journalist chose to describe a transgender person, citing criminal backgrounds 
unrelated to the article, mischaracterizing transgenderism as drag or cross-dressing, and equating 
transgenderism with a sexual perversion. Billard found that the media shifts normative practices 
when confronted with sources or actors considered by journalists to be outside the norm. This 
study builds on this scholarship and expands the scope of sphere theory to the study of elections 
and voters.  
The state of election coverage 
 
Many scholars (Bennett 2017; Patterson 2016; Tiffin 2014; Hallin 1992) have identified 
flaws in normative practices of election coverage that narrows the scope of sources, avoids 
discussion of issues, zeroes in on controversy and emphasizes the horse-race nature of the 
election. These practices fall into the sphere of legitimate controversy, which is where political 
coverage is expected in Sphere Theory. Patterson (2016) documented the lack of issue coverage 
and the hyper-focus by the media on covering the election as a horserace. Ignoring issues in 
favor of polls and opinion surveys, the media has limited the opportunity to explore issues, he 
argues. Patterson found less than 10 percent of media reports in the 2016 election addressed 
issues. Within those reports, the voice of the voter is rarely heard. Rather, the reports focus on 
the positions of powerful political actors. Bennett (2019) argues that coverage of Trump 
supporters in the 2016 election falls into his theory of indexing, defined as the “tendency of 
mainstream news organizations to index or adjust the range of viewpoints in a story to the 
dominant positions of those whom the journalists perceive to have enough power to affect the 
outcome of a situation” (p.16). By limiting the range of perspectives and issues debated, the 
media not only eliminates many different viewpoints from the public debate but offers more 
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power to the political actors who are defining the sphere of legitimate controversy. Cook (2006) 
argues that indexing has led to a homogenization of the news, where all major news outlets 
report on the same topics and rely on the same powerful political actors as sources. The 
symbiotic nature of the relationship between the media and elected officials has turned the media 
into a branch of the government, Cook argues. Hallin (1992), in a separate study, identified the 
“shrinking soundbite,” which is the growing trend to reduce the space and time that a source is 
offered to explain his or her perspective. Tiffen et. al. (2014) built on Hallin’s study and found 
that the media is shifting to fewer sources in their news reports and focuses primarily on political 
actors. 
All of these trends have contributed to a tendency by the media to narrate the news or 
explain the news from the perspective of the journalist as a story where facts are slotted in to 
make a point for the audience. As Hallin (1992) and Bennett (2017, 2019) have identified, the 
trend toward narrative news decreases the media’s reliance on facts and source-based reporting 
and invites the reporter to adopt the role of analyst and interpreter. It places the journalist within 
the powerful world of elite political actors that define the agenda of political discussion (Iyengar 
and Kinder 2010). The range of accepted political debate is limited in this world by those in 
power and in a position to bring attention and action to an issue. Narrating the news, journalists 
have adopted the role of contextualizing and explaining political events based on their 
perspective and expertise. By covering only those in power, shifting a focus away from issues 
and relying more and more on a style that places the journalist at the center of media reports, the 
media has relegated the voice of the electorate to a minor role. Confronted with ideas that are 
outside the mainstream of political power, the media recognizes it as deviant rather than part of 
mainstream debate. This study aims to identify how journalists slipped out of the role of 
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objective reporting and into the role of democratic watchdog and aims to encourage a wider 
understanding of what makes up the sphere of legitimate controversy. 
National and Local Reporting 
 
This study was based on a content analysis and qualitative reading of  384 election news reports 
produced by three national newspapers and five local Pennsylvania newspapers during the last 
siz weeks of the 2016 presidential election. The local newspapers were included to measure 
whether journalists based in the same communities as the voters they were covering framed 
voters in a more nuanced manner than national reporters did. Many scholars have tied the 
challenges of covering the 2016 election to the decline of local reporting resources. Graber and 
Dunaway (2017) found that “elite national journalists” who usually relied on information from 
their colleagues in smaller bureaus and locally-based news outlets “were unable to pick up on the 
extent of public discontent” (p.153) in the 2016 election. Similarly, Hermida (2016) argues that 
“tectonic shifts” in how Americans receive and share their news fails to inform the voter. The 
gatekeepers of news have been undermined by economic realities and technology and proximity 
to the voter by news organizations is gone, Hermida argues. As a result, Lewis and Carlson 
(2016) suggest that the loss of local newspapers has changed our definition of news. They argue 
that towns suffering economic hardship, like factory closings, are those most likely to also lose 
their media outlets. Without media representation, the perspective of rural and small town 
residents was often not represented in the news world.  After the election, journalists Bryant and 
Ordway (2018) suggest that major media organizations missed the support for Trump because 
they are “disconnected” from poverty. As a result, this study compares and contrasts the 
reporting of local and national newspaper election coverage in an effort to point to a path 
forward in election coverage of a wide range of voters.  
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Goals of this study 
 
The broad goal of this study is to contribute to scholarship on the relationship of the 
media to the electorate in the U.S. democratic system. Specifically, this study aims to offer 
insights on normative practices that can assist the media in covering and informing voters during 
an election. Recent surveys by media organizations suggest that American confidence in the 
media is low. In late 2019, a Gallup poll found that only 41 percent of Americans said they had a 
“fair amount of trust” in the media to report “fairly and accurately.”3 While that figure is up from 
the distrust displayed immediately following the 2016 election, it is still alarmingly low. A 2019 
Columbia Journalism Review poll found that 60 percent of those polled believed journalists were 
paid by their sources sometimes or very often.4 Many studies show a growing divide between the 
media trusted by Republicans and Democrats. A 2020 Pew survey measuring confidence in more 
than 30 news sources found that the difference between the confidence that Republicans and 
Democrats place in major media organizations has grown significantly in the past five years.5 As 
distrust, anger and polarization toward the media grows in society, this study aims to contribute 
to a better understanding of ways in which the media can improve election coverage and fulfill 
its mission in a democracy.  
The campaign of 2016 was a difficult assignment for political reporters, as their post-
election debate illustrates. While Clinton won more popular votes, Trump won an unexpectedly 
large percentage of votes in key states in order to win the presidency. The tension of how to 
 
3Brenan, Megan. (2019, September 26). Americans' Trust in Mass Media Edges Down to 41%. Gallup. Retrieved 
from: https://news.gallup.com/poll/267047/americans-trust-mass-media-edges-down.aspx 
4Columbia Journalism Review. (2019, Winter). Poll: How does the public think journalism happens? Retrieved 
from: 
https://www.cjr.org/special_report/how-does-journalism-happen-poll.php.  
5Potter, Debra and Katrina Eva Matsa. (2014, March 24). A Boom in Acquisitions and Content Sharing Shapes 




cover a candidate that many perceived as a threat to democracy created a dilemma that 
journalists were forced to confront as they produced copy on deadline and identifying Trump 
supporters as deviant would have been a natural and predictable response, according to Sphere 
Theory although this lens has not been deployed widely as a method to study voters. However, 
that lens seems to be a logical answer to the questions posed by journalists themselves about how 
the media coverage of 2016 miscalculated the response of the voter to Trump.  
In order to determine whether voters were framed as deviant as defined by Hallin, this 
study developed a coding scheme to measure deviance and legitimacy based on the work of 
previous studies and expanded the application of Sphere Theory to the media coverage of voters.  
Research Questions 
  Based on previous scholarship, the following research questions will be explored in this 
dissertation: 
R1: Did the media coverage of the 2016 election frame the Trump voter as deviant or 
outside the sphere of legitimate controversy as defined by Hallin (1992)? 
R2: Did local journalists cover local Trump supporters in a manner different from 
national reporters? If so, did this coverage reflect a greater understanding of issues important to 
the local voter? 
R3: How did the media understand their coverage of the voter in the debate that followed 
the 2016 election? Did that debate offer feasible solutions for future coverage of voters? 
These research questions suggest the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Many journalists covering the 2016 election identified Trump as deviant from the 
political norm, as defined by Hallin (1986), and covered the campaign according to the norms 
prescribed by this model.  
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H2: Many journalists covering the 2016 election also identified Trump supporters as 
deviant and outside the sphere of legitimate consensus, as defined by Hallin (1986) and covered 
those voters according to the norms prescribed by this model.  
H3: Local journalists may have been more nuanced in their understanding of their 
communities and less likely to use the deviance model when covering these voters during the 
election.  
H4: Journalists understood their coverage of the 2016 election as flawed and generated a 
public debate about changes in normative practices following the election.  
The scope of this dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters.  
Chapter Two is a literature review. This study falls into the field of agenda setting and 
framing analysis. Specifically, this study will apply Sphere Theory, developed by Hallin, to the 
election coverage by the media in the 2016 presidential election. The premise is that the media 
understood the Trump voter as deviant, as defined by Sphere Theory, and therefore shifted its 
normative practices away from objectivity and fact-gathering and toward a narrative style that 
sounded an alarm. Many scholars have demonstrated how Sphere Theory is useful in 
understanding the coverage of political actors and events that run contrary to values perceived by 
the media to be shared community standards (Luther and Miller 2005, Murray et. al. 2008, 
Taylor 2014, Billard 2016). This study builds on this scholarship by applying Hallin’s  theory to 
an examination of the coverage of voters as first suggested by Carlson.  
As a result, Chapter Two begins with a discussion of Sphere Theory, including a 
discussion of objectivity. Objectivity is a defining concept in modern U.S. journalism, yet it is 
often misunderstood and ill-defined. This chapter explores the very American origins of 
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objectivity and how the pursuit of this goal affects news gathering practices. As a central tenet of 
the sphere of legitimate concern, this study explores how objectivity helps define the size and 
scope of accepted political debate and normative practices.  
The chapter moves on to explore how Sphere Theory fits into the literature on election 
coverage by the media. Specifically, it explores the growing body of work that explores whether 
the news media is fulfilling its role as the provider of information to the voters during an 
election. As mentioned earlier, many scholars have documented shifts in normative practice that 
have built up since the Vietnam War and Watergate eras. This study holds that these changes in 
journalistic practice have encouraged a shrinking understanding of what topics and which actors 
make up the sphere of legitimate controversy in Sphere Theory. Chapter Two includes a deeper 
analysis of these trends and how it contributes to a narrower scope of accepted political debate. 
Finally, Chapter Two examines scholarship that examines the contribution of local reporting and 
examines the forces that are working against the success of smaller newspapers.  
 Chapter Three is an examination of the method used in this study. This chapter explores 
in greater detail how other scholars have operationalized Sphere Theory. It explains how those 
methods were used to develop a coding analysis that was applied to the content of newspaper 
coverage of the last six weeks of the 2016 election. Building on Luther and Miller and Taylor, 
the coding analysis examines whether journalists used de-legitimizing language to frame the 
Trump supporter as deviant. Billard developed a set of “Legitimacy Indicators” for the coverage 
of transgender people based on the best practices defined by GLAAD and the National Lesbian 
and Gay Journalist Association Stylebook. Following Billard’s example, the coding system was 
designed using guidelines for election coverage developed by media organizations including The 
Handbook for Journalists During Elections, published by Reporters Without Borders and 
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Society for Professional Journalist and the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public 
Policy’s 2018 report on how to cover poverty. It was designed to identify language within the 
newspaper reports that might signal to the reader that Trump voter was deviant. The coding 
system applied the same measures to an analysis of the Clinton voter. 
The study method focused on gathering and analyzing media content in three national 
newspapers: The New York Times, The Washington Post and USA TODAY and five local 
Pennsylvania newspapers during the last six weeks of the 2016 presidential campaign, 
September 25 to November 8. These articles were selected using a keyword search on Nexis Uni 
and measured using quantitative and qualitative methods to determine whether the voter was 
framed as deviant. This chapter includes the results of the coding scheme and quantitative study 
of these articles, as well as an explanation of the keyword search, coding scheme and qualitative 
analysis. 
Local newspapers were included in this study to measure differences in coverage between 
national and local newspapers. Pennsylvania newspapers were chosen for two reasons. First, 
Pennsylvania was a surprise swing state in the election and representative of the several states 
that were traditionally Democratic and predicted to support Clinton. The voters of Pennsylvania 
have supported Democratic candidates for president in every election since 1988. In the weeks 
before the election, The New York Times gave Clinton an 89 percent chance of carrying 
Pennsylvania and that prediction was supported by five national polls. Yet, Trump won the state 
with 48.8 percent of the vote compared to Clinton’s 47.5 percent. In 2012, Obama won with 51.9 
percent of the vote compared to 46.5 percent for the Republican challenger, Mitt Romney. The 
second reason is the fact that the University of Maryland’s subscription to Nexis Uni includes 
Pennsylvania newspapers with a wide range of size, political leaning, histories and locations. It is 
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the largest database of local newspapers in a state predicted to vote for Clinton. The five local 
newspapers included in this study will be The Philadelphia Inquirer, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 
Public Opinion (Chambersburg), Lebanon Daily News, and The Evening Sun (Hanover). The 
coverage of the 2016 election will be compared and contrasted to national coverage in The New 
York Times, The Washington Post and USA TODAY.   
 Chapter Four outlines the results of this study which found that the Trump voter was 
often framed as deviant. Using language that described the voter’s education, race, use of insults 
toward the other party’s candidates and supporters, belief in conspiracy theories, and odd 
clothing or language the media signaled to its readers that the Trump supporter was less 
respectable than other members of the community and a not a valued source of information 
during the 2016 election. This chapter includes the results of the coding analysis and quantitative 
study of the newspaper accounts. It identifies a pattern of word choice and style in each of the 
newspapers and contrasts the coverage of the Trump voter with the coverage of the Clinton 
voter, which the coding scheme measured in the exact same way.   
 Offering examples from the quantitative study as well as a quantitative overview of the 
results from the coding analysis, this chapter suggests that understanding the media coverage of 
the election through the lens of Sphere Theory offers a unique insight into the media challenges 
of the 2016 election coverage. It highlights the language used to separate the Trump voter from 
the Clinton  voter and reflects values held by the media as a whole. Through this quantitative and 
qualitative examination of the media content, this study aims identify the shifting roles the media 
played in the election and suggest better practices for voter coverage in future elections.  
 Chapter Five starts with scholarship about the differences in local and national reporting 
and reports the findings of this study on the differences in reporting on the election between 
18 
 
national and local newspapers, specifically USA TODAY, The Washington Post, The New York 
Times and five Pennsylvania papers: The Philadelphia Inquirer, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Public 
Opinion (Chambersburg), Lebanon Daily News, and The Evening Sun (Hanover). This study 
found that local newspapers often covered voters in a more nuanced manner than the national 
media did. It offers one path forward for improvement to election coverage.  
 Chapter Six is an analysis of the debate within the journalistic community about 
campaign coverage immediately following the election. This project examines how journalists 
began this self-examination before the final results were in on Election Day 2016 and follows 
this discussion until Inauguration Day 2017. At that point, Trump’s policy choices dominated the 
news reports and the debate was largely dropped in favor of coverage of the breaking news. As 
the media prepares to cover another presidential election in 2020, some have returned to themes 
of this debate.6 Most have not and the risk is that a lack of understanding about what went wrong 
in 2016 will mean a repeat of these mistakes in future elections.  
 This chapter explores the range of problems and solutions suggested by member of the 
media, especially the political correspondents. The purpose of including an overview of this 
debate in this study is to highlight the problems and potential solutions the media recognized and 
also to highlight what they did not identify. This study suggests that the media was unaware of 
the changing roles they adopted when covering the Trump supporter. Perhaps by understanding 
these shifting roles and the practices associated with them, the media can better cover the 
electorate in future elections. The debate is a hopeful sign that the media is looking for ways to 
adapt.  
 
6  As an example, Dean Baquet, executive editor of the New York Times, discusses “The Lessons of 2016” on the 




 Chapter Seven is the conclusion. For many in the media, the voters who supported Trump 
were threats to society, a deviant part of the electorate that could damage the U.S. democracy. 
Confronted with voters that held very different values than they did, the media sounded an alarm. 
Instead of resorting to normative practices of objective fact-gathering and reporting, political 
reporters shifted into the practices associated with emergencies as outlined in Hallin’s sphere of 
deviance. The result was that the media missed the story of the election and the opportunity to 
discuss the issues that attracted many voters to Trump’s candidacy. By reporting on the voters 
who wanted change in areas once labeled taboo, the media could have facilitated discussion and 
brought more clarity to the election. Instead, Trump voters were painted with the broad brush of 
deviance through delegitimizing cues that signaled to the reader that these voter were outside the 
norm. This framing encouraged the media and their news consumers to dismiss the Trump voter, 
leading to a misunderstanding of the electorate and a missed opportunity to encourage a 
discussion about the issues facing the nation in the 2016 election.  
Conclusion 
 
 Elections are a time that the media really matters in a democracy. Campaign coverage is 
one of the roles that offers a bright light for news organizations: they are still needed. As 
Boczkowski and Mitchelstein (2013) found, the public still turns to the media in elections and 
times of crisis. As the media struggles through these challenges, the role of journalism in a 
democracy has never really changed. The public still needs reliable information about the 
candidates, issues and other voters during an election in order to cast an informed ballot. This 
study suggests through its findings that the media should alter normative practices when 
covering voters in an election. The sphere of legitimate controversy is too narrowly defined by 
elite political actors, including the media itself. Understanding that the electorate is made up of 
20 
 
many different types of voters, with cross-pressured interests and influences, suggests that 
election reporting of voters should be nuanced and issue-oriented. Through a greater reliance on 
sources and facts, the media should aim for its North Star of objectivity and report on all 






Chapter Two: Literary Review 
 
 
 This study aims to add to scholarship on media coverage of an election by 
applying Sphere Theory to the coverage of voters in the 2016 presidential election. It contributes 
to literature that has applied Sphere Theory to media coverage of other political events and 
suggests that understanding the role of the journalist in an election leads to a greater 
understanding of professional practices employed when reporting on voters. This study also 
reviews recent scholarship on the content of media coverage in U.S. presidential elections. Much 
of this scholarship points to trends that are reducing the parameters for what topics are 
considered legitimate debate and which voices are heard in the media during an election. Based 
on this review, this study proposes a changed understanding of Sphere Theory, one where the 
sphere of legitimate controversy is shrinking and an increased number of political actors and 
topics are understood by the media as deviant. The goal of this review is to explain Sphere 
Theory, the scholarship that has employed the theory, review literature that explores trends in 
media coverage of elections (which would fall into the sphere of legitimate controversy) and 
explain how this study adds to this body of work. 
The case for sphere theory 
 
  Schudson (2003) applied Sphere Theory to an examination of journalism content 
following the 9/11 terrorist attack. “Hallin’s conceptualization is useful and clarifying,” (p. 40) 
he wrote. Like Schudson and others (Carlson 2016, Billard 2016, Luther and Miller 2005, 
Murray et. al. 2008, Taylor 2014) this study argues that Sphere Theory is an excellent tool to 
study media coverage of moments of political upheaval. Sphere Theory is a particularly useful 
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tool to measure the media content of the 2016 election coverage and any election in which the 
media perceives the electorate to be acting in an unexpected manner. It suggests that the media 
was following professional standards in their coverage of the voters in 2016 but was unaware of 
the shifting roles they were fulfilling during the election. Identifying that the media employs 
different professional standards while fulfilling different roles in society, Sphere Theory offers a 
method to measure normative practices during times of change. It also recognizes the shifting 
roles that the media plays in a community and how those roles affect professional norms. 
Focusing on the changing nature of how a political event or actor is perceived by the media, it is 
more precise than agenda setting theories, although it fits in that tradition. Similarly, Sphere 
Theory recognizes framing as a journalistic tool and identifies framing as a method to measure 
practice.  
Sphere Theory was developed by Hallin in 1986 to explore coverage of the Vietnam War, 
which shifted as public attitudes toward the conflict changed. It has most commonly been 
applied to the study of media coverage of war protestors (Luther and Miller 2005, Murray et. al. 
2008, Taylor 2014) because protestors are often identified as deviant when a war begins but as a 
it drags on and public acceptance of a conflict wanes, the media adapts its understanding of these 
political actors and recognizes them differently. Hallin developed Sphere Theory to help 
understand the media’s response to political change and identify areas for improved political 
coverage. As a theory, it resonates with the changing political environment of the 2016 election 
and recognizes the challenges of covering Trump supporters.  
 Understanding election coverage through the lens of Sphere Theory, it becomes clearer 
that the challenge for the media in 2016 was the shifting normative practices that the changing 
political landscape required. Confronted with voters who were outside the norm, journalists 
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shifted spheres. No longer were they working within the sphere of legitimate controversy, they  
had shifted to the sphere of deviance. Professional practice in the sphere of deviance is different 
and does not rely on the pursuit of objectivity. Instinctively, much of the media reported on and 
framed the Trump voter as a deviant element of society that threatened democracy.  
Based on the survey of journalistic responses to the election (see Chapter 7), this study 
suggests that this shift was not perceptible to the professional journalists assigned to cover the 
presidential election. The media shifted practices because that is normative practice when 
confronted with voters understood to be outside the norm. For the seasoned journalist, these 
shifts are routine practice. Assigned to cover a story within the sphere of legitimate controversy, 
journalists report by gathering facts, interviewing sources on both (or many) sides of a topic and 
writing a report using language that is neutral and accurate. Assigned to cover a topic or source 
outside this sphere, professional practice changes. These practices include identifying the deviant 
element through language that frames the source or event as abnormal or dangerous. Journalists 
do not remain neutral when faced with this type of story; rather, their role is to alert the 
community. (Professional practice in sphere theory is explored more fully below). What made 
the 2016 election difficult to cover accurately was the unrecognized shift from the sphere of 
legitimate controversy to the sphere of deviance that occurred when covering the Trump voter. 
 At the same time, many scholars (Bennett 2016, 2017; Patterson 2016; Cook 2006; 
Hallin 1992) have demonstrated that some trends in professional practice have developed over 
time within the sphere of legitimate controversy that might discourage the exploration of 
different types of voters by media outlets. The sphere of legitimate controversy is the coverage of 
elections with which most news consumers are familiar. It includes presidential campaigns, voter 
coverage, and an exploration of the issues raised during an election. This study suggests this area 
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of journalism is getting smaller, encouraging more journalism to fall into the other two spheres 
of coverage: consensus and deviance.  
This study adds to the body of scholarship that has applied Sphere Theory to media 
coverage. Below is a greater exploration of how Sphere Theory has been applied and how this 
study builds on that scholarship by expanding it to the coverage of voters. The concept that the 
sphere of legitimate controversy is being restricted is also a new suggestion. It follows from a 
rich body of scholarship that has documented changing normative practices over decades. 
Understanding these changes through the existing literature, it is not much of a leap to view the 
sphere of legitimate controversy -- the public arena for political debate --  as shrinking. As a 
result, this chapter also explores scholarship on normative practices in an election.  
Finally, this study examines voter coverage through the lens of newspaper content. This 
study will focus on content produced by three national newspapers and five Pennsylvania 
newspapers. These organizations are older, sometimes called “the legacy press” and have lost 
readership and revenue with the rise of social media. Yet several points suggest these news 
organizations are the best site for studying election coverage. First, these news organizations are 
high profile, professional news outlets with dedicated political reporting staffs. In a study on the 
effects of traditional media on the news agenda during elections, Harder et al. (2017) drew a 
distinction between news produced through journalism practice and information produced and 
passed along by social media. Traditional media legitimize news and offer context while social 
media offers speed but often is passing along information that is not newsworthy, Harder found.  
The eight newspapers, local and national, included in this study practice journalism and produce 
news content. Patterson (2016) demonstrated that traditional news organizations, specifically 
newspapers, focused on issue coverage more than other types of news outlets. If this is a study of 
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journalism and its role in democracy, it is best to study news organizations that promote 
professional journalism and aim to fully cover issues and the voters.  
Second, newspapers are important actors in the interconnected, hybrid flow of 
information. Intermedia agenda setting studies are premised on the concept that content flows to 
and from old news platforms to new ones and that journalists are influenced by the content 
produced by other news organizations. Most political communication scholars place traditional 
news media as an important element in the flow chart of news production (McCombs et. al.2014; 
Funk and McCombs 2017). Scholarship on the role of traditional newspapers in intermedia 
agenda setting during an election points to a greater role for traditional news outlets. Harder et. 
al. (2017) identified “highly regarded media outlets” such as The New York Times and The 
Washington Post as important influences on the content choices of other news organizations. As 
McCombs (2014) describe “prominent media” influence the content of other, smaller news 
organizations.  
Partisanship and Polarization in the Media 
 
Scholarship on partisanship and polarization in the media is a field that has grown in 
response to the growth and success of partisan media organizations. Much scholarship has 
focused on right-wing news outlets and their role in the spread of disinformation. Jamieson and 
Capella (2008) outlined the rise of a conservative media that operates like an echo chamber, 
anchored by outlets such as Rush Limbaugh’s radio program. The study highlighted a growing 
number of media outlets attracting an audience of like-minded listeners that reinforced 
conservative beliefs. Levendusky (2013) added to this field by finding that partisan media outlets 
have a strong effect on citizens with “extreme” political views and that these citizens pull their 
political parties further from the political center, thereby contributing to greater polarization 
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across society. After the 2016 presidential election, Druckman and Levendusky (2018) refined 
this argument and suggested that partisan media outlets have a stronger effect than previously 
realized because of a “two-step” communication system in which viewers or readers of partisan 
outlets share what they read to others, mainly through social media. While both the left and the 
right have media outlets aimed at partisan audiences, Faris et.al. (2017) added that right and left-
leaning outlets are “rooted in different traditions and journalistic practices,” (p.1) and that right-
wing outlets ignored professional norms more often than left-wing outlets. 
Similarly, Benkler et. al. (2018) argue that the spread of disinformation in the 2018 
election stems from a decades-old split between right-wing media and all other news outlets. The 
rise of Fox News, Brietbart News and others created an “asymmetric media ecosystem” that was 
in place and ready to amplify narratives that supported the conservative agenda during the 
election, the authors argue. Benkler et. al. use the term “radicalization” as opposed to 
“polarization” to describe right-wing media outlets because they did not find a symmetry 
between the practices of right and left-leaning media outlets. Not only did false narratives 
circulate among the conservative outlets, the study argues, but these narratives also spilled into 
the mainstream media which sometimes promoted them unchecked.  
Julian Sanchez, a Cato Institute scholar, coined the term “epistemic closure” to describe 
the lack of insight and interrogation that right wing media outlets promoted and the imbalance 
between right-wing and left-wing media outlets. “So suppose it’s true that there’s a real 
asymmetry here—the obvious question, if we’re going to sideline the cheap partisan explanation 
that conservatism intrinsically appeals to the stupid or closed minded, is why this should be true 
now,”7 Sanchez wrote six years before the 2016 election. Scholarship on polarization and 
 




partisanship in the media offers an important explanation of the political landscape of the 2016 
election. It suggests that a portion of the electorate felt alienated from the “mainstream” and 
turned to a radicalized media eco-system, which in turn failed to adhere to professional norms in 
reporting the news. So the question, as Sanchez asked, is why?  
 There is a correlation between this study and the scholarship on polarization in the 
media. This study aims to add insight into how the voter in the 2016 election was covered. It 
suggests that the mainstream media framed the Trump voter as a deviant part of the electorate 
and that this, in turn, led to a misunderstanding of the election by the media and their news 
consumers. Understanding the voter coverage using Sphere Theory recognizes that professional 
norms encouraged this practice and discouraged an exploration of the issues important to this 
slice of the electorate. Presumably some of the same voters that were dismissed in the election 
coverage were also consumers of right-wing media (although that presumption ignores nuances 
within the electorate including voters who supported Obama in 2012 then Trump in 2016 and 
voters who were consumers of multiple outlets rather than just openly partisan media). This 
study will not answer Sanchez’s question of why voters were turning to a radicalized media 
system leading up to the 2012 or 2016 election. Nor will it add to the exhaustive studies by 
scholars such as Benkler (2018) and Faris (2017). It aims instead to offer insight into how the 
voters in general, and conservative voters in particular, are understood by the mainstream media 
and suggests that through improved normative practice the media can be a source of information 
about the wide range of political perspectives that currently make up the American democracy. It 
might also contribute to a greater understanding of why those voters are seeking out a 
“radicalized” media eco-system and, presumably, rejecting the mainstream press.  




Hallin (1986) developed Sphere Theory to explain journalistic approaches to coverage of 
the Vietnam War, which changed in tone and practice over time. The theory outlines three 
“spheres” of journalistic practice: consensus, legitimate controversy and deviance. Sphere theory 
holds that journalists employ different normative practices depending on the perception of the 
news event he or she is covering. The sphere model is drawn as three concentric circles similar to 
a donut (See Figure 1). The innermost circle is labeled the sphere of consensus, the middle circle 
is the sphere of legitimate controversy and the outermost, which is unbounded in the model, is 
the sphere of deviance. Each sphere has different standards of journalistic practice and the 
boundaries of the spheres are fluid. A topic or actor can fall into the sphere of consensus, flow 
into the sphere of legitimate controversy and end in the sphere of deviance. It can flow in any 














 Figure 1         
 
Legitimate controversy 
The sphere of legitimate controversy is the most recognizable form of journalism in the 
U.S. This is where objectivity is the normative goal for the media and the press aims to cover 
different sides of an issue or news event without partisanship. When covering news events in the 
sphere of legitimate controversy, journalists strive to serve as a neutral observer of topics 
understood to be central to the functioning of a democracy. Hallin called this sphere the “stuff of 
democracy” (p.116). Topics that are introduced in the sphere of legitimate controversy are 
“recognized as such by the major established actors of the American political process” (p.116). 
For example, elections, issue debate and breaking news events are topics that fill this sphere of 
coverage. The limits of this sphere “are defined primarily by the two-party system, by the 
parameters of debate between and within the Democratic and Republican parties and the 










political actors define the boundaries of the sphere of legitimate controversy, determining which 
topics are part of the agenda and which are not. Bennett (2016) called this practice “indexing,” 
which he defined as the “tendency of mainstream news organizations to index or adjust the range 
of viewpoints in a story to the dominant positions of those whom the journalists perceive to have 
enough power to affect the outcome of a situation” p.16). Hallin’s description of how topics and 
actors are accepted into the sphere of legitimate controversy does not use the term “indexing,” 
yet Bennett’s description fits with Hallin’s. Indexing describes a practice in which the media rely 
on those in power to define the political agenda and, in return, the media meets professional 
practices of writing about topics likely to be debated and voted on. It limits the discussion of 
what is legitimate political topics and whose voices are heard in a debate, but it also allows the 
media to focus its resources and produce copy efficiently.  
Journalists signal to their news consumers that a topic falls into the sphere of legitimate 
controversy through the use of framing and word choice. In Hallin’s study of the Vietnam War, 
early coverage was characterized by the framing of government officials, generals, politicians 
with legitimizing cues and war protestors with de-legitimizing cues. As the political climate 
changed and public opinion turned against the war, these legitimizing cues shifted and sources 
such as war protestors moved from the sphere of deviance to the sphere of legitimate 
controversy.  
Professional practice within the sphere of legitimate controversy is the pursuit of 
objectivity, or as Hallin described, “the routines of objective journalism” (p.6). Once a topic for 
coverage has been chosen, the journalist then pursues that topic using fact-based reporting that 
relies on information from sources and strives to include two or more sides of each conflict or 
debate. This is where “journalists seek conscientiously to be balanced and objective” (Schudson, 
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2002). Yet, as many scholars agree (Schudson, 1978; Mindich, 1998; Nord, 2001), objectivity is 
difficult to define. As a central tenet to Sphere Theory, this study will explore the history and 
definition of objectivity as a central tenet of American journalism.  
Objectivity 
Mindich (1998) argued that objectivity is a term often described in negatives and not 
understood by the profession that embraces it. He defined objectivity as having five parts: 
factivity, detachment, balance, use of the inverted pyramid and nonpartisanship. Factivity is the 
reliance on facts to report a story (see an exploration of its history below). Detachment is related 
and means the reporter follows the facts and does not allow preconceived ideas to interfere with 
reporting. Nonpartisanship is an ethic that encourages the reporter to offer all sides of the story 
fairly. Balance means offering undistorted reporting that presents two or more sides of an issue. 
Finally, Mindich defines objectivity as requiring the use of the inverted pyramid, which is the 
ranking of facts in a news report from most important to least and presenting those facts to the 
news consumer in that order.  
According to many journalism scholars (Schudson, 1978; Mindich, 1998; Nord, 2001), 
journalists adopted objectivity as a normative goal during the Progressive Era (1890-1920) when 
reformers were crusading for large-scale social and political change. Newspapers became an 
important part of the reforms when journalists moved into the role of investigative reporters, 
relying on facts and sources to expose corruption and fraud. Nord explains that the era idealized 
facts and emphasized the power of the individual to understand and absorb information through 
their own lens, which would then lead to civic action. Nord called this “factivity” and described 
it as a belief system based on the premise that pure, unbiased facts allow for inductive reasoning. 
Nord argues that the journalism practice of neutrally presenting facts to the reader draws on the 
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Protestant view that inductive reasoning is a path to God. Through facts any individual can arrive 
at a truth and become closer to God. Facts, according to the understanding at the time, were pure 
and journalists were considered a central part of the discovery of truth, according to Nord. 
Understanding the roots of this concept, it is easier to understand how objectivity became the 
“North Star” and “supreme diety” of modern U.S. journalism, as Mindich  described (p. 10).  
Objectivity is an important concept when understanding of Sphere Theory. When 
journalists are using a non-partisan tone, seeking out multiple perspectives on a topic, ranking 
facts without bias, following the facts using source-based reporting and presenting those facts in 
a balanced manner, those journalists are operating within the sphere of legitimate controversy. 
Outside this sphere, in either the sphere of deviance and/or consensus, objectivity is not the 
norm. It is fair to argue that objectivity is an elusive term and therefore Sphere Theory suffers 
from relying on a concept that is difficult to define. However, as Mindich  argues, it is the basis 
of most professional practice. Journalists are taught to gather facts and report them in a neutral 
and objective manner. Hallin seems to have used objectivity as a short-hand for normative 
practices that promote balance and fairness when covering political events. It is fair to argue that 
a deeper, more nuanced definition of what makes up objective practice in the sphere of legitimate 
controversy could improve the theory. Nevertheless, Hallin’s description of when objectivity is 
the normative goal is very clear -- it lies squarely in the sphere of legitimate controversy and is 







Understood Through Sphere Theory 
 
Confronted with CONSENSUS      Framed positively, Lack of objectivity 
(Patriotism, Holidays, Tradition) 
 
Confronted with LEGITIMATE CONTROVERSY         Framed neutrally, Objectivity Rules 
(Elections, political debate, social issues) 
 
Confronted with DEVIANCE                             Framed Negatively, Lack of Objectivity 
(Unacceptable social behavior,  
Threats to democracy) 
 
Figure 2        
Sphere of Consensus 
The sphere of consensus is found in the center (the ‘donut hole’) of the model. This is the 
area of shared beliefs. The role of the journalist in the sphere of consensus is to emphasize and 
reinforce shared values. They are community builders. Examples of stories that derive from the 
sphere of consensus are stories about children or pets that are endearing, weather that is 
threatening, holidays and traditions. Because these values are so commonly accepted and shared, 
journalism practice does not require objectivity. There is no need to seek an alternative opinion 
about whether a snowstorm is disruptive or a fireman is a hero for rushing into the burning 
building. In fact, that would be jarring and inappropriate to the reader or the viewer because the 
point of the report is to recognize and reinforce the consensus of opinion.  
Schudson’s (2002) study of post-9/11 journalism differed from most applications of 
Sphere Theory, which have focused on the sphere of legitimate controversy or the sphere of 
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deviance. Schudson found that in the weeks following the attacks, the media operated within the 
sphere of consensus as defined by Hallin. This shift, from the sphere of legitimate controversy to 
the sphere of consensus, was instantaneous and focused primarily on the lack of objectivity. 
“U.S. journalists instinctively and willingly abandon the effort to report from a neutral stance,” 
Schudson wrote when confronted with events that they identify as falling within the sphere of 
consensus. Schudson identified those events as tragedies, public danger, threats to national 
security and the events of 9/11 fell into this sphere. This shift from one sphere to another – and 
the normative practices that accompany it --happen instantly when the media recognizes an event 
as outside the sphere of legitimate controversy: “(J)ournalists shifted modes as if changing to 
another musical key or switching to a different language,” (p.40), Schudson wrote. He is 
highlighting an important element of Sphere Theory: the shifting nature of coverage based on the 
journalist’s perceived role. Schudson described the language and framing of the news reports 
following 9/11 as “priestly” or “pastoral” and identified examples of news reports that 
emphasized shared community values and the “intimacy” of the shared experience of 9/11. This 
is different than media reports that stem from the sphere of legitimate controversy, where this 
tone would be inappropriate. But confronted with a shared national tragedy, the media shifted 
their tone and practices to reflect the shared community value of outrage and sorrow, Schudson 
argues. 
Hallin’s description of the sphere of consensus reflects a rich field of scholarship that 
understands the journalist as a community builder. Robinson (2014) edited an entire issue of 
Journalism Practice devoted to the topic of community-based journalism. She defined it this 
way: “community-based journalism should emphasize the “local” in all of us: that is, the idea 
that we can be among community as long as we are connected in some way to others,” (p.1). 
35 
 
Carey (1997) identified the importance of journalism in community building in the U.S and 
defined two roles for the media in the U.S. democratic system: the model of information and the 
model of conversation, with the latter being most important. Communication, he pointed out, 
draws from the same root words as community and common and he argued in favor of a greater 
role for the journalist in developing conversations around shared community values. Hermes 
(2006) urges journalism research to focus on more on the interconnection of journalism and 
community. Graber and Dunaway (2017) point to a reduced number of community newspapers 
as a source of concern for the future of U.S. election coverage.  
Sphere of Deviance 
 
 On the other side of Hallin’s model is deviance. In this sphere falls the identification of 
actors, events, and trends that threaten a community. In the model, the sphere of deviance falls 
outside the center. For Hallin, this is the “realm of those political actors and views which 
journalists and the political mainstream of society reject as being unworthy of being heard” (p. 
117). The role of the journalist is to disregard or denounce these types of stories, set the 
boundaries of political consensus and defend “the limits of acceptable political conflict” (p. 117). 
The definition of this zone shifts over time as norms of acceptability shift. In the past, stories 
about same-sex marriage or extramarital affairs by politicians might have fallen into this 
category but now fall into the sphere of legitimate controversy. Hallin recognized that one way to 
mark something as deviant is to withhold coverage. Billard noted that invisibility, or the media’s 
refusal to cover a topic or source, is one way the media can mark a topic as outside the sphere of 
legitimate concern and in the sphere of deviance. That is one reason the model has this sphere as 
unbounded, because the topics unaddressed are limitless.  
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When the media covers an event or source that falls into the sphere of deviance, 
journalists employ frames that signal the deviant nature of the subject. Luther and Miller called 
these frames “delegitimizing cue words” (p. 3). Taylor studied the shifting nature of political 
issues and identified times when topics or sources moved from legitimate to delegitimized or in 
the reverse direction. Journalists signaled changes in legitimacy through “subtle lexical choices” 
(p. 48), Taylor found. Most research using Hallin’s sphere of deviance has focused on the 
coverage of war protestors (Luther and Miller 2005, Murray et. al. 2008, Taylor 2014). This is a 
natural outgrowth of Hallin’s initial research on the media coverage of the Vietnam War. 
However, Billard  expanded the realm of this application to examine media coverage of 
transgender people. Billard operationalized the concept of delegitimizing language used to signal 
deviance with the development of a list of legitimacy indicators. Billard’s study highlighted the 
transient nature of the sphere of deviance. Discussion of transgender people is moving from the 
sphere of deviance into the sphere of legitimate controversy much as topics such as gay marriage 
have moved. Billard credits this shift to changing social attitudes, however, and argues that the 
media follows rather than leads in areas of social change. This study builds on this scholarship to 
expand Sphere Theory to the media coverage of voters during an election. 
Agenda Setting 
To understand sphere theory more fully, it is helpful to explore the broader field it falls 
into: agenda setting, which is the concept that when the media highlights a particular issues or 
event, it draws greater public attention to those issues and events, (Iyengar, 2017). Not only does 
the media’s choice of topics matter, but so does the way the topic is covered, according to 
Iyengar. The concept grew out research on the effect of the media on the public, especially in 
political news coverage. Early research on media effects focused on the propaganda model, 
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which assumed that the media had the power to change the opinion of voters (Herman and 
Chomsky1988). However, scholarship on media effects soon shifted to accept a minimal effect 
of the media on the consumer. In the famous Elmira Study, Berelson et. al. (1954) studied 
influences on voter choice in the 1948 presidential election. Based on the results of this study, 
Berelson formulated the minimal effects model, which found that voters were influenced by 
factors closer to home such as family and friends and that the mediate. Building on this concept, 
Campbell et. al. (1976) developed the “funnel of causality” model that emphasizes the 
importance of socio-economic factors when a voter is choosing party identification, which then 
factors into which policy issues and political campaigns that voter will choose to support. The 
Berelson studies came to be known as the Columbia model, which emphasized the setting of the 
voter and the Campbell studies as the Michigan study, which emphasized party identification. 
Both schools argue that media coverage of a campaign matters less than other factors and 
therefore the media has a limited effect on the voting behavior of the electorate. Iyengar and 
Kinder (1987) explored the role of “priming,” which they defined as the media (especially 
television) “calling attention to some matters while ignoring others” (p.63). In presidential 
campaigns, this can mean raising the importance of an event or issue at the expense of others or 
focusing on the horserace aspect of the election at the expense of issues. Hundreds of subsequent 
studies in agenda setting have parsed the different effects of the media on the voting public. 
Oates (2008) argues that despite the fact that news reports have minimal effects on how a voter 
chooses a candidate, the media matters in a democratic society because it provides information to 
the voters that helps them match preferences to political candidates, it helps voters establish 
long-term political party preference, and media reports can help sway close elections or 
contested issue debates. 
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Intermedia Agenda Setting 
Intermedia agenda setting studies are premised on the concept that content flows to and 
from old news platforms to new ones and that journalists are influenced by the content produced 
by other news organizations. Recent scholarship on the role of traditional newspapers in 
intermedia agenda setting during an election points to a greater role for traditional news outlets. 
While this study acknowledges the minimal effects of the media it also recognizes that many 
studies have shown newspapers are important actors in the interconnected, hybrid flow of 
information. Harder et. al.  (2017) points to the rise of public participation in the gathering of 
news. Events can be reported with greater speed when citizens witness it and post to social 
media. The public has come to expect speedy reporting of breaking news and this works against 
the professional reporting of an event by journalists. However, Harder found that social media 
lacks the power to set the agenda of conversation in the same manner as professional news sites. 
Chadwick et. al. (2013) identified the interconnection between traditional news sites and social 
media, calling it a hybrid flow of information, where social media often serves as an echo 
chamber to news gathered by professional organizations. Most political communication scholars 
place traditional news media as an important element in the flowchart of news production 
(Chadwick, 2013; Oates and Moe, 2016; McCombs, Shaw and Weaver, 2014). 
Harder identified “highly regarded media outlets” such as The New York Times and The 
Washington Post as important influences on the content choices of other news organizations. 
While McCombs (2014) found that “prominent media” influence the content of other, smaller 
news organizations. The newspapers chosen for this study are news organizations that are older 
than social media sites and are sometimes called “the legacy press.” Newspapers have lost 
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readership and revenue with the rise of social media.8 Yet, major U.S. newspapers are still high 
profile, professional news outlets with professional political reporting staffs that reach millions 
of readers daily in their print and digital editions. In a study on the effects of traditional media on 
the news agenda during elections, Harder et al. (2017) drew a distinction between news produced 
through journalism practice and information produced and passed along by social media. 
Traditional media outlets often lag behind social media in announcing and spreading news but 
professional media outlets add “value” to the information by legitimizing it as important to 
society and placing the facts in context, Harder said. Because of the hybrid nature of the news 
flow -- the numerous streams of information and constant flux of incoming information -- it is 
often difficult to measure the effect of one outlet on the other, Harder wrote. Yet some outlets, 
such as The Washington Post and The New York Times, are highly regarded and still influence 
the news agenda of other media outlets, he wrote.  
Framing 
Within agenda studies, scholars have focused much research on the content of media 
coverage. Through word choice, story placement, sources used and other journalistic tools, the 
journalist “frames” how the reader, listener or viewer understands the news that is being 
reported. Entman (1993) helped apply the idea of framing to journalism based on sociologist 
Erving Goffman’s concept of framing as a tool used to describe complex ideas, the process 
through which societies reproduce meaning. Framing theory is based on the assumption that how 
a text is written, or framed, will influence how the audience understands it. Entman defined 
 
8The estimated total U.S. daily newspaper circulation (print and digital combined) in 2017 was 31 million for 
weekday and 34 million for Sunday, down 11% and 10%, respectively, from the previous year, according to the Pew 




framing as “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52). Framing is an 
inherent part of journalism. McQuail (2005) states that it is “almost impossible” for a journalist 
to avoid using frames because they allow the writer to explain complex ideas in relation to facts 
the reader already understands (p. 378).  When producing a broadcast or news article, journalists 
employ all four elements of framing, according to Entman. Framing theory allows journalism 
scholars to unwind the production of a news report to recognize how the journalist packaged the 
news event he or she was reporting on. Within that packaging are fingerprints of the reporter, 
whether the reporter was trying to personalize the event or not. He or she chooses a way to 
define the event, place it in context, laces the report with moral judgement, and presents potential 
solutions to the issue at hand, according to framing theory.  
Since Entman’s definition, many scholars have applied, refined and debated framing 
theory. Scheufele (1999) developed the concept of  “frame building” which is the process of 
creating frames that the media and public easily recognize. To study frame building is to 
examine the processes that contribute to the creation of a frame for communication. Some debate 
whether framing inherently includes a bias and how that bias affects the relationship between 
journalism and politics. Robinson (2002) states that the terms “slant” and “bias” is 
interchangeable with “frame” (p.137). On the other side, Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) argue 
that most journalists do not aim to “spin” a story or “deceive” their audience when using frames. 
They argue that framing is a “necessary tool” and is designed to help reduce the complexity of 
the issues journalists report (p.12). Scheufele and Iyengar (2017) argue that framing studies have 
been confounded with agenda setting and priming. They distinguish framing effect research as 
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the study of communication effects that are “not due to differences in what is being 
communicated, but rather to variations in how a given piece of information is being presented” 
(p. 620). Scheufele and Tewksbury, who guest-edited the special edition of the Journal of 
Communication dedicated to the study of framing, argue that a lack of agreement or even 
understanding about how to conceptualize framing, agenda setting and priming theory has led to 
“inefficiency and even gridlock” in the field (p.18). Matthes (2009) supports this assessment. His 
study of international journal articles found that the term “framing” was defined in widely 
inconsistent manners and that most studies failed to include the fourth part of Entman’s 
definition, moral evaluations, as part of their studies. 
This study recognizes the importance of framing theory. Election coverage requires the 
communication of complicated ideas to the public. This is arguably the most important role the 
media can play in a democracy. As a result, the language and images used by the media to 
communicate the events and issues involved in a presidential campaign can influence how the 
public understands the election. This study is based on the premise that the language used to 
describe the Trump voter in the 2016 election identified that voter as deviant and outside the 
norm of society. Hallin’s Sphere Theory, which falls into the general category of framing theory, 
specifically identifies the situations when journalists would use deviant frames as opposed to 
frames that identify the voters as within the sphere of legitimate controversy. This study aims to  
contribute to the field of framing theory and ,more specifically Sphere Theory, by applying this 
lens to the content of election coverage and an analysis of the framing of the voter. 
Content of the 2016 Media Election Coverage 
 This study suggests that the sphere of legitimate controversy is getting smaller due to 
practices that are considered the norm in newsrooms and have been documented in previous 
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scholarship. Below is an exploration of these practices and how they affect the range of debate 
and the number of sources included in the media discussion of elections.  
Issue Coverage  
 
Many studies have documented journalistic changes that minimize the examination of 
issues during a political campaign (Patterson 2016; Bennett 2017). Patterson has focused his 
studies on media reports during an election, arguably the most important time period for issue 
coverage in a democracy. Over the past 20 years, Patterson (2017) outlined a pattern of coverage 
that de-emphasizes the examination of political issues. His studies newspaper coverage of the 
2016 election overwhelmingly focused on the horserace aspect of the election. The study 
identified 42 percent of newspaper articles published during the Trump/Clinton election cycle 
focused on which candidate was ahead in the polls or likely to lead in the polls. (The study 
identified more than 100 polls published between August 8 and Election Day, more than one poll 
released a day.) Controversies involving the candidates or their staff made up the next most 
common topic, compromising 17 percent of the stories. Only 10 percent of the sample studied 
newspaper articles published during the 2016 election focused on the issues important to the 
voters. In addition, Patterson’s study identified that a large percentage of those stories were not 
on the substance of the issue, but rather controversy about the candidates’ policy commitments 
or a change in the candidate’s position. Covering the election as a horserace between candidates 
is a pattern that has increased over each presidential election for the past twenty years, according 
to Patterson. Journalists chose to write about the horserace four times as often as they wrote 
about how Clinton or Trump would handle public policy issues if elected president. This framing 
reduces an election to a contest, similar to a sporting event. Jamieson and Cappelli (1997) 
studied voter response to this type of election coverage. They found that voters responded 
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positively to issue-based coverage and negatively to horse-race style coverage, responses that 
included signs of depressed learning and increased cynicism. 
Negative Bias 
Patterson’s other important finding in his study of the election coverage of the past 
twenty years was a media bias toward the negative. His studies found that the majority of 
election stories that are negative in tone and far outnumbered stories that focused on positive 
elements of the campaign. In the 2016 election, Patterson calculated a 19 percent increase in 
media reports that were negative in tone compared to the average number of negative stories in 
the six preceding presidential elections. Patterson found that during some weeks of the post-
convention election coverage, the ratio of negative stories to positive stories was 10 to 1: “The 
real bias of the press is not that it’s liberal. Its bias is a decided preference for the negative” (p. 
19). Watts and Rothschild (2017) conducted a similar study focused only on The New York 
Times in the last few weeks of the election. Their results mirrored those of Patterson. Watts and 
Rothschild found that front page stories in The New York Times about the campaign focused 
overwhelmingly on scandals or controversies involving the candidate, with far fewer articles that 
covered policy issues. Their results found 291 articles about scandal or controversy compared to 
70 that mentioned policy issues, with most of those offering little to no detail on those issues.  
Watts and Rothschild wrote that the concerns about social media spreading false information 
during the election “diverts attention from the culpability of the mainstream media itself,”  (np). 
That culpability, the authors argue, is focusing on the negative at the expense of the issues. 
Journalism is meant to expose negative aspects of politics, Patterson wrote, “(y)et an 
incessant stream of criticism has a corrosive effect. It needlessly erodes trust in political leaders 
and institutions and undermines confidence in government and policy,” (p. 18). In addition, 
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Patterson argued that “bashing both sides” does not create an objective perspective. It blurs 
distinctions of magnitude. The media reports “all the ugly stuff they can find and leave it to the 
voters to decide what to make of it,” (p. 19). This type of reporting creates false equivalences and 
distorts distinctions among controversies, policy platforms, and major differences among the 
candidates. The effect is anger toward journalists by the public because news reports highlight 
negative aspects of society and a loss of effectiveness when journalists do report important 
events or expose wrongdoing.  Journalists “lose the bite of the watchdog when everyone and 
everything is condemned,” Patterson argues (p. 20).  
Informing the Public 
Like Patterson, Bennett (2017) agrees that the media’s watchdog role has been 
diminished. Bennett points to the media’s reliance on official sources as the reason. Because 
journalists rely on sources that are in power, they are less likely to see and report on wrongdoing, 
he argues. During an election, this means talking to party officials, pollsters, elected officials, 
candidates and even other journalists rather than talking to the voter, exploring the issues that 
matter to the voting public or exposing wrongdoing. Adding to the diminished role of a 
watchdog, Bennett argues that media reports have shifted toward sensationalism and soft news in 
the past twenty years. 
 Zaller (2003) famously defended the rise of soft news and sensationalism, arguing that 
the media should adapt to a public that was not interested in democratic debate. Zaller called for 
a new, less demanding media system that only provided citizens with minimal information about 
the workings of government and policy issues. Zaller argued that criticism of soft news and 
sensationalism was based on an unrealistic ideal of citizens in a democracy. Instead of constantly 
informing the electorate, the media should aim to simply alert the public when government fails 
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to operate as it should similar to a burglar alarm, Zaller argued. The media consumer would act 
as a “monitorial citizen” ignoring the process of governance until the media sounds an alarm.  
Bennett (2003) called Zaller’s argument “perfectly backward” and dismissed the idea that 
the media’s obligation to inform the public was an “onerous” obligation. He argued that the 
public had become desensitized to a media that was always trying to attract new consumers 
through sensationalized news reports. The “incessant ringing of alarms about dubious problems,” 
not important to the functioning of democracy but good for ratings has soured the public’s 
relationship with the media, Bennett argued (2003, p. 131). The news consumer fails to be 
alarmed when the media constantly draws its attention to matters that are not important, Bennett 
wrote. Zaller’s argument that public should take a passive role, waiting for the press to sound 
alarms to wake up, ignores this desensitization. In addition, Bennett argued, the burglar alarm 
system fails to account for false alarms when the media hypes a story. It also fails to account for 
moments when the media fails to sound the alarm, either through a failure to uncover the 
problem or a desire to report on stories with higher audience interest. Finally, Bennett argued, the 
idea that the news system is either a collection of soft news or a series of issue-related stories that 
turn off the public is a false argument. Both types of reporting exist in most major news 
organizations and, depending on the news flow, the balance of those two types of stories 
fluctuates. 
Bennett said the real issues isn’t that the public isn’t capable of following news reports 
important to a democratic debate. It is that the media outlets have sounded a false alarm about 
stories that are not important to the functioning of democracy. The result is that readers and 
audiences tune out the coverage and are turned off by the press, according to Bennett. This in 
turn encourages a more dramatic approach. Politicians use stronger, ‘shriller” language to get the 
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attention of an audience that is turned off and the press uses more dramatic language to call 
attention to topics that are not urgent, Bennett writes.   
Narrative Driven News 
Narrative-driven news consists of media reports that are packaged to fit a narrative theme 
where journalists are the storytellers. Narrative style has two slightly different meanings in 
journalism scholarship. As Bennett (2017) articulates, one school sees journalists as emerging 
into cultural storytellers, defining the national identity through their interpretation of news events 
(Gans 1979; Barnhurst and Nerone 2001). The other school understands narrative news as the 
increasing role of journalists as analysts, explaining news events in their own voice (Hallin 
1992). Both perspectives recognize a shift away from source-based reporting and analysis to 
explain news event.  Bennett argues that narrative-driven news has risen and journalists “have 
stepped more into the center of news stories than in earlier periods” (2017, p. 253). Hallin found 
that as sound bites decreased, the media’s control over the story frames increased. Journalists 
began using the words of politicians and other sources as “raw material” to support a news frame 
developed by the reporter. 
Narrative style also includes the use of journalists as experts. During the 2016 campaign, 
Bennett identified the trend of journalists to interview other journalists assigned to the same story 
as part of their reporting. In addition, journalists often stepped into the role of pundit and 
commentator in their own articles and broadcasts, blending newsgathering with analysis. 
Offering their own opinion on a news event, journalists are changing the role of the reporter. 
Bennett (2016, 2017), Patterson (2016), and Hallin (1992) argue that this practice, which seems 
to violate professional norms of objectivity, is a central part of narrative style journalism. 
Identifying themselves as political insiders rather than objective observers, journalists become 
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their own experts. The descriptive style of reporting based on who, what, where, and when has 
shifted to an interpretative style that requires an answer to “why,” with the voice of the 
journalists providing the answers (Patterson 2017).  
Shrinking Soundbite 
In his 1992 study, Hallin identified another major change in the nature of media in a 
separate, later study. In his study titled “Sound Bite Democracy,” Hallin identified that the 
content of news broadcasts had shifted dramatically to allow the journalist to speak more and 
offered sources far less time to present their own perspectives. Hallin found that over a twenty-
year period from 1968-1988 the average soundbite on television news had shrunk from 43 
seconds to 8.9 seconds. During the 1968 Nixon-Humphrey election, Hallin reported that nearly 
25 percent of evening news soundbites were more than a minute, some as long as two minutes. 
By the 1988 presidential election, soundbites were only long enough to cover a quick quip such 
as Bush’s “Read my lips: no new taxes.” Soundbites represent the amount of time a source is 
able to present his or her perspective of a news event during the course of a broadcast. A 
reduction in the soundbite time means less time for sources to speak in their own voice. At the 
same time, Hallin found that the length of the news broadcast did not shrink dramatically. The 
shrinking soundbite represented a shift in the style of news delivery that once relied on the 
information and words of sources but now focuses on a packaged story narrated by the journalist. 
Less time for sources to speak has meant more time for the journalist to interpret, pull apart 
quotes and explain a story to the viewer: “Now such words rather than simply being reproduced 
and transmitted to the audience, are treated as raw material to be taken apart, combined with 
other sounds and images, and woven into a new narrative” (p. 34). Hallin called this a shift from 
48 
 
a passive role for journalists to a much more active role that requires the journalist to package a 
news event, with an easily-identifiable theme, story-line and wrap-up.  
 In his 2016 study of the national political party conventions, Patterson measured 
soundbites featured in television news reports and found that journalists, not sources, did most of 
the talking during broadcasts. Politicians have adapted to this shift in the power balance. 
Campaigns aim to provide journalists with a soundbite that can easily be fit into a broadcast or a 
quote written into a news story, Patterson found. 
 Other scholars have identified the same shift in newspaper coverage. Ryfe and 
Kemmelmeier (2010) tracked the quoting practices of five American newspapers during the 
period of transition to modern news (1876-1916). Despite variation in size, location, and partisan 
orientation of the newspapers, Ryfe and Kemmelmeier found that trends in quoting practices 
moved together across all five newspapers, indicating a shift in journalism practices that ushered 
in the modern era. The study pointed to the inclusion of direct quotes in news articles taken from 
the spoken word rather than the written; increasing use of government officials as primary 
sources; the rise of quotes from campaign speeches; and shorter quotes. Most significantly for 
this study, Ryfe and Kemmelmeier attributed this shift to a political event: the presidential 
contest of 1896 between William McKinley and William Jennings Bryan and the breakdown of 
the third-party system. Ryfe and Kemmelmeier argue that changes in the quoting practices of 
journalists were dramatic, a moment of punctuated equilibrium prompted by a political event 
rather than a gradual historical shift. Their study is significant because it identified the shift from 
a partisan press to a more professionalized press that relied on normative standards and it 
suggests that the reason for the shift was political events. Like other scholars (Mindich, 1998, 
Schudson, 1978), Ryfe and Kemmelmeier identified this as a shift toward the use of objectivity 
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as a standard, a sign of professionalism. Ryfe and Kemmelmeier’s contribution was to suggest 
that the shift in normative practices stemmed from the events of the election of 1896, which was 
a candidate-centered election that ushered in an era of populism. Much like the campaign of 
2016, the campaign of 1896 revolved around the candidates’ ability to stir the political passions 
of an electorate that felt ignored. Journalists, working at multiple different organizations, were 
compelled to change their practices to accurately cover the election and attract readers who were 
interested in the fiery words of the candidates, Ryfe and Kemmelmeier argue. Allowing more 
sources more room to speak for themselves, journalists adopted a practice that became standard 
practice for 20th century newspapers. Linking Hallin to Ryfe and Kemmelmeier, this pattern of 
sourcing continued until the mid-1960s.  
Indexing 
 In Sphere Theory, legitimate controversy is defined by modern political actors, most 
prominently actors in the two-party system. According to Hallin, these actors determine which 
topics fall into the sphere of legitimate controversy and journalists take their cues from these 
sources. Many scholars have studied the range and diversity of sources in the modern U.S. 
media. Bennett (2005, 2016) identified a practice he labeled “indexing” as “the tendency of 
mainstream news organizations to index or adjust the range of viewpoints in a story to the 
dominant positions of those whom the journalists perceive to have enough power to affect the 
outcome of a situation” (p. 16). The premise is that journalists routinely interview only a narrow 
range of sources because those sources are most influential and easily accessible. Bennett drew 
on Ericson et al. (1989), who recognized a similar pattern in journalism: “Typically, the 
journalist seeks a source in the know to say it is so, and has a routine, predictable supply of 
sources in established organizations” (p. 1). In political coverage, this means elected officials, 
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party officials, lobbyists, bureaucrats, political activists, and those who work for them. Outside 
ideas from non-powerful sources, such as voters or citizens, are rarely included in the media 
coverage of an event. According to Bennett, this system means that power becomes the definer 
of truth. Regardless of the validity of outside ideas or perspectives, journalists tend to only report 
on the viewpoints of those in power.  
 Journalists participate in this system because it supports the normative practices of 
balance, fairness, and objectivity, according to Bennett. Reporters are accurately covering the 
story and getting two sides of an issue from those in power but are typically failing to 
acknowledge that there may be many more perspectives on an issue. If a story includes a 
Democratic proposal and the Republican response, with quotes from leaders in both parties 
framed fairly and placed prominently in a news report, the reporter can feel confident that he or 
she has produced a news report that meets professional standards even though many other 
perspectives might exist on the topic.  Under pressure to produce copy quickly for multiple 
platforms, reporters rely on indexing as a professional method. Davies (2008) used the term 
“churnalism” to describe the pressure the media feels to quickly produce more copy each day. In 
order to meet this demand in a professional manner, Bennett argues that journalists focus on the 
positions being promoted by those in power. Journalists are focusing on the most likely outcome 
of a public policy debate, rather than exploring the best outcome or range of options available.  
Sphere Theory and the Election 
 Applying indexing theory to an examination of the 2016 election, it becomes easier to 
understand how most major news organizations failed to predict the election of Trump to the 
presidency. According to Bennett (2017), “the core dynamic of the institutional organization of 
news involves filtering stories according to power balances in political institutions that are 
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covered” (p. 251). This leads to a homogenous output including the ranking of stories, the 
narrative lines that emerge and use of sources to frame the stories. In other words, when 
hundreds of journalists assigned to cover the presidential election of 2016 all talk to the same 
small pool of official sources (and then echo what they hear in conversations with each other), 
thus they will all report the same things in the same way. When small pieces of information 
conflict with the narrative promoted by those in power, those facts are rejected or minimized. In 
the 2016 presidential campaign, indexing sources was established as journalistic practice and 
accepted as the best method to report and write about the election.  
 Cook (2006) goes further to describe the media as a “de facto” branch of the government. 
Some scholars (Sparrow, 2006; Ryfe, 2006) describe this view of the media as New 
Institutionalism, the term coming from the idea that the media is an institutionalized part of the 
system of governance rather than an independent observer. Cook describes a symbiotic 
relationship between the press and government officials where politicians need media coverage 
to highlight their role as elected officials and therefore feed the media a steady diet of news. This 
homogenizes the news stream, resulting in multiple news organizations creating very similar 
outputs. Cook points to similar topics, frames, and slants as proof that the media acts a single 
political organization. Cook argues that the mutual dependency of elected officials and the media 
is dangerous to democracy because the media loses its independent voice.    
Vox Pop 
 In the sphere of legitimate controversy, the voice of those who are not in power are often 
ignored. Elite political actors are the primary sources included in media reports and signal which 
issues should top the media agenda.  Media scholars such as Kleemans (2015) and DeKeyser and 
Raeymaecker (2012) have documented the trend of journalists to include “the ordinary citizen” 
52 
 
as a source in news productions. But they found that citizen voices rarely challenge the ideas 
presented by elite political actors included as sources in these reports. The common men and 
women included in these stories were being used as a colorful illustration of an expected idea. 
Kleemans found that studies counting the number and type of sources were misleading. 
Measuring the prominence of citizen sources and the capacity in which they were used in the 
broadcast, the scholars found that citizen sources were considered “passive” and “mere 
illustrations” and that only the elite sources “actively” affected the content of the news report. 
DeKeyser and Raeymaecker found that “prominent, quality daily” newspapers were less likely to 
feature citizen voices than “popular” daily newspapers were. This means that news sources that 
were more respected, and often imitated by other news sources, determined citizen sources to be 
less important. In addition, they found the dramatic rise of the use of citizen voices in news 
stories to be a “shift in the margins” (p. 835) that fills only a tiny percentage of the news.  
Applying studies on sourcing to sphere theory, it is easier to understand how news 
sources can move within Hallin’s spheres. In the sphere of consensus, the voice of the citizen is 
used as a prop to support the consensus. As Hermes, Kleeman and others have found, the vox 
pop is used primarily to illustrate a larger point of a media report. In the sphere of consensus, that 
means the citizen voice is a cheerleader for the shared value(s) that the news report is 
celebrating. But when the citizen voice is challenging the status quo, they are moved to the 
sphere of deviance. Studies on the framing of war protest coverage (Gitlin, 1980; Luther and 
Miller, 2005; Murray et. al., 2008) highlight this point. They have found that the media framing 
of citizens participating in protests uses language that labels them as deviant, especially early in a 
protest movement before public opinion has been swayed or affected: “(I)f the protests are 
viewed as challenging elite consensus or upsetting the status quo, the media tend to delegitimize, 
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marginalize, or dismiss the efforts of the protestors through various techniques such as relying on 
official sources or using negative expressions to describe the protestors” (Luther and Miller, 
2005, p. 80).  
In the sphere of legitimate controversy, studies on indexing demonstrates how elite actors 
define the boundaries of political discussion. As many scholars have shown, (Bennett, 2016, 
2017; Cook, 2006; Sparrow, 2006; Ryfe, 2006), the media defers to politically powerful sources 
for many reasons, including professionalism. When citizens attempt to change the political 
agenda, the media resists and those sources are moved from the sphere of legitimate controversy 
to the sphere of deviance.  
Role of Social Media 
 One salient criticism of Sphere Theory is that it fails to account for the challenges faced 
by the media with the rise of technology and social media. The boundaries of the sphere of 
legitimate controversy is challenged by the rise of so many news sources online. It is more 
difficult to recognize what is consensus and deviance when the range of debate is expanded in so 
many ways in the online world. The media’s gatekeeper role has been uniquely challenged by the 
rise of the internet. Without a centralized source of information, many scholars question whether 
a public sphere for the debate of ideas – the sphere of legitimate controversy in Hallin’s theory --
can exist.  
Sphere theory was developed by Hallin before the rise of the internet. The development 
and integration of the internet has created many challenges for the media, yet it has not 
significantly altered how news reports are written. Within the professional media, framing is still 
an accepted practice and Sphere Theory is a strong lens to understand these practices. In a blog 
post that explained Sphere Theory, media scholar Jay Rosen (2009) argues that the rise of social 
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media does not diminish the useful nature of Sphere Theory. However, he argues that the rise of 
social media reduces the power of journalists to define the boundaries of Sphere Theory: “(T)he 
authority of the press to assume consensus, define deviance and set the terms for legitimate 
debate is weaker when people can connect horizontally around and about the news.” Rosen 
argues that social media allows citizens to connect when they otherwise might have been ignored 
or assigned to the sphere of deviance by the media. Rosen is not arguing against a press that 
defines the boundaries of the sphere but rather in favor of a more informed understanding that 
the spheres exist and that journalists are keepers of the boundaries. “That journalists affirm and 
enforce the sphere of consensus, consign ideas and actors to the sphere of deviance, and decide 
when the shift is made from one to another -- none of this is in their official job description. You 
won’t find it taught in J-school, either. It’s an intrinsic part of what they do, but not a natural part 
of how they think or talk about their job. Which means they often do it badly. (sic) Their “sphere 
placement” decisions can be arbitrary, automatic, inflected with fear, or excessively narrow-
minded,” Rosen wrote. Hallin responded to Rosen’s blog and argued for a press that understood 
the boundaries and took a more informed role in creating the sphere of legitimate controversy.9  
Conclusion 
 Hallin’s Sphere Theory is a particularly useful lens to examine the 2016 election because 
it helps to answer the question of how the media could have misunderstood the voter in its 
coverage of the campaign. Normative practices shift when journalists are confronted with 
different actors and events. In the sphere of legitimate controversy, the normative practice is the 
 
9 Rosen’s blog is titled Pressthink.com. The January 12, 2009 entry is “Audience Atomization Overcome: Why the 
Internet Weakens the Authority of the Press.” Rosen describes the sphere model as “easily the most useful 
diagram I’ve found for understanding the practice of journalism in the United States, and the hidden politics of 
that practice.” Daniel Hallin responded to the blog. For Hallin’s full response, see 
http://archive.pressthink.org/2009/01/12/atomization.html#comment52316.   
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pursuit of objectivity to provide information and understanding to the electorate. However, in the 
sphere of deviance, objectivity is no longer normative. Instead,  journalists move into the role of 
watchdog – sounding the alarm that a deviant segment of society is threatening democracy.  
Understanding the shifting norms of sphere theory, it is easier to understand that the media 
covers different sources and topics in different ways. Previous research using Sphere Theory 
demonstrates that the media employs delegitimizing cues about sources when those sources 
express ideas that challenge the status quo or threaten the agenda of elite political actors (Luther 
and Miller, 2005; Murray et. al, 2008; Taylor 2014; Billard, 2016). Scholars such as Patterson 
have documented the declining coverage of issues in the 2016. This study suggests that by 
framing the Trump supporter as a threat to the U.S. democratic system,  the media missed the 
opportunity to explain this voter to their readers and to better report the political landscape in 
2016.  
 Scholarship on normative practices covering an election point to the likelihood that the 
media will make this type of mistake again. The accepted practices of the media, as documented 
by this scholarship, are moving away from talking to voters and exploring the issues they care 
about. The monitorial citizen, as defined by Schudson (1998), relies on the media to cover the 
issues that matter to them. Boczkowski and Mitchelstein (2013) found that the demand for 
information about political issues rises and falls. During times of heightened political activity, 
such as elections, the public demands information about issues facing the country. But tuning 
into the news for election coverage, these voters find a limited range of debate focused only 
established political actors. Election coverage focuses on polls not issues, as Patterson found. 
The rise in narrative journalism puts the journalist in the role of analyst and explainer, but 
56 
 
without fact-based reporting and a wide range of sources their reports can fail to cover the 
political landscape accurately.  
 The U.S. system of democracy has a unique reliance on the informed voter. 
Representational Democracy, as James Madison termed it, was designed to be of the people and 
for the people. That means elected officials should be chosen to represent the views of the voters 
who elect them. Media organizations in the U.S. have a constitutionally protected role in this 
system. The public is expected to draw its information about the issues facing the country and 
the debate surrounding solutions from independent, competing news organizations. Media 
scholar James Carey (1997) wrote that the “public is the god-term of journalism, the be-all and 
end-all” (p.192). He meant that the public’s need to know should be the starting point for 
journalism in a democracy. It is not the responsibility of the press to create a conversation; 
instead the media should take its cues from the concerns of citizens, inform them of the facts, 
and facilitate the public debate. Applying Sphere Theory to the examination of media coverage 
of the 2016 voters, this study aims to determine whether the Trump voter was framed as deviant 
and whether the media missed an opportunity to create a conversation that explored this support. 
By understanding past normative practices, this study suggests that future election coverage 








Chapter Three: Methods 
 This study relies on a qualitative and quantitative examination of news reports about 
voters published during the last six weeks of the 2016 election. Specifically, this study is 
designed to identify whether Trump voters were framed as deviant, as defined by Hallin’s Sphere 
Theory, and whether coverage of the voter differed between local and national news outlets. This 
chapter explores how the study was created and executed, with a particular focus on previous 
scholarship on the operationalization of deviance.  
Why newspapers? 
This study focuses on content produced by three national news and five local news 
organizations: The Washington Post, The New York Times, USA TODAY, The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, The Lebanon Daily News, The Evening Sun, and Public 
Opinion. Online and print newspapers are older organizations, sometimes called “the legacy 
press” and have lost readership and revenue with the rise of social media.  
Yet these media organizations are professional news outlets with dedicated political 
reporting staffs that aim to objectively cover news events. Sphere theory is premised on the 
concept of professional practice. Through the norms of news gathering and writing, the media 
identifies to the media consumer whether a political event or an actor is in the sphere of 
consensus, legitimate controversy or deviance (Hallin 1986). Media organizations that mix 
political perspectives with news coverage are not appropriate for the study of deviance in their 
coverage. Professional practice also differentiates news organizations from social media sites. In 
the 2016 election, social media played a significant role in the dissemination of information 
(accurate and inaccurate.) Social media was an important source of information for millions of 
voters in the 2016 election. However, as Bennett (2016) succinctly identified, the participatory 
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nature of social media excludes professional practice. This study is an examination of 
professional journalism practice in the 2016 election. The goal of this study is to illuminate and 
suggest improved practices for future study.  
In addition, this study aims to compare local and national media organization to 
determine differences and look for best practices. Newspapers are a medium that is similar in 
national and local venues. They compare well. The database Lexis Uni, available at the 
University of Maryland, included a wide selection of national and local newspapers. The 
availability of these local and national newspapers was an important factor in the selection of 
newspapers as a news medium to study. 
 Finally, these newspapers were selected because they brought different elements to this 
study. The local newspapers are from different areas of the state of Pennsylvania, an important 
swing state in the 2016 election that was predicted to vote Democratic. They range in size and 
location. Two were based in cities, the others in more rural areas. Some have large reporting 
staff, others very small. In short, they represent a variety of newspapers aimed at different types 
of readers in urban, rural and suburban settings. The national newspapers were selected because 
they all have professional political reporting staff dedicated to election coverage and they 
dedicate a significant portion of their news coverage to political events. The Washington Post 
and The New York Times are publications identified by scholars such as Harder et. al. (2017) as 
“highly regarded media outlets” that are important influences on the content choices of other 
news organizations and influential sources in the hybrid flow of information in election 
coverage. Finally, USA TODAY was included because of its national distribution, different style 
of writing that might attract a broader audience, and its inclusion in the University of Maryland 
Nexis Uni database. 
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Local New outlets 
 
The local newspapers examined in this study include The Philadelphia Inquirer, 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Public Opinion (Chambersburg), Lebanon Daily News, and The 
Evening Sun (Hanover). These newspaper vary in size and range of their audiences.10 For 
example, The Philadelphia Inquirer is the largest of the local newspapers included in this study 
with a self-reported daily circulation of 197,310 readers in 2020.11 The Philadelphia Inquirer 
covers the city and the suburbs of Philadelphia, an area that includes more than 6 million 
people.12 The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette is the next largest and reports a daily circulation of 
80,000. However, in 2018 the newspaper stopped publishing on Tuesday and Saturdays and 
limited its print editions to three days a week.13 The greater Pittsburgh metro area is estimated to 
be about 2.3 million, a number that has dropped for the past seven years.14 
Comparatively, The Lebanon Daily News located in southeastern PA, the Evening Sun in 
Hanover in central PA and Public Opinion in Chambersburg are all much smaller newspapers 
now owned by Gannett and do not publish circulation numbers. Public Opinion, and The 
Lebanon Daily News publish a print and electronic edition everyday compared to the Evening 
Sun publishes only three days a week. These three smaller newspapers have very small staffs- the 
 
10 Accurate newspaper circulation statistics are difficult to determine and compare. The Alliance for Audited Media 
produces estimates based on readership and circulation figures. However, many newspapers, including The New 
York Times and The Washington Post have stopped fully reporting their circulations. For more information on the 
state of newspaper circulation and readership measures, please see Pew Research Center Media and News (2019, 
July 9) Newspaper Fact Sheet. Retrieved at:  
https://www.statista.com/statistics/273503/average-paid-weekday-circulation-of-the-new-york-times/. 
11 See: https://inquirersolutions.webflow.io/about. 
12 Bond, Michealle and John Duchneskie. (2019, April 18) Slow but Steady. The Philadelphia Inquirer. 
https://www.inquirer.com/news/a/philadelphia-population-growth-census-south-jersey-20190418.html 
13 See: https://www.pgmediakit.com/statistics-demographics/. 
14 Gratzinger, Ollie. (2020, March 26) Pittsburgh has reported a loss of population for the seventh year in a row. 





websites list two or three editiorial staff writers or editors at each organization and content is 
shared from the parent company Gannett. Each also has a long history in their communities: The 
Lebanon Daily News was founded in 1894; Public Opinion was founded in 1896, the Evening 
Sun in 1915. 
 This study aimed to include a diverse group of local newspapers. Clearly, The 
Philadelphia Inquirer is a much larger newspaper than any of the other media included in the 
local section of this study. It is based in a city with a growing population and an expanding 
suburban community. Conversely, the The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette is slowing publication and 
covers a community that is losing residents. However, like the three much smaller newspapers – 
Evening Sun, Public Opinion and The Lebanon Daily News, each newspaper focuses its news on 
local rather than national events and has a professional reporting staff that reports under their 
own bylines. By diversifying the types of local news organizations, this study aimed to draw 
conclusions that were not about one type of local newspaper and encompassed a range of styles, 
sizes and publication schedules. 
Of the total 387 reports examined in this study, 91 were produced in the local 
Pennsylvania outlets. The majority, 52 news reports, were published in The Philadelphia 
Inquirer, the largest circulation newspaper in Pennsylvania. Far fewer were published in the 
other four local newspapers: 19 in the Pittsburg Post-Gazette, 9 in the Lebanon Daily News, 6 in 
the Evening Sun and 5 in Public Opinion. The latter three small newspapers were all owned by 
Gannett in 2016, which also publishes USA TODAY. The Lebanon Daily News  and Public 
Opinion were published daily, while the Evening Sun (with a staff of 5) was published three days 
a week. Each newspaper included in the local study covered a different region of Pennsylvania, 
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with small overlaps.15 There were 296 national news reports included in this study with 189 
published in The New York Times, 59 in The Washington Post and 48 in USA TODAY. 
Nexis Uni Keyword Search 
 
 Selecting which newspapers to include allowed this study to move onto creating a 
database of news stories. Using Nexis Uni, this study attempted to create a keyword search of 
that focused on coverage of the voter during the 2016 election.  
 Using the University of Maryland’s access to Nexis Uni, the keyword search started 
broadly with “Clinton, Trump, voter” and the time limit of the year 2016. The evolution of the 
search syntax is included so that others can replicate the process and (with the final search terms 
as reported below) replicate the same search. Producing far too many results that did not focus 
on the voter, the keyword search was altered to focus on hard news reports in this manner: 
“hlead (voter) and hlead (clinton or trump or candidate) and section(front_page or news 
or a or A01 or pg. 1 or pg. 1a or pg. a1 or page 1 or national or state) and length > 400.” 
The inclusion of the terms Clinton and Trump in the headline or lead resulted in more articles 
focused on the voter. The news report was also featured prominently in the newspaper or online 
because it was featured in the front or news section of the report. However, on the negative side, 
this keyword study missed incidental mentions of the voter, only included the longer stories 
(such as those published in The New York Times) and severely limited the number of  shorter 
stories, which meant fewer local stories and those from USA TODAY. To meet those concerns, 
the keyword search was altered to: 
 
15 Lebanon Daily News covered the Lebanon Valley, in southeastern PA. Evening Sun covered Hanover and Adams 
County in central PA. Public Opinion covered the Cumberland Valley in southern PA. The Pittsburg Post-Gazette 
covered Pittsburg and its suburbs in western PA. The Philadelphia Inquirer covered the city of Philadelphia and its 
suburbs in eastern PA. 
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“voter w/25 clinton or trump and section(front_page or news or A01 or pg. 1 or pg. 1a or 
pg. a1 or page 1 or national or state) and length > 300” 
And was limited by the following filters:  
 Date: Sept 1 2016-Nov 8 2016 
Newspapers 
Location: DC, NY, PA, United States  
Sources: NYT, WP, USAT, Pub Opinion, Evening Sun, Lebanon Daily News, Phil Daily 
News, Pittsburgh Post, Phil Inquirer. 
This produced 652 results but with a small number of results from local newspapers and 
The Washington Post and too many results from The New York Times.  
Working with a Lexis Uni representative, this study developed a search strategy that 
focused on longer media reports that also had the term voter within 25 words of Clinton or 
Trump, a length of greater than 300 words, and were hard news reports as opposed to lifestyle, 
television listings, editorials, columnists, calendars and other non-news reports.    
 The date of the search was altered to run from September 25, 2016, the last Sunday in 
September, to November 8, 2016, election day. This time period was chosen because it fell after 
the primaries and conventions and focused on the general election. This allowed a more direct 
comparison of Clinton/Trump voters as other candidates had been eliminated at this point. The 
dates also incorporated reactions to three presidential debates and a vice-presidential debate. It 
included seven Sundays, which is often a day when longer, more in-depth articles are published 
in the media. And, it was a time period of intense campaigning across the country. As a result, 
this time period struck a good balance between limiting the number of articles to a number that 
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could be quantitatively and qualitatively studied and concentrated the search on a time when 
voters were deciding between two presidential candidates. 
 One challenge in producing a successful keyword search was the different styles of the 
newspapers included in the search. USA TODAY and the local newspapers tended to produce 
shorter news articles while The New York Times produced longer reports. If the word limit did 
not require more than 300 words in The New York Times, the results produced dozens of short 
reports that were not news. However, this requirement eliminated many relevant reports 
produced in the other newspapers. The solution was to run two separate but very similar keyword 
searches. Here is the final keyword search: 
“voter or supporter and clinton or trump and section(front_page or news or A01 or pg. 1 
or pg. 1a or pg. a1 or page 1 or national or state) and length>500 and not byline 
(compiled or Associated Press)” 
After the search was run, the following filters were applied: 
Content Type: News Timeline: Sep 25, 2016 to Nov 08, 2016 Publication 
Type: Newspapers Location by Publication: Dist. of Columbia or Pennsylvania or United 
States Sources: The Philadelphia Inquirer or USA TODAY or The Washington Post or 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette or Public Opinion (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania) or The 
Lebanon Daily News (Pennsylvania) or The Evening Sun (Hanover, PA) or The 
Philadelphia Daily News. 
 This search produced 250 results. 
In The New York Times, the following keyword search was run: 
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“voter or supporter w/25 clinton or trump not debate and section(front_page or news or 
A01 or pg. 1 or pg. 1a or pg. a1 or page 1 or national) and length>1000 and not byline 
(compiled OR Nate Cohn or Associated Press)” 
The following filters were applied:  
Content Type: News Timeline: Sep 25, 2016 to Nov 08, 2016 Publication 
Type: Newspapers Location by Publication: New York Sources: The New York Times. 
 The search produced 159 reports. 
What this study measured 
This study was based on the following research questions: 
R1: Did the media coverage of the 2016 election frame the Trump voter as deviant or 
outside the sphere of legitimate controversy as defined by Hallin (1992)? 
R2: Did local journalists cover local Trump supporters in a manner different from 
national reporters? If so, did this coverage reflect a greater understanding of issues important to 
the local voter? 
R3: How did the media understand their coverage of the voter in the debate that followed 
the 2016 election? Did that debate offer feasible solutions for future coverage of voters? 
These research questions suggest the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Many journalists covering the 2016 election identified Trump as deviant from the 
political norm, as defined by Hallin (1992), and covered the campaign according to the norms 
prescribed by this model.  
H2: Many journalists covering the 2016 election also identified Trump supporters as 
deviant and outside the sphere of legitimate consensus, as defined by Hallin (1992) and covered 
those voters according to the norms prescribed by this model.  
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H3: Local journalists may have been more nuanced in their understanding of their 
communities and less likely to use the deviance model when covering these voters during the 
election.  
H4: Journalists understood their coverage of the 2016 election as flawed and generated a 
public debate about changes in normative practices following the election. 
 As these questions and hypotheses suggest, this study aims to determine whether media 
reports produced during the general election of 2016 framed Trump supporters as deviant, as 
defined by Hallin’s Sphere Theory. Journalism practice “has not one but many different sets of 
standards and procedures, each applied in different kinds of political situations,” Hallin wrote 
(p.10). When confronted with deviance, journalists  “slant” their coverage through negative 
framing of a source or event, according to Hallin (p.148). Framing a source or event as deviant 
differs from framing them as within the sphere of legitimate controversy. Normative practice 
when covering events or actors that fall into the sphere of legitimate controversy is the pursuit of 
objectivity. Most political news coverage falls into the sphere of legitimate controversy and aims 
to incorporate these professional practices.  
However, when covering deviant events or actors, the media shifts into another practice, 
according to Hallin. In this sphere, journalists “plays the role of exposing, condemning, or 
excluding from the public agenda those who violate or challenge the political consensus. It 
marks out and defends the limits of acceptable political conflict” (Hallin, p.117). For the 
journalist, the shift from one sphere to the other happens seamlessly. Relying on their own 
understanding of legitimate controversy and deviance, the media will adopt different practices 
preparing media reports. The difference in practice between the sphere of legitimate controversy 
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(where the pursuit of objectivity is norm) and sphere of deviance (where sounding an alarm is the 
norm) can be measured.  
In addition to measuring the framing of deviance, this study aimed to compare and 
contrast the use of deviance in five local news outlets in Pennsylvania with three national news 
outlets. This study aimed to determine whether local news outlets framed voters in a more 
nuanced manner than national newspapers did. Nuance was defined as having less deviance in 
the framing of voters measured quantitatively through the coding scheme and offering more 
information about voters and their views on the issues and candidates in the qualitative 
examination.  
Operationalizing deviance 
Hallin’s 1986 study operationalized deviance in television news reports by measuring the 
tone of the broadcast. The framing of actors and events were coded as favorable/unfavorable and 
whether the journalist editorialized about the event or actors. Following Hallin’s study, Aday, 
Livingston, and Herbert (2005) applied Sphere Theory to the examination of  U.S. television 
news reports of the 2003 Iraq invasion. Their coding scheme, similar to Hallin’s, first identified 
the subject of the report (which provided a range of topics included in the war coverage) and 
then measured the tone of the report according to neutral, critical or supportive. Neutral was 
operationalized as an absence of value-laden language. Critical and supportive tones were 
evaluated through a coding scheme of terms related to war coverage. 
 Luther and Miller (2005) applied the concept of deviance to the coverage of war 
protestors and introduces the concept of legitimizing and delegitimizing cues. Media coverage 
that frames events or actors as deviant includes “delegitimizing cues.” Delegitimizing cues are a 
signal to the reader that the source or event is not within the mainstream, that the source or event 
67 
 
falls outside the parameters of legitimacy and is even a threat to the norm. Legitimacy was 
defined as “that which connotes propriety, lawfulness, and characteristics reflective of the core 
values associated with America” and de-legitimacy was defined as “that which connotes 
anarchy, unlawfulness, and anti-Americanism” (p.85). Luther and Miller developed a list of 
delegitimating cue words that included terms such as “arrested, violence, felony, dissent, idiots, 
disorderly, hell, threat, arrest” and compared it to a list of legitimation cue words that include 
terms such as “peace, democracy, bless, love, Americans, freedom, God, family, honor.” To 
evaluate whether protestors were framed as deviant, Luther and Miller measured the frequency 
of legitimizing and delegitimizing cue words, assigned each story a total and then subtracted the 
delegitimizing cue word total from the legitimizing to give the story a score. Robinson, Goddard, 
Parry and Murray (2008) built on this model to continue the study of the relationship of the 
media to government sources during war and revisited the 2003 Iraq invasion to examine British 
media. They amended Aday et. al.’s model to include an assessment of the topic addressed in the 
report and whether that topic was value-laden.  
Building on this scholarship, Billard (2016) applied the concept of delegitimizing cues to 
examine the media coverage of transgender people. Coding a sample of articles published in 13 
major newspapers from 2004 to 2013, Billard identified patterns of journalistic practice that he 
identified as delegitimizing transgender people. Using the National Lesbian and Gay Journalist 
Association Stylebook and GLAAD media reference guide, Billard developed a set of nine 
“Legitimacy Indicators” to measure “the various aspects of respecting the self-identifications and 
human dignity of transgender individuals.” (p.5) The study found that coverage of transgender 
people in major national newspapers was “extremely limited” (p.1).  However, the coverage that 
did exist nearly universally contained language identified as delegitimizing. Billard argued that 
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the use of this type of language by journalists was a normative practice that negatively impacts 
the transgender community in the “political arena and public perceptions” (p.1).  
This study relied on previous scholarship that operationalized deviance in the framing of 
news reports, as explained above. Following the example of Luther and Miller (2005), Robinson, 
Goddard, Parry and Murray (2008) and Billard, this study created a coding system that to 
measure delegitimizing cues. Unlike previous scholarship, however, this study applied these cues 
to the coverage of voters during a presidential election. Of the previous scholars that had 
developed a coding system to examine delegitimizing cues, only Billard expanded Sphere 
Theory past the study of the media’s coverage of war protestors. As a result, this study relied on 
Billard’s method of developing a new coding system. Billard’s coding system to measure the 
framing of transgender people was developed using the definition of best practices defined by 
GLAAD and the National Lesbian and Gay Journalist Association Stylebook.  
Professional Standards 
Following Billard’s example, the coding system for this study was designed using 
guidelines for election coverage developed by media organizations including The Handbook for 
Journalists During Elections, published by Reporters Without Borders and Society for 
Professional Journalist and the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy’s 2018 
report on how to cover poverty. 
These guidelines encouraged the practice of objectivity in all aspects of election coverage 
and did not recognize the legitimacy of covering deviance as Sphere Theory does. Therefore, the 
overarching advice in these guidelines is the pursuit of objectivity. However, several key points 
did stand out and encouraged the coding system to include a comparison between Trump voters 
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and Clinton voters. They included the following from The Handbook for Journalists During an 
Election:16 
• “The tone of news stories must be neutral. They should report on differences 
between the parties but without judging them in any way,” (p.20). 
• (w)rigint style, layout and- especially – the choice of photos should not show 
unfairness or bias for one candidate over another,” (p.20-21). 
• “The underlying principle is that all parties and candidates are to be treated in fair, 
impartial and neutral fashion,” (p.19) 
And these from the Society for Professional Journalists Code of Ethics,17 which 
encourage journalists to: 
• “Identify sources clearly. The public is entitled to as much information as possible 
to judge the reliability and motivations of sources.” 
• “Support the open and civil exchange of views, even views they find repugnant.” 
• “Boldly tell the story of the diversity and magnitude of the human experience. 
Seek sources whose voices we seldom hear.” 
• “Avoid stereotyping. Journalists should examine the ways their values and 
experiences may shape their reporting.” 
These guidelines contributed to the creation of the coding system and the examination of 
the news reports in the qualitative analysis. Understanding the goals of election reporting is an 
important step in understanding how deviant framing contributes to the media’s role in the 
democratic system. 
 
16 Reporters Without Borders for Freedom of Information, (2015 ed.) “Handbook for Journalists During Election.” 
https://rsf.org/sites/default/files/handbook_for_journalists_during_elections.pdf. 
17  Society of Professional Journalists, (Sept. 6, 2014) “SPJ Code of Ethics.” https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp 
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Media Identification of Deviant Framing 
Following the 2018 election, several journalists studied normative practice when 
covering working class and rural voters and developed some specific advice for future election 
coverage. Bryant and Ordway (2018) examined the coverage of poor and working-class 
communities, Smarsh (2018) looked to rural communities. Each report suggested that journalists 
often marginalize the communities they are assigned to cover without meaning to do so. 
Marginalization, they suggest, is a response to being confronted with something outside the 
normal experience of the journalist. The response is sometimes highlighting the more demeaning 
aspects of the poor, working class or rural world they are sent to cover. Through language, 
choice of details, and a lack of nuance, journalists often send the message that these communities 
are outside the norm. 
 Bryant and Ordway suggest that low-income individuals are marginalized when media 
coverage focuses solely on economic status as “the central framing of their identity,” (p.2). 
When journalists exaggerate or overly highlight differences, the authors argue, it is exploitative. 
It makes a news story more interesting to the reader and creates better copy for the journalist, but 
is using the source in a negative way. Using details such as fast food consumption, television 
viewing, or misuse of a word, the journalist is using something very common to convey how 
desperate and different these communities are. Bryant and Ordway label this type of writing 
“poverty porn” (p. 6). Details are an important part of a news story, but not when they are used 
unequally, the authors argue. At that point, journalists are “guiding how other people view” 
people with limited means (p. 6). Smarsh (2018) makes a similar argument about news coverage 
of rural communities. Journalists that “venture into the hinterlands” of rural America often come 
with preconceived notions about class and place that leads to an oversimplification or 
71 
 
mischaracterization of the political, social and cultural nature of the rural landscape, Smarsh 
argues. Details such as poor grammar or misuse of a word is a code to the reader that this 
person’s perspective can be dismissed. The reader can identify these details as “shorthand” for 
deviance, Smarsh argues.  
Qualitative and Quantitative Examination 
 In order to examine the coverage of the voter, this study employed both qualitative and 
quantitative measures. The qualitative measures included a reading of the news reports produced 
after the keyword search and a second reading after the quantitative review. The qualitative 
review included a coding system that marked each news report for elements of deviance, whether 
the tone suggested “no good choice in the race” (see below for a fuller explanation), examples of 
local coverage that differed from national, examples where the voice of the voter was both 
highlighted and dismissed. The news reports where elements of deviance were highlighted were 
then read more carefully to determine their context and determine if other elements were 
included that helped balance the details that suggested deviance, such as a voter that explored the 
issues or explained support for the candidate or an explanation as to how or why the voter was 
wearing odd clothing or other unusual details.  
 In the examination of local newspapers compared to national newspapers, the qualitative 
examination was especially helpful. The tone of the local news reports was often more intimate: 
descriptions of a community excited by the presence of a national political candidate where the 
writer seemed to share the excitement or references to gathering spots such as the hair salon and 
diner that were familiar. These elements were not measured on the coding sheet and would have 
been lost without a close reading of the texts. For example, some news reports highlighted the 
lack of education of the Trump supporter but also offered a fuller description of the voters quoted 
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in the news report including background information. Others explored issues important to the 
voters. These additional details often seemed to suggest that the news report shifted from the 
sphere of legitimate concern to deviance within the same report, as Hallin suggests happens 
often. At other times the detail was not an example of deviant framing but rather a factual detail 
framed in an objective manner that a close reading and analysis made clear. 
 In addition, the qualitative review was a helpful follow-up to the coding sheet. Tagging a 
news report that stood out from other reports – perhaps as a strong example of deviance or an 
example where local news differed from national reports – allowed the coding work to proceed 
without distraction because it was understood that the researcher would return to that report for a 
fuller examination.  
Building the coding sheet and quantitative measures 
Based on scholarship that has studied deviance, professional standards and an exploration 
of normative practices by members of the media, this study developed a coding sheet that aimed 
to measure deviance. Some consideration (and effort) was given to coding for legitimacy or a 
lack of legitimacy. After reading through the results of the keyword search, measuring language 
that suggested deviance seemed more appropriate to the results, more tailored to the research 
questions and hypotheses of this study, and successfully used by previous scholarship. So the 
coding system was designed, in large part, to measure deviance. 
To develop a list of delegitimizing cues, as Luther and Miller (2005) and Billard (1999) 
did, the study started with a qualitative review of the 384 news reports produced by the Nexis 
Uni keyword search to identify a pattern of delegitimizing cues. Several themes emerged: 
education, unemployment, race, conspiracy theories, costumes, insults, chants, odd use of words, 
noise, revolution, clothing with insulting or angry messages, use of the word “shy” or 
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“squeamish” to describe public support for the candidate. Some of these themes were eliminated 
or combined with others in the coding system. For example, the theme of noise was often 
associated with the Trump rallies. While they were consistently reported to be louder or rowdier 
than Clinton rallies, the concept of noise at a political rally is not unusual. So the delegitimizing 
indicator of “noise” was eliminated from the coding sheet. The cues of chants and insults were 
similar but eventually chants were eliminated as a part of the coding scheme because, again, 
chants are a regular feature of political rallies and insults became a separate category.  
Based on the identified delegitimizing themes, this study employed Google forms to 
develop a coding sheet. Several versions of the coding system were worked through. An early 
version included 75 questions. However after coding approximately 25 stories, it was deemed 
too time-consuming. It was revised and pared down so that the final version included 39 
questions, including 10 identical questions to measure deviance in the coverage of Trump and 
Clinton voters. Most of the questions were answered with a yes or no answer. Of the questions 
measuring deviance in the framing of Trump or Clinton voters,  not all were successful 
measures. For example, there was very little difference in whether Trump or Clinton voters were 
identified as unemployed. In addition, the type of work both Trump and Clinton voters were 
identified by were very similar. An early coding system included questions to identify clothing 
descriptors, unusual habits, odd phrasing of language or grammar. These elements were 
combined in a later version to one question that measured the inclusion of “unusual details such 
as clothing, habits or expressions.” A yes answer to this question triggered a qualitative review to 
determine what the unusual detail was and examine its context.  
The final coding sheet measured six delegitimizing cues in the framing of voters that 
suggested deviance: lack of education, socially unacceptable, lack of diversified race, suggestion 
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of conspiracy theories, insulting the other candidate or supporters, and inclusion of unusual 
details. For the coding scheme, these cues were developed  into the following yes or no 
questions.  
- Is the education level or lack of education of the voter mentioned? 
- If so, is the education level framed in negative terms? 
- Was support of the candidate described as socially unacceptable? 
- Are the Trump/Clinton voters identified by their race? 
- If the race is identified, please identify which races are associated with 
Clinton/Trump supporters.  
- Are Clinton/Trump voters described or quoted as believing in conspiracy theories such 
as the election is rigged, that guns will be confiscated, the other party is engaging in 
fraudulent behavior or some other conspiracy? 
- Are Clinton/Trump supporters quoted as insulting the other candidate or candidate 
supporters? This would include the use of words such as liar, criminal, rapist to describe 
the candidate and his/her supporters. 
- Are Trump supporters described as "shy" or "squeamish" or unwilling to announce their 
support for the candidate? 
- Are Trump supporters described using unusual details - such as clothing, habits, 
expressions? 
The final coding sheet is included at the end of this chapter as Appendix A. 
Negativity 
Included in the coding system were several questions to measure the coverage of issues. 
Patterson (2016) found that less than 10 percent of news reports produced during the election 
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included a discussion of the issues. Based on Patterson’s findings, the coding scheme included 
two questions to determine whether voters addressed issues when included in the reports. Those 
questions were “Does the voter mention an issue(s) that he or she is concerned about in the 
election such as health care, the economy, trade or immigration?” and “Do(es) the voter(s) 
discuss either candidate’s qualifications or lack of qualifications to be president?” Both questions 
were included in the section of the coding scheme that applied to all news reports (as opposed to 
those questions that applied only to news reports that included sources identified as Trump voters 
or Clinton voters.) While this topic was not fully explored, it was included to determine whether 
stories that included the voice of the voter had a higher percentage of addressing issues or 
qualifications of the candidates. (The findings supported Patterson’s findings that neither topic is 
addressed often.)  
 Patterson found that the dominant theme of the 2016 election coverage was a negative 
tone. The news reports produced by the keyword search supported Patterson’s finding. 
Specifically, this study noted a theme in the news reports that implied that neither candidate was 
a good option in the election. As a result of this qualitative observation, the coding scheme 
included the question “Does the article imply or state that voters believe that neither candidate is 
qualified or that there is no good choice in the election?”   
Vox Pop 
In addition to measuring deviance in the framing of the voter, the coding scheme was 
designed to identify how often the voter was included as a source. In order to measure the 
frequency, this coding scheme compared the number of voters included as a source to the 
number of professional political analysts such as pollsters, political scientists, politicians, and 
media analysts. It then simplified the comparison to a yes/no question: Are there more 
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professional political sources in the article than voters?  
      As a follow up question, the coding scheme included the question “(i)f both types of sources 
are included in the article, are voters quoted AFTER most of the politicians or political observers 
in the article?” According to professional journalism practice, journalists rank elements of a 
news report and place the most important at the beginning. This practice is referred to as the use 
of the inverted pyramid. (Mindich 1999). Based on this practice, recognizing where the voter's 
voice is included in an article can reveal how important the reporter understood that source to be 
to the news report. The coding scheme asked if voters were included after political sources as a 
measure of understanding the importance of the voter as source to the journalist.  
The concept of “vox pop,” as defined by scholars (Kleemans et. al. 2015, DeKeyser and 
Raeymaecker 2012) asserts that citizens are rarely an important source in a news article. Rather, 
elite actors such as professional political observers and politicians are the drivers of a news 
report. When citizens are used in political stories, they are often used either to illustrate a point 
made by a different source or used as colorful entertainment for the reader. Rarely are the ideas 
important to the voter the centerpiece of a news report. Measuring the frequency and location in 
the story as compared to elite political actors such as politicians or professional political analysts 
was an attempt at measuring whether the voter was treated as a “vox pop” element of the story.  
Local News Comparison 
One important component of this study was the comparison of local news coverage of 
Trump voters in the 2016 election compared to national media coverage of these voters. Scholars  
have suggested that a decline in local reporting contributed to the misunderstanding of Trump’s 
support by the media in the election (Hermida 2016, Lewis and Carlson 2016). This study aimed 
to explore coverage in both mediums to determine if local media understood local voters in a 
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manner different than national media did and whether that coverage offered a path for future 
coverage for all media. (Chapter 5 on local results explores previous scholarship on local media 
and outlines the results of this study.) 
 To compare local news to national news, the coding sheet included a category to identify 
which newspaper published the article.  Google forms works seamlessly with Excel to create a 
spreadsheet of answers. Based on these initial codes in the column that reported the name of the 
newspaper, the results of local news reports on the coding sheet were separated from national 
news reports results. This yielded a quantitative comparison for each question included on the 
coding form.  
 In early attempts at coding, local news was coded in order followed by national news. 
This segregated approach meant the coder read similar news reports, one after the other. Coding 
in this manner allowed the reader to recognize patterns of difference between the different news 
mediums but also occasionally dulled the recognition of deviance.  
 After comparing local news reports to national news reports results on the coding form, 
local news reports were re-read to recognize differences in style and examine language tagged as 
deviant. In addition, elements such as the headlines, bylines, story length and placement in the 
newspaper were noted.  
Future Research 
 
The qualitative review of news articles made clear that the coding system developed for 
this study was imperfect. Reading the news reports carefully, there were sometimes examples of 
deviance not caught by the coding system and others that identified a deviant element but not the 
context that softened the suggestion of deviance. In addition, despite many revisions, the coding 
system included time-consuming elements that did not yield fruitful results (such as the list of 
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professions). Future research using quantitative measures should consider the list of 
delegitimizing cues developed for the coding system as a starting point and improve this list. The 
coding system did not include an analysis of headlines, photos, placement in the paper. 
Examining these features could be part of a future study.  
 In addition, the coding system did not solely focus on the deviant framing of the voters. It 
included small measures of whether issues were included, the treatment of the voter as vox pop 
and the negative tone of the report toward the two candidates. It is a fair criticism of this study 
that perhaps the coding system attempted to measure too many elements or that the inclusion of 
one or two questions did not fully explore these aspects of the news report. These questions were 
included in the final coding system because they seemed to contribute to a fuller understanding 
of the framing of the voter and election coverage. However, future research could easily separate 
these elements into different studies and explore them more fully.  
 Despite these imperfections, this study identified and measured deviance in the coverage 
of the voter. Using qualitative and quantitative measures, it attempted to assess the news reports 
accurately and holistically. It seems clear that deviance was an element in the framing of the 
Trump voter in the 2016 election and it is likely that other elements, such as the treatment of the 
voter as vox pop, the lack of exploration of issues and and/or a negative tone toward the 




Chapter Four: Results 
 
The results of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the media coverage of the last 
six weeks of the 2016 election support the hypothesis that journalists understood Trump 
supporters as deviant as described by Hallin’s Sphere Theory. The 384 articles analyzed for this 
study found a pattern of identifying Trump supporters as uneducated, primarily White voters that 
espoused conspiracy theories and insulted Hillary Clinton and her supporters. Compared to the 
coverage of Clinton voters, Trump voters were more likely to be described as “shy” or 
“squeamish” in their public support of the candidate and more likely to be framed using unusual 
details about their appearance, habits or verbal expressions. The results also support previous 
scholarship that found issues were rarely the focus of media political coverage and not described 
as important to the voter (Patterson 2016). In addition, the results of this study identified that the 
media missed the opportunity to explore the motivations of all voters. News reports included far 
more political analysts to speak on behalf of the voter than actual voters. When both political 
analysts and voters were included in the newspaper content, voters usually were placed after 
these sources, often at the end of a story. Finally, the content analysis of the election coverage 
found a tendency to suggest that the election offered voters “no good choice.” While Trump 
supporters were framed in a manner that suggested deviancy, Clinton supporters were often 
framed as unenthusiastic or disenchanted, creating the impression that neither candidate was 
desirable. 
 As defined earlier, Sphere Theory was developed by Daniel Hallin (1986) to explain 
media coverage of the Vietnam War. Hallin found that journalistic norms and practices changed 
when members of the media were confronted with events they understood to be outside the 
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sphere of legitimate controversy.18 This change in practice was a shift from the pursuit of 
objectivity to the identification of deviance. Hallin found that normative practice encourages 
journalists to change how they cover a deviant event. When confronted with something 
understood to be a threat to democracy, journalistic practice encourages the media to frame the 
event or actors as a threat and sound the alarm to society. When an event or actor is understood 
to be part of the legitimate debate, the normative practice is the pursuit of objectivity through 
reporting and fact-gathering. Hallin explained that during the Vietnam War, the media 
understood political dissent as deviant and understood the origin of deviance as “outside the 
mainstream of society,” (p.194). As a result, early coverage of war protestors focused on the 
“most radical factions and most militant tactics,” (p.194). Hallin found that “the antiwar 
movement could rarely become news except by playing the deviant role, usually by “provoking” 
(sic) violence or charges of aiding the enemy” and this led to the “(t)he movement increasingly 
defined itself (sic) according to the deviant role in which it was cast by the media,” (p. 194). In 
other words, it was a circle. Mainstream society rejected the antiwar movement, the media 
reflected this rejection and framed protestors as deviant members of the political spectrum, the 
protestors adopted this deviant role to get news coverage. This encouraged a greater divide 
between mainstream society and the protestors.  
As the public’s understanding of the Vietnam War changed, media coverage changed. 
Spheres, as Hallin defined them, are porous. People and events shift in and out the spheres as the 
journalist understands them, triggering different normative practices. Eventually mainstream 
society accepted and embraced the message of domestic opposition to the war (although not 
 
18 For a greater exploration of Sphere Theory, see Chapter Two: Theory. 
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always the protestors and their attention-getting strategies) and the media shifted practices to 
include opposition as a legitimate part of the debate.  
The findings of this study support the hypothesis that Trump voters were covered as 
deviant, as defined by Hallin’s Sphere Theory. Clearly not all coverage fell into the sphere of 
deviance. The 2016 media coverage of the election shifted in and out of legitimate controversy 
and deviance. But, as Billard identified even occasional framing as deviant can marginalize a 
group within society. As Billard wrote, the media is a powerful enforcer of what is acceptable. 
Framing a voter as outside the norm excludes the exploration of issues and opinions that 
motivate that voter. In addition, according to Hallin, it can also encourage the deviant behavior 
of voters to get media attention. 
 This study does not suggest that the media was wrong in framing Trump voters in this 
manner. As Hallin demonstrated in his study, this is normative practice for the media. However, 
this study suggests that awareness of these shifting practices might be useful in future election 
coverage. Understanding the impact of framing voters as deviant, the media should make an 
informed choice about what type of coverage it provides the public. This study suggests that the 
choice to cover these voters as deviant was a missed opportunity to explore the issues and 
motivations important to millions of voters, leading them to support a candidate like Donald 
Trump and adding to the polarization of the electorate. Like coverage of early Vietnam War 
protestors, the coverage of Trump voters as a legitimate part of the democratic discussion might 
encourage less division in the public arena.  
The 2016 election coverage may have contributed to a misunderstanding of the electorate 
by the public and encouraged coverage that suggested to the news consumer that Hillary Clinton 
was likely to win the presidency. (This study recognizes that many factors may have contributed 
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to this misunderstanding including polling. For a greater exploration of the media’s response to 
the election coverage, please see Chapter Six: Mea Culpa.) Finally, this study aims to identify the 
fact that normative practices shift during election coverage and encourage members of the media 
to recognize this fact and choose how they intend to frame voters.   
Findings Explained 
These findings are based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of newspaper articles 
produced by a Nexis Uni keyword search. The search covered content produced between 
September 25 to November 8, 2016, by three national newspapers and five Pennsylvania-based 
newspapers, including The Washington Post, The New York Times, USA TODAY, The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, The Lebanon Daily News, The Evening Sun, 
and Public Opinion. Below is a description of findings from each media outlet, including the 
results of a quantitative coding-scheme analysis and a qualitative examination of the content.  
        The coding scheme (Attachment A) measured 384 articles produced by the keyword search: 
“voter or supporter and clinton or trump and section (front page or news or A01 or pg. 1 or pg. 
1a or pg. a1 or page 1 or national or state) and length>500 and not byline (compiled or 
Associated Press)” for all newspapers except The New York Times. For The New York Times, the 
search was modified to include longer articles, thereby generating a roughly equal number of 
news reports for each of the national newspapers to: “voter or supporter w/25 clinton or trump 
not debate and section (front page or news or A01 or pg. 1 or pg. 1a or pg. a1 or page 1 or 
national) and length>1000 and not byline (compiled OR Nate Cohn or Associated Press).” The 
keyword search was refined multiple times (for more on this see Methods Chapter 3) and was 
designed to produce articles either about the voters or featuring the voice of the voter(s) in the 
front section of the newspaper, written as a news report. 
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Research Questions and Hypothesis 
 This study was designed to explore the coverage of the voter in the last six weeks of the 
2016 election by news organizations that follow professional norms and aim for objectivity. 
Following the election, many members of the media engaged in a self-critical discussion to 
determine how coverage had failed to understand the voters and predict Trump’s victory. (For an 
analysis of this debate, please see Chapter Six). This study suggests that examining the news 
coverage using the lens of Hallin’s Sphere Theory provides insight into answering these 
questions. In most political coverage, the media aims to cover the event using normative 
practices that support the pursuit of objectivity.19 This type of coverage is labeled the sphere of 
legitimate controversy by Hallin. However, when journalists are confronted with events or actors 
they consider deviant, journalistic practices shift. The role of the media is no longer objective 
news gathering but to sound the alarm that something deviant is afoot. (For a broader discussion 
of Sphere Theory, please see Chapter Two). This study holds that journalists understood the 
Trump supporter as deviant, a threat to democracy, and covered these voters in this manner. It 
further suggests that this coverage contributed to a lost opportunity to explore the thoughts of the 
electorate because the practices associated with the coverage of deviance does not encourage in-
depth reporting. 
 This chapter provides the results of a study designed to answer the following research 
question: 
R1: Did the media coverage of the 2016 election frame the Trump voter as deviant or 
outside the sphere of legitimate controversy as defined by Hallin (1986)? 
 
19 Many news outlets do not pursue objectivity. This study aimed to focus on news outlets that followed professional 




It is based on the following hypotheses: 
H1:  Many journalists covering the 2016 election identified Trump as deviant from the 
political norm, as defined by Hallin (1986), and covered the campaign according to the norms 
prescribed by this model.  
H2: Many journalists covering the 2016 election also identified Trump supporters as 
deviant and outside the sphere of legitimate consensus, as defined by Hallin (1986) and covered 
those voters according to the norms prescribed by this model.  
 This study also addressed two additional research questions and hypotheses. Those 
questions are answered in Chapters Five and Six.  
Deviance and Delegitimizing Cues  
 Hallin’s (1986) study of the Vietnam War coverage was broken in two parts: the early 
coverage of the war in The New York Times and television news evening news broadcasts in the 
later years. The study is largely a qualitative analysis of the shifting roles and practices that the 
media played in response to different political actors for the time period 1961-1973. His book 
The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam, begins at the earliest days of the conflict and 
narrates the media’s response chronologically. The majority of Hallin’s analysis relies on and is 
demonstrated with quoted passages that explain his observations. The study does employ 
quantitative measures to measure the media response, however. Primarily, it measures for 
favorable and unfavorable statements of political actors involved in the war, including “domestic 
opposition,” and the frequency of normative practices such as editorializing, attribution and the 




Subsequent scholars have adapted Hallin’s study using Sphere Theory to develop to 
quantitative studies that rely more heavily on coding schemes. Aday, Livingston, and Herbert 
(2005) examined U.S. television news reports of the 2003 Iraq invasion. Their coding scheme, 
like Hallin’s, first identified the subject of the report (which provided a range of topics included 
in the war coverage) and then measured the tone of the report according to neutral, critical or 
supportive. Neutral was operationalized as an absence of value-laden language. Critical and 
supportive tones were evaluated through a coding scheme of terms related to war coverage. 
Robinson, Goddard, Parry and Murray (2008) built on this model to continue the study of the 
relationship of the media to government sources during war and revisited the 2003 Iraq invasion 
to examine British media. They amended Aday et. al.’s model to include an assessment of the 
topic addressed in the report and whether that topic was value-laden.  
Luther and Miller (2005) used Hallin’s sphere model to examine coverage of war 
protestors and developed a coding scheme to analyze legitimizing and delegitimizing cues. 
Legitimacy was defined as “that which connotes propriety, lawfulness, and characteristics 
reflective of the core values associated with America” and de-legitimacy was defined as “that 
which connotes anarchy, unlawfulness, and anti-Americanism” (p.85). Luther and Miller 
measured the frequency of legitimizing and delegitimizing cue words and in stories where both 
types of words appeared, they subtracted one from the other to give the story a score. Billard 
(2016) used Hallin’s sphere model and built on Luther and Miller to step outside of war and 
protester coverage and examine media representations of the transgender community. 
Interestingly, this last study offered the most parallels for a study of media coverage of Trump 
supporters. Billard studied newspaper coverage of transgender people and developed a list of 
nine “legitimacy indicators” to measure the tone of the news article. The legitimacy indicators 
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are in some ways a measure of the respect the reporter demonstrated to the subject of 
transgenderism and the individuals interviewed or described in the articles. They are specific to 
the discussion of transgenderism, for example they include pronoun usage, genital focus, and 
sexualization as indicators. However, Billard also uses measures such as shock tactics, name-
calling, and defamation as measures of legitimacy. 
 This study employs Billard’s form of analyzing language designed to measure 
legitimizing and delegitimizing language. (For more information on how the coding system was 
developed see Chapter 3, Methods.) Billard’s application of Hallin’s sphere theory identifies one 
of the important roles journalists have in a democratic society: identifying what is socially 
acceptable and what is illegitimate. Through language, journalists signal to their readers and 
other journalists who follow their example that a subject could be in or out of the sphere of 
legitimacy. Billard highlights how discrimination against transgender people has been a 
normative practice in most major newspapers. Although delegitimizing language used in the 
coverage of transgender people seems to be on the decline, Billard credits awareness created by 
social activists and scholars - rather than awareness by journalists - as being the engines of 
change in newspaper language.   
 Based on previous scholarship, this study developed a list of seven delegitimizing cues in 
the framing of the Trump voter in national and local media: support for the candidate of choice is 
socially unacceptable; the voter lacks a college education; the voter insults other voters or 
candidates; the voter is described as having unusual habits, clothing or speech; the voter believes 
in conspiracy theories; the voter’s race; and rallies that gather these voters are dangerous. News 
reports in this study were analyzed qualitatively using a coding scheme (Appendix A) and 
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quantitatively to determine if delegitimizing cues were a part of the media election coverage of 
voters and, if so, how those cues were included in descriptions of voters.   
Category One: Socially Unacceptable: 
Result: This study found that 20.4 percent of the news reports that included a description 
of Trump voters also had language that described some or all of those voters as “shy,” “reluctant” 
or some other term that suggested they were embarrassed by their support for the candidate. In 
news reports describing Clinton voters, less than 6 percent of the stories described voters as 
being reluctant to announce support for their candidate. (Results included Trump voters: 20 out 
of 98 yes/ Clinton voters: 6 out of 104 yes). 
 
Figure  3       
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Explanation: “Socially Unacceptable” is the name assigned to the framing of voters that 
suggests they were reluctant to admit their support for Trump publicly. This delegitimizing cue 
was developed to measure and analyze language that suggested or stated that Trump voters were 
not expressing their support for their candidate because it was stigmatized in their communities. 
Reading the media coverage of the 2016 election, terms such as “shy,” "rreluctant,” or 
“squeamish” were included in descriptions of the Trump voters. It was often used in descriptions 
of polls as a caveat that they might not be measuring the full range of support for Trump. This 
delegitimizing cue was built on previous scholarship. Klar, Weber and Krupinov (2017) 
developed their study based on Patterson (2016) to examine whether negative coverage of Trump 
the candidate “stigmatized Trump supporters and led to social desirability biases” (p. 433). Klar 
et. al. found that expressions of support for Trump were muted or withheld during the election 
because it was not socially acceptable in many environments to be labeled pro-Trump.  
This study found a considerable number of news reports mentioned this phenomenon.  
News reports were examined to determine if they mentioned the word “shy” or “squeamish” or 
any term that identified reluctance to vote for Trump or Clinton. In most examples, voters did not 
identify themselves in that manner. Rather, news reports speculated or quoted sources as 
speculating that Trump had more support than the polls showed because of “squeamish voters.”  
As an example of coverage that uses this delegitimizing term, consider the following USA 
TODAY article, published on Election Day 2016: 
“It would be a fitting end to the craziest presidential election in living memory if all the 
polls were wrong. 
The Trump campaign is counting on that. For months, they've encouraged talk 
about Donald Trump's secret weapon, his ace in the hole. One might even call 
it Trump's trump card: The "hidden" Trump voter. Such voters certainly exist, but it may turn out 
that they're outnumbered by the hidden Hillary vote. 
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First, let's look at the case for Trump. It's true that pollsters have found that there are 
"shy Trump" voters. Shy voters -- a term borrowed from the British, to describe "shy Tories" -- 
are people too embarrassed to tell pollsters their real preference.” 20 
 
The article defines Trump voters as “too embarrassed” and then later goes on to describe 
them further in this way:  
“The voters who tend to be squeamish about admitting to prefer Trump tend to be affluent 
college-educated whites. The share of these voters in the electorate isn't large enough to sway the 
final tally as much as the Trump campaign would like, particularly because many no doubt live 
in blue states -- California, New York, Washington and Illinois -- where Trump will lose 
regardless. (Though it does seem that the recent tightening in the polls is largely attributable to 
many of these voters.) 
Trump supporters say there's another hidden Trump vote: the legions of white "low 
propensity" voters pollsters fail to contact. If Trump can activate this hidden army of voters, the 
theory holds, make way for the tsunami.”21 
 
The article states that educated voters would be “squeamish” about admitting to 
supporting Trump but does not explain why. It leaves the reader with the impression that if you 
have an education, then you would not support Trump. (Or if you did, you might feel ill.) This 
may have been a fact in 2016 (and again perhaps in 2020) but there is no reporting on or 
explaining these phenomena. It reads as pure speculation. In addition, the report attributes the 
identification of “legions of white ‘low propensity’ voters to Trump supporters. This suggests 
that someone who supported Trump knew about large segments of voters who were not being 
counted in the polls. Who were these sources with this insight? In hindsight, investigative 
reporting on this tip might have led the reporter to an important element of the election.  
In comparison, the article also described hidden Clinton voters. Those voters are 
described in the following manner: 
 
20 Jonah Goldberg. (November 8, 2016 Tuesday). Clinton's Hidden Voters; Trump's Election Day bet on a wave of 






“There's also anecdotal evidence that there are in fact "hidden Clinton" voters among 
married Republican women.”22 
 
Despite mentioning hidden Clinton voters in the lead and headline, this is the full 
description of those voters in this report. As in the earlier example, the sourcing on this statement 
is vaguely written as “anecdotal evidence.” The implication of this statement is that married 
Republican women are afraid to publicly announce their support for Clinton because their 
spouses support Trump. Interestingly, this framing manages to make both Clinton and Trump 
supporters look deviant.  
These examples were drawn from one USA TODAY report that was particularly full of 
deviant framing. However, it does highlight use of this delegitimizing cue. In many other reports, 
this cue was included as a detail, often in stories about polling. A typical example that would 
have registered in this study as a delegitimizing cue that suggested the voter was socially 
unacceptable includes this phrase published in The Philadelphia Inquirer: “the belief that polls 
are missing millions of silent Trump backers.”23 The term silent was coded as a cue for deviance 
because it suggests something out of the ordinary in a negative manner. It begs the question, 
rarely if ever explained in these news reports, why would backers of a major political candidate 
not announce their support? When the question remains unanswered, it suggests the reason is 
something socially unacceptable. 
In late October 2016,  media reports included descriptions of Trump voters who were  
adopting the “shy voter” description. (This is similar to the Trump voters’ embrace of the 
comment by Hillary Clinton that many Trump supporters belonged in a basket of deplorables. 
 
22 Ibid. 
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That comment spawned voters to wear buttons and t-shirts with logos such as “Adorable 
Deplorable” or “Deplorables for Trump.”)  In a news report that featured a photo of a voter 
holding a sign that read, “the silent majority stands with Trump,” The Washington Post reported 
on the shy Trump voter this way: 
“This is an extension of the "silent majority" argument Trump and his surrogates have 
been making throughout the campaign. They even have signs. 
The idea is to signal that Trump's base is bigger than it appears because some backers — 
plagued by the scourge of political correctness, of course — feel they must criticize him publicly. 
The Trump campaign has even suggested that telephone polls underestimate the billionaire's 
support because some voters are afraid to admit to another person that they plan to vote for 
Trump.”24 
 
This coverage suggests a complicated social dance: Trump voters claim their numbers are 
larger than polls suggest because some elements of society have made it “politically incorrect” to 
support Trump. Yet, the Post report suggests this is not true. Another report published in October 
in The Washington Post with the headline “Shy Trump supporters? This new evidence says no” 
attempted to measure whether a shy Trump voter existed and suggested it did not: 
“According to the “shy Trump supporter” hypothesis, polls overstate the size of Hillary 
Clinton’s lead because some members of Trump’s “silent majority” decline to state their choice 
for president to pollsters. Although they may support Trump for partisan or policy reasons, they 
are embarrassed to admit their support for fear of being associated with Trump’s socially 
disapproved views on race and gender.” 
Later in the report, it read:  
“The study provides no hint of a silent majority that withholds its opinions from pollsters 
but will nevertheless turn out to vote for Donald Trump on Election Day.”25 
 
 
24  Borchers, Callum. (2016, October 6). The Donald Trump campaign takes its ‘silent majority’ case to the media. 
The Washington Post. 
 Retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/10/06/the-donald-trump-campaign-takes-
its-silent-majority-case-to-the-media/. 
25 Coppock, Alexander. (2016, October 25). Shy Trump supporters? This new evidence says no. The Washington 





The silent Trump voters is an important delegitimizing cue because it suggests both that 
there was a reason for voters to keep quiet about their support of one of two major political 
candidates and that there is a part of the electorate that the media was not covering well. As the 
election results suggested, the media did miss large pockets of Trump voters. The “silent” voter 
that was referred to by the media was an important, deciding factor in the presidential election 
that was often mentioned and very rarely explored. The fact that the cue was as common as this 
study found suggests that the media built the idea of the “shy” voter into its coverage but did not 
investigate it. This lack of reporting led to a misunderstanding of the electorate in media reports 
that predicted Clinton would win and suggested to readers that Trump voters have a reason to 
hide their support. In addition, the use of this delegitimizing cue does not merely reflect societal 
values, it enforces them. By identifying the presence of voters who were silently supporting 
Trump but not exploring the issues or motivations behind that support and the social pressure to 
stay silent, the media participated in the cycle of delegitimization and polarization 
Category Two: Uneducated 
Result: The education level of voters was a common detail to build into a description of 
voters in the coverage of the 2016 election. In 20.4 percent of the newspaper articles where 
Trump voters were mentioned, their education level or lack of education was referenced. For 
Clinton voters, the number was even higher: 25.3 percent of the stories mentioned the education 





Figure 4           
 
Explanation: The educational breakdown of the electorate, according to Pew Research 
Center’s U.S. Politics and Public Policy analysis of the election, found that 63 percent of voters  
in the 2016 election were non-college graduates and 37 percent of voters did hold a college 
degree.26 As the Pew analysis demonstrates, a large majority of voters lacked a college degree. 
However, the framing of the education level of the voters in this study, rarely - if ever - included 
 
26 Pew Research Center, U.S. Politics and Policy. (2018, August 9). An examination of the 2016 electorate, based on 




the fact that voters without a college education were the majority, perhaps even the norm. 
Instead, voters who did not have a college degree were often framed as “lacking.” 
As the results of this study show, the education level of Clinton voters was included in 
news reports slightly more often than they mentioned the education level of Trump voters. A 
qualitative examination of this cue revealed that when describing Clinton voters, education was 
framed as a positive attribute, but the education level of the Trump voters was nearly exclusively 
described in negative terms. For example, “college-educated women,” was a commonly used 
phrase to describe Clinton voters, while “lacking a college education” was often used for Trump 
voters. The following news report in The Philadelphia Inquirer was a good example of the 
results found in this study: “Polls show white college-educated women backing Clinton by 
double-digit margins, a voting bloc that could offset turnout by white non-college-educated men 
for Trump.”27  
The inclusion of education as a descriptor for voters was a delegitimizing cue for Trump 
voters and a legitimizing cue for Clinton supporters.  In addition, as The Philadelphia Inquirer 
example suggests, the difference of positive and negative framing of Clinton and Trump 
supporters was often included in contrast to each other. Sometimes the framing suggested that an 
educated person would not support Trump, such as this example from the The New York Times: 
“college-educated women—who would have considered voting Republican but are repelled by 
Mr. Trump”28 or this from The Washington Post:  
 
27 Hanna, Maddie. (2016, November 7). Trump’s ‘Locker Room’ Talk Eclipses Clinton’s Historic Moment. The 
Philadelphia Inquirer. Retrieved from https:// 
www.inquirer.com/philly/news/polics/20161106_Trump_s__locker_room__talk_eclipses_Clinton_s_historic_mome
nt.html. 
28 Peters, Jeremy; Richard Fausset, Michael Wines. (2016, November 1) Black Turnout Soft in Early Voting, Boding 




“Educational achievement remains a clear dividing line and one of the potential mold-
breakers of this campaign. Republicans have generally won the votes of whites with college 
degrees and those without. This fall, among white voters without college degrees, Trump leads 
by four points or more in 14 of the 15 states surveyed, most by sizable margins.” 29 
This latter example is interesting because it is describing polling data and a potential 
change in the voting pattern of the electorate, facts that a report that falls into the sphere of 
legitimate controversy would include. (Although it excludes that fact that a large majority of all 
voters do not hold a college degree). However, the framing of the voters as “without college 
degrees” lacks any exploration: no quotes from voters without a college education, no expert 
explaining what socio-economic forces would encourage this shift, no community members 
describing the reasons that these communities were voting Republican.  
This lack of reporting made education one of the most polarizing details in the news 
reports of 2016. Many different variations of this cue were found including: his mostly white, 
less educated base.”30 “ Trump has done well among another group of voters not inclined to cast 
ballots: those who do not have a college education”;31 “The crisis is not confined to the white 
men backing Donald Trump, who has commanding majorities among men without college 
educations”;32  "He has strong support among white voters without college degrees” and “a 
 
29 Balz, Dan. (2016, October 18) Clinton Holds Clear Advantage in New Battleground Polls. The Washington Post. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/clinton-holds-clear-advantage-in-new-battleground-
polls/2016/10/18/2885e3a0-94a6-11e6-bc79-af1cd3d2984b_story.html. 
30 Burns, Alexander (2016, November 6) Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump Scramble to Make Their Final Pleas. 
The New York Times. Retrieved from http:// https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/us/politics/campaign-clinton-
trump. 
31 Page, Susan (2016, October 3) Many Are Asking if It’s Ethical Not to Vote. USA TODAY. Retrieved from http: 
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higher concentration of non-college-educated voters.”33 In fact, every media outlet included in 
this study used language that described Trump voters as lacking a college degree during the 
general election coverage.    
 This is not to argue that education should not be included as a detail in election reporting. 
The results of the election found that education was a strong measure of predicting voting 
patterns in communities. Nate Silver, editor of FiveThirtyEight, published a statistical analysis of 
counties in the U.S. that examined vote choice and the percentage of residents that held college 
degrees.34 The analysis found a correlation between the number of residents with college degrees 
in a county and the likelihood of those communities voting for Hillary Clinton, even more than it 
was likely to vote for Barack Obama. The counties with the fewest college degrees were more 
likely to vote for Trump.  
However, highlighting the lack of a college of education among Trump voters as 
compared to Clinton voters has one clear implication: an educated voter supports Clinton. These 
voters were often described through statistical data or as a group and rarely as individuals. What 
was missing from the coverage was a thoughtful examination of why communities where fewer 
voters have college educations were attracted to Trump. Instead, these voters were labeled with a 
cue that suggests they were ignorant. Framing and a lack of reporting turned a potentially 
insightful fact into a delegitimizing cue. For example, many respected professions, sometimes 
labeled as “blue collar” in American society, do not require a college education: farmers, 
 
33 Tumulty, Karen and Dan Balz. (2016, November 6) Battleground Fight Intensifies. The Washington Post. 
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firefighters, members of the military, electricians, plumbers. Large communities supporting 
Trump were summed up and dismissed as “voters lacking a college education.” 
A college education is not a requirement to cast a vote in the U.S. democratic system. As 
a measure of the electorate, it is a worthwhile statistical measure. However, when presented too 
often as a contrast between voters, held out as the norm when in fact a majority of voters do not 
hold a college degree, and repeating this detail without fully exploring how and why it matters, 
citing a lack of education becomes a delegitimizing cue and can contribute to a lack of 
understanding that works against accurately informing the electorate. 
Category Three: Race 
Results: The race of voters was another detail regularly mentioned in the coverage across 
all media outlets for both Clinton and Trump supporters. Nearly 35 percent of the reports in this 
study that described Trump voters also mentioned their race. Overwhelmingly, when the race of 
Trump supporters was mentioned, they were described as “White.” As with the “Education” cue, 
more news reports identified the race of Clinton supporters than Trump supporter. Nearly 45 
percent of the articles that described Clinton voters included an identification of race. However, 
Clinton supporters were more likely to be described as a race other than White. As demonstrated 
in the charts below, nearly half of the voters described as supporting Clinton were identified as 
either African American or Hispanic. 
 In the 2016 election, according to the Pew Center for Research, the breakdown of the 
race of the entire electorate included: 74 percent White voters, 10 percent Black voters, 10 
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percent Hispanic voters.35  The Pew study did not include any other racial measures. (Results 




Figure 5       
When race was mentioned to describe voters, Trump supporters were almost always 
described as White. The results of the 2016 election support the fact that most of Trump 
supporters were White. Trump won 54 percent of the White vote compared to Clinton’s 39 
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percent. Clinton won support from minority voter with 66 percent of the Hispanic vote and 91 
percent of the Black vote, compared to 39 percent of Hispanic voters and 6 percent of Black 
voters for Trump.36 These results also reflect similar racial breakdowns of support for 
Republican and Democratic presidential candidates in recent elections, although Clinton won 
slightly less of the minority vote than Obama did, which contributed to her loss.37  
As a result, describing Trump voters as primarily White was an accurate description. 
However, the descriptor of race, primarily the use of the term “White” to describe Trump voters, 
was found to be a delegitimizing cue after a quantitative analysis of the results for several 
reasons. First, as Pew Research Reports show, Trump’s support among White, Black and 
Hispanic voters did not vary from the support offered to Republican candidates over the past 20 
years. In fact, Trump won more of the Hispanic and Black vote than Mitt Romney did in 2012 
and nearly the same percentages as Sen. John McCain when he ran as the Republican candidate 
for president in 1988.38 
 Scholars Carnes and Lupu (2020) argued that Donald Trump’s support among White, 
working class voters stems from long-term shifts in the electorate, not the candidate. Carnes and 
Lupu argue that media reports that portraying “white working class” as offering “unprecedented 
and crucial support” to Trump were wrong. Their study found that Trump’s support came from 
the same sectors of society that previous Republican candidates have drawn from and the idea 
that Trump was a rallying symbol for blue collar workers was not accurate. “The white working 
 
36 Ibid. 
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class was not uniquely central to Trump’s election and there was nothing unprecedented about 
his support among this group,” Carnes and Lupu argue (p.3). Instead, the study argues, “The 
relationship between education, income, race, and presidential voting is evolving. But observers 
will never understand that evolution if they get stuck on the simple narrative that it was 
something about Trump that appealed to the working class.” (p.12). Similarly, Morgan and Lee 
(2017) argued that “racial prejudice, anti-immigrant sentiment, concerns about economic 
security, and frustration with government responsiveness may have led many white, working-
class voters to support an outsider candidate who campaigned on these themes.” However, they 
go on to state that the issues and motivations of the white working class reflects historical trends 
and “give(s) no support to the related claim that the white working class changed its positions on 
these matters in response to the 2016 primary election campaign or in the months just before the 
general election,” (p.1). 
 In other words, Trump voters in 2016 were not supporting different causes or turning out 
in different racial breakdowns than Republicans have in the past and that historical trends would 
suggest. As this scholarship suggests, the media suggestion that White voters were attracted to 
Trump because his rhetoric supported racist views or divisions among races is not accurate. 
Similar support among White voters went to much less controversial candidates such as Mitt 
Romney and John McCain. While Trump may have been a divisive, angry or even racist 
candidate, the evidence suggests that this did not change racial voting patterns. His support came 
mostly from a traditional Republican base. Yet, the racial descriptor “White” was used in nearly 
a third of the articles mentioning Trump voters. Highlighting the race suggested that this was 
something new and alarming in the U.S. democratic system. It allows the suggestion that Trump 
supporters were motivated by race, without fully exploring this suggestion, and this leads news 
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consumers and the media to dismiss these voters as a deviant part of society. And, as Carnes and 
Lupu (2020) suggest, misunderstanding this fact in the media means that real truths are not 
explored. 
Coupling the suggestion that the Trump voter was uniquely motivated by race was the 
pairing of the term White with descriptors that the voter was also angry. A quantitative review of 
the news reports that identified Trump supporters as White commonly also described those 
voters as supporting Trump because of resentment or anger. An October 2016 report in The New 
York Times is a good example: “frustration and resentments evident among Trump’s supporters 
have roots.” Similarly, a September report in The Washington Post: “a test of whether Trump can 
expand his support beyond his base of aggrieved white voters, most of them men” also highlights 
the themes of this type of coverage. The terms “frustration and resentments” and “aggrieved” are 
strong terms that are not explained or investigated these reports. It suggests that White voters 
supported Trump because of anger rooted in race as opposed to issues. Studies like Morgan and 
Lee (2017) and Carnes and Lupu (2020) suggest that issues motivating Trump supporters were 
the same type of issues that motivated the Romney and McCain voter. Trump’s language and 
campaign style did not attract more White voters than previous Republican candidates have. 
What was missing from the election coverage was an exploration of why and how the White 
voter appeared more angry or aggrieved or resentful.  It suggests a moment for greater 
exploration and in-depth reporting for the media and an insight into the Trump voter that the 
election coverage did not offer.  
Finally, the most important reason this descriptor was determined to be a delegitimizing 
cue for this study was the description of White extremists that was included in news reports 
about of Trump supporters. Several news reports suggested that Trump supporters tolerated, or 
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even supported, the views of racial hate groups.  Clearly Trump’s campaign attracted voters who 
held racists views, felt emboldened by Trump’s candidacy and were vocal in their positions. 
What was rarely explored in the coverage was what percentage of Trump supporters shared these 
views. As a delegitimizing cue, this was a powerful frame. Understanding voters to be tolerant of 
hate groups allows the news media and consumers to dismiss the views of all Trump voters. A 
small suggestion of hate can be a powerful delegitimizing tool to reject a large number of voters.  
This study considered allegations of racism to be the most delegitimizing cue in the 
election coverage because it was often included without attribution.  For example, consider this 
from a report in USA TODAY: “They also note that a number of racists and anti-Semites seem 
attracted to Trump's campaign.”39 The term “they” in this quote refers to critics of the Trump 
campaign, who are not quoted or identified in the report. The report does not explain or attribute 
this observation. A similar example published in The Washington Post included the phrase 
“offensive language and ethnic insults became routine at Trump rallies.”40 This report offers the 
same assessment without explanation or attribution. Another example includes a report in The 
New York Times about Black voters that reads: “some go so far as to wonder if Mr. Trump’s 
supporters have been planted by the Klu Klux Klan.”41 Again, this report is vague on attribution. 
The term “some,” similar to the term  “critics” is not followed with concrete examples or quotes 
from sources who support this statement. In a more damning report, The New York Times ran a 
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story the Sunday before Election Day on Trump’s “extremist” supporters. The story featured 
several self-identified white nationalists who supported Trump’s candidacy and reported that the 
campaign had brought these groups “out of the shadows.” The news report was headlined, 
“Donald Trump’s Extremist Supporters Feel Like Winners Either Way,” and included: 
“Of course, Mr. Trump’s populist candidacy has energized ordinary Americans across the 
country who previously felt alienated from the political system, but it has also emboldened 
extremist groups that say he has validated their agendas.” 
 
A few paragraphs later, it stated: 
 “The biggest beneficiary may well be the so-called alt-right, the once obscure and now 
ascendant white nationalist movement.”42  
 
Including these terms to describe Trump voters without careful, in-depth reporting does 
not benefit the media, the reader, or the democratic system. Highlighting them without context 
contributes to the framing of the Trump voters as deviant and is a clear example of shifting 
normative practices that moves these voters from the sphere of legitimate controversy to the 
sphere of deviance where the media aims to alarm the public rather than inform.  
Many issues facing the country in 2016 had roots in race: immigration, the Black Lives 
Matter movement, poverty, educational inequities. Yet a Pew Report on issues important to the 
voter in 2016 suggests that race was not the most important motivation in the election. The Pew 
Report put the economy at the top of the list of issues with 84 percent of voters identifying it as a 
“very important” factor in their vote, followed very closely by terrorism and foreign policy.43  By 
suggesting that the White Trump supporter was angry, the media missed an opportunity to 
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Winners Either Way. The New York Times. Retrieved from https: 
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untangle the issues of economic depression, immigration, terrorism and race and explore the 
differences that separated the Trump voter from the Clinton voter on these topics. Future 
research would benefit from a deeper exploration of language used to the describe the race of 
voters and how often it was paired with language that suggests this is a motivating factor for the 
voters.  
At the same time, this study does not suggest that racial divisions were not a motivating 
force for Trump voters. Scholars such as Hooge and Dassoneville (2018) found that racial 
resentment and anti-immigrant sentiment were “important determinants” of who would support 
Trump. As a candidate, Trump often used racial stereotypes and insults in his campaign 
speeches. Yet, despite the common use of racial descriptors, Trump’s supporters’ views on race 
were rarely explored in the media coverage. Clearly, there are normative barriers to exploring 
race in election coverage. Few voters self-identify as racist and it can require a skilled 
interviewer to navigate this topic. Yet, this study found that the media highlighted racial 
differences of both Clinton and Trump voters and suggested it was fueled by anger without much 
exploration. Unsupported by reporting, it is a delegitimizing cue that ignores whether anger and 
resentment are present and if so, why. In addition, it is worth considering whether the media’s 
habit of highlighting race without explanation may have contributed to the polarization of the 
electorate based on racial lines that became a prominent issue in the 2020 election.  
Category Four: Insults 
Results: This category measured how often Trump and Clinton supporters were quoted as 
insulting or calling each other names. This study that 49.5 percent of the news reports that 
mention Trump supporters also quoted them insulting either Hillary Clinton or her supporters. In 
news reports that referred to Clinton supporters there was also a high rate of insults. Nearly 43 
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percent of the news reports that described Clinton voters also  quoted them as insulting Trump or 
his supporters. Insults were coded to include strong words such as “liar,” “criminal,” “rapist” and 
were not included if the voter was quoted as simply disagreeing or disliked the other candidate. 
(Results included Trump voters: 44 out of 99 yes/ Clinton voters: 44 out of 104 yes) 
 
Figure 6 
This delegitimizing cue reflects the tendency of the news reports to use the voter as an 
interesting detail or entertainment within the article rather than a source of information. The high 
rate of news reports that featured voters insulting other voters or the candidates devalues the 
voice of both the Clinton and Trump supporters. This is not to suggest that these types of 
statements were not offered often on the campaign trail. The pattern of insulting your opponent 
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stemmed from the candidates themselves in 2016. Trump included insults in almost every 
campaign rally speech. He called Clinton a “monster,” “a weak person,” “unhinged,” 
“unbalanced,” “liar” and “44  and he regularly referred to Clinton as “Crooked Hillary." 45 Clinton 
also famously insulted Trump supporters. At a Democratic fundraising for her election, Clinton 
was quoted as saying:  
“You know, to just be grossly generalistic, you could put half of Trump’s supporters into 
what I call the basket of deplorables. Right?” she said to applause and laughter. “The racist, 
sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamaphobic — you name it. “46  
 
As a result, it is not a surprise that the rate of insults attributed to voters was high. 
However, it was coded as a delegitimizing cue because it also reflects a pattern by the journalist 
when framing a news report about how the voice of the voter will be represented. When 
choosing between topics to include in the coverage of the voter, the media often chose the 
colorful insult rather than the exploration of issues. This study found that in 27.6 percent of the 
news reports included in this study that described voters, they were quoted as mentioning an 
issue important in the election. (See Figure 9 below.) That leaves nearly 75 percent of the news 
reports that mention voters, yet exclude  a mention of issues. Comparatively, nearly half the 
articles mentioning voters were found to include insults. 
 
44 At a rally in Green Bay, Wisconsin on August 4, 2016. For a transcript see: https://www.c-
span.org/video/?413593-1/donald-trump-endorses-speaker-ryan-ahead-primary. 
45 For more on Trump’s insults see: Itkowitz, Colby. (2016, April 20) ‘Little Marco,’ ‘Lyin’ Ted,’ ‘Crooked 
Hillary:’ How Donald Trump makes name calling stick. The Washington Post. Retrieved from: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/inspired-life/wp/2016/04/20/little-marco-lying-ted-crooked-hillary-donald-
trumps-winning-strategy-nouns/ 
46 Chozick, Amy. (2016, September 10) Hillary Clinton Calls Many Trump Backers ‘Deplorables,’ and G.O.P. 




 An example of reports that attributed insults to voters included these final lines from a 
November 2016 news report in The New York Times about former President Clinton’s role as a 
campaigner:  
“A white middle-aged man standing beside his young son in the back shouted the refrain 
often heard at Mr. Trump’s rallies: “Lock that bitch up.” 
Mr. Clinton continued as if he had not heard a thing.” 47 
 
In the above example, the detail of the white, middle-aged man yelling out an insult that includes 
a curse word to the husband of the candidate while standing next to a young child, presumably 
his son, is particularly jarring and the image the writer chose to conclude the report with. As the 
study results suggest, insults were a common delegitimizing cue for Trump and Clinton voters. 
The result was that it was very common to find news reports that featured voters and insults and 
not include the issues important to those voters. For example, consider this passage from The 
Philadelphia Inquirer about Cuban American voters who disliked Trump: 
“(H)e has something in common with exile Carlos Bautista, a retired stationery engraver 
who senses an authoritarian streak in the GOP nominee that reminds him of Argentina's Juan 
Perón, Fidel Castro, and other dictators. 
"He's the classic bad guy in all the old movies," said Bautista, 76. "To me, he is an 
animal. He don't care about nothing or nobody but himself. . . . Too much power in one person is 
bad, very bad." 48 
 
Or this description of a Trump rally in an October 2016 report in The Washington Post: 
 “On the other side of the street, a Trump supporter in line screamed: What about Bill 
Clinton? Clinton is still a rapist!” A vendor sold blue yard signs that said: “Trump that b---- (sic) 
before it’s too late.” Another sold T-shirts showing a cartoon of Trump urinating on the word 
“Hillary.”49  
And this example from an October report in The New York Times: 
 
47 Horowitz, Jason. (2016, November 7) Bill Clinton Evokes Past, but From the Periphery of His Wife’s Campaign. 
The New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/us/politics/bill-clinton-campaign.html. 
48 Gabriel, Trip. (2016, October 12). Donald Trump Faltering? Die-Hard Fans Refuse to Buy It. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/us/politics/donald-trump-voters.html. 
49 Johnson, Jenna. (2016, October 11). Base is Increasingly Worried that a Trump Win Isn’t Assured. The 
Washington Post. P. A1. 
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 “At lunchtime on Thursday, the first day of early voting here, Fred Ames, 73, was 
standing in a line of more than 120 voters waiting to cast ballots. His T-shirt had a picture of Mr. 
McCrory ad the words ‘human garbage.’ 
 He faulted the governor, who earned a reputation as a moderate in his 14 years as mayor 
of Charlotte, for failing to stand up to more conservative Republicans in the Legislature. 
 “Essentially,” Mr. Ames said, “he has no backbone.”50  
 
 The media is participating and abetting a cycle when it highlights the voters insulting 
each other. The behavior that attracts attention is often repeated and exaggerated, Hallin (1986) 
found. His study identified that when political actors are framed as deviant in the media, these 
same political actors will go on to exaggerate their deviant behavior to gain further media 
attention. Therefore, highlighting the more deviant elements of a political group, Hallin argues, 
that the media is actually encouraging this type of behavior. The cycle of delegitimizing behavior 
(See Figure 1 in Chapter Seven: Conclusion) encourages political actors to act out in a deviant 
manner to gain attention for their cause which the media highlights, encouraged by press 
coverage of previous deviance, political actors ramp up their behavior and attract more press 
attention, Hallin wrote. 
 Recent scholarship has found that voters are growing more and more hostile to members 
of the other party. Iyengar and Krupenkin (2018) used American National Election Studies data 
to determine that “hostility” toward the opposing party has grown dramatically in the past 20 
years. The study concluded that negative feelings toward the opposing party has become more 
consistent and serves a motivating force for political participation. In fact, the study found that 
negative feelings toward the opposing party is the greatest motivator of political involvement, 
more than positive feelings toward the party that the voter associates with. Patterson (2019) 
found that the increasing negativity described in Iyengar and Krupenkin (2018) was also present 
 
50 Fausset, Richard and Jackie Calmes. (2016, November 26) Protests and Storms Make North Carolina’s Election 




in the media coverage of the 2016 election. Patterson measured the tone of election news reports 
and found that the tone of coverage of both candidates was overwhelmingly negative, peaking at 
84 percent negative for one week in October 2016. His study identified that the negative tone of 
election news reports has increased with each presidential election since 1960 and was a function 
of the candidates or their supporters in 2016. “As journalists would have it, the Trump and 
Clinton camps were the cause of all the negativity. And it was certainly true that the election was 
unusually nasty. But to attribute the tone entirely to the opposing camps is to ignore the pattern 
of presidential election coverage during the past few decades,” Patterson wrote (2016, p.4). 
 The trend toward greater hostility is encouraged by media coverage of voters using 
insults toward the opposing party. This increased polarization exists and should be covered, but 
highlighting it at the expense of other descriptions of the voter has consequences that this study 
urges the media to examine.  
Category Five: Conspiracy Theories 
 Results: This study found that nearly 40 percent of the news reports that described Trump 
reporters also included the voter’s belief in a conspiracy theory. Comparatively, less than two 
percent of Clinton supporters were quoted as believing in a conspiracy theory. Conspiracy 
theories were coded as language that stated that the voter(s) believed in ideas such as military 
revolution would follow the election, Clinton would confiscate all guns, or the election was 
rigged. The difference between Trump voters and Clinton voters framed with this delegitimizing 
cue was one of the biggest disparities of the study. (Results included Trump voters: 36 out of 95 








 As a candidate Trump regularly suggested exaggerated claims on the campaign trail 
about rigged election processes, the government taking away guns or media bias. So, it is no 
surprise that some Trump supporters were quoted as concerned about these issues. However, 
given the lack of issue coverage and the high rate of associating Trump supporters with some of 
the most controversial and exaggerated claims of the campaign, this was one of the most obvious 
delegitimizing cues of the coverage. Similar to the cues of insults and odd behavior, clothing or 
speech patterns, this framing could have been replaced with an exploration of the issues and 
motivations of voters. But these details are often colorful, perhaps even humorous and offer the 
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journalist a chance to add this sensational element to a political news story. In addition, as these 
other cues do also, they contribute to the deviant framing of the Trump voter and the idea that 
these voters are an easily dismissed element of society not a significant political force. 
 Examples of this delegitimizing cue were common in the news coverage. Consider this 
report on Trump supporters at a rally featured in The New York Times: 
 “They also repeated conspiracy theories that flourish online. ‘A lot of people affiliated 
with Hillary have died over the years, and nobody says nothing about it,’ said Eric Bulger, a 
retired police officer with the Port Authority for New York and New Jersey.” 51 
 
Or this unattributed example from The Philadelphia Inquirer that ran the day before the 
Election Day:  
 “It's easy to find Republican voters sincerely convinced Clinton would confiscate their 
guns.”52  
 
And this report from The New York Times with the headline “Trump Backers See 
Revolution if Clinton Wins”: 
 “Jared Holbrook, 25, of Green Bay, Wis., said that if Mr. Trump lost to Hillary Clinton, 
which he worried would happen through a stolen election, it could lead to another 
“Revolutionary War.”  
“People are going to march on the capitols,” said Mr. Holbrook, who works at a call center. 
“They’re going to do whatever needs to be done to get her out of office, because she does not 
belong there.”53 
 
And this example from USA TODAY: 
 “At a campaign town hall in Newton, Iowa, last week, Trump's running mate, Mike 
Pence, faced a woman who said she was "ready for a revolution." 
"Our lives depend on this election," she said with emotion. "Our kids' futures depend on 
this election and I will tell you just for me, and I don't want this to happen but I will tell you for 
 
51 Gabriel, Trip. (2016, October 12). Donald Trump Faltering? Die-Hard Fans Refuse to Buy It. The New York Times. 
Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/us/politics/donald-trump-voters.html. 
52 Fitzgerald, Thomas. (2016, November 7) A presidential election unlike any other. The Philadelphia 
Inquirer. Retrieved from: 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/20161106_2016__A_presidential_election_unlike_any_other.html 
53 Parker, Ashley and Nick Corasaniti. (2016, October 28). Trump Backers See Revolution if Clinton Wins. The 
New York Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/us/politics/donald-trump-voters.html. 
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me personally if Hillary Clinton gets in, I myself, I'm ready for a revolution because we can't 
have her in." 
When Pence demurred, saying "Don't say that," she went on: "What are we going to do to 
safeguard our votes? Because we've seen how the Democratic Party is just crooked, crooked, 
crooked."54 
 
The delegitimizing cue of believing in a conspiracy theory contributed to the media’s 
framing of the Trump voter as deviant. In the above examples, the voters who are quoted in 
believing that that there will be a revolution, the election is rigged, that guns will be confiscated 
or that “people died” when associated with Clinton are one of the few mentions of the voters and 
their specific concerns in the news reports they were featured in. Framing voters expressing these 
types of suspicious thoughts as opposed to concerns about issues the country faced in the 
presidential election, the media made a similar choice as they did when including insults. It adds 
to polarization by highlighting animosity between voters and makes the Trump voter easy to 
dismiss because their beliefs do not seem grounded in reality. When 40 percent of the news 
reports featuring Trump voters includes the delegitimizing cue of “believing in conspiracy 
theories” but less than 30 percent include the voter mentioning issues, suggests how tempting it 
might be for a journalist to include this type of quote in a news report.  
Scholarship on conspiracy theories that are circulated on social media suggest that the 
media is often being manipulated when it highlights this type of disinformation. Marwick and 
Lewis (2017) concluded that during the 2016 election many online groups worked to manipulate 
social media sites to gain attention from mainstream news organizations by spreading false and 
misleading information and conspiracy theories. The study found that these online groups were 
 
54 Jackson, David and Susan Page. (2016, October 16). Rigged election? A chorus of complaint from Team Trump. 





mostly far-right political organizations but also included “an amalgam of conspiracy theorists, 
techno-libertarians, white nationalists, Men’s Rights advocates, trolls, anti-feminists, anti-
immigration activists, and bored young people.” Like Hallin’s theory that the media encouraged 
deviant framing in war protestors, Marwick and Lewis (2020) found that online groups were able 
to gain mainstream media attention by “attention hacking,” which increased the visibility of their 
political agenda. “The media’s dependence on social media, analytics and metrics, 
sensationalism, novelty over newsworthiness, and clickbait makes them vulnerable to such 
media manipulation,” (2020, p.1). Similarly, Haughey, Muralikumar, Wood and Starbird (2020) 
found that the “misinformation beat,” as they termed reporting on conspiracy theories, 
misinformation and disinformation, is complicated. “Even in seemingly cut-and-dry situations, 
there are concerns that journalists may be amplifying mis- and disinformation through their 
efforts to debunk it,” (p.5). Recognizing the inclusion of conspiracy theories in news reports as 
part of a cycle of manipulation and as a delegitimizing cue that allows news consumers to 
dismiss Trump voters, the choice to include this type of disinformation attributed to voters 
should be reconsidered in future election coverage.  
Category Six: Odd Behavior, Clothing or Speech 
Result: This study found that when Trump supporters were included in media reports 
more than 18 percent of the articles included a description of those voters that distinguished 
those sources as “odd.” Clinton voters were described in this way in less than 1 percent of the 
reports. The coding for this was designed to recognize very unusual behavior, language or 
clothing that was highlighted in a media report. (Results included Trump voters: 18 out of 98 






The framing of odd details such as behavior, clothing or speech in the news reports 
examined in this study were considered a delegitimizing cue because they highlighted a detail 
about the voter that seemed out of step with his or her community and was not presented in a 
positive tone. These types of details added to the perception that the Trump voter was a deviant 
part of society and not an important political group that cared about issues.  
For example, the lead of a front-page article in The Washington Post described an 89-
year-old Trump supporter named Cathy Frasca, who “woke up at 5 a.m. and hand-wrote a four-
page letter to Donald Trump.” The article goes on to describe Frasca as wearing  
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“a yellow T-shirt featuring a screaming Hillary Clinton, flames and the message, ‘Liar! Liar! 
Pants suit on fire.” 55 Two days later, The New York Times published a report where the first 
voter quoted was a 70-year-old Trump supporter named Lewis Beishine, who was described as 
“drinking at 11 a.m. on a Friday at Cusat’s Café, a bar owned by the mayor, who lives upstairs.” 
Later in that article, another voter was described as “Nick Zapotocky, 31, who now has three 
deadbolt locks on his front door.”56 Many articles highlighted the Trump supporters who wore 
prison costumes to the rallies. “(T)he voters trickling in - more than one dressed as Clinton in a 
prison jumpsuit.”57 Another example, from USA TODAY illustrates both the conspiracy theory, 
lack of issue coverage and the use of odd language and details: 
 "Since the polls are starting to shift quite a bit towards Hillary Clinton, I've been buying 
a lot more ammunition," says Rick Darling, 69, an engineer from Harrison Township, in 
Michigan's Detroit suburbs. In a follow-up phone interview after being surveyed, the Trump 
supporter said he fears progressives will want to "declare martial law and take our guns away" 
after the election. "You can say I'm wearing my tin-foil hat," Darling says. "I don't know what's 
going to happen. It's so unpredictable...If it all falls apart, I'm going to be ready if I have to be. 
I'm going to be a good Boy Scout."58 
 
55 Johnson, Jenna. (2016, October 11). Base is increasingly worried that a Trump win isn't assured. The Washington 
Post. Retrieved from https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5KX8-DNC1-DXXY-3007-00000-
00&context=1516831. 
56 Appelbaum, Binyamin. (2016, October 13). Divisions in an Evolving Economy. The New York Times. P. B1. 
57 David Weigel. (2016, November 1). Clinton's resilience with black voters is put to test. The Washington 
Post. Retrieved from https://advance-lexis-com.proxy-
um.researchport.umd.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5M2R-TFV1-JBFW-C53X-00000-
00&context=1516831. 
58Page, Susan and Karina Shedrofsky. (2016, October 27). Poll: 51% fear Election Day violence; Clinton up, but 





While only 18 percent of the news reports included these delegitimizing cue, when it was 
included it a powerful suggestion that Trump voters were outside the norm, or deviant, in more 
than their political beliefs. Clinton voters were not framed using this delegitimizing cue. 
Certainly, some Clinton voters displayed odd behavior on the campaign trail or in interviews, but 
it was not often featured in news reports examined in this study. In many of these reports, the 
voters displaying odd behavior, language or clothing were the only Trump voters included in the 
article. In the final example above, published in a USA TODAY report, the article states that the 
voter, Mr. Darling, was interviewed a second time over the telephone. That suggests that the 
reporter chose to call the engineer from the Detroit suburbs after he participated in a poll 
conducted by the newspaper. His follow-up quote, where he talks about wearing a tinfoil hat, 
having guns taken away and being a “good Boy Scout,” does very little to illuminate his earlier 
statement, but does make him appear more deviant.  
The Voter in General 
This study also looked at the framing of voters in general, as opposed to the differences 
between the descriptions of Trump and Clinton voters. The most noticeable trend was that the 
voter was not often included in election news reports, even when the headline and lead suggested 
that the article was “about” voters. In only 50.5 percent of the news reports that were about 
voters actually included the voter as a source or a description of voters in general. In other 
words, many news reports that talked about voters rarely included information about actual 
members of the voting public. Instead, this study identified a trend among the media to talk about 
the voter rather than interviewing voters. It was far more common for a news report to include a 
political analyst describing voters than it was for a news report to include on-the-ground 
reporting interviewing voters in their home communities. In addition, this study found that when 
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voters were included in a news report, they were often featured at the end of the report, after 
other types of sources. This suggests that voters were an unimportant element of the report.  
The final observation and measurement in this part of the study was that a significant 
number of news reports that featured voters also suggested that the candidates offered the voters 
“no good choice.” This suggestion was common enough that it was included in this study, with 
the likelihood that understanding this measurement would most likely come in future 
scholarship.  
These observations were identified in a qualitative examination of the news report and 
then measured in the coding scheme. The following are the three categories that were identified 
and measured and the results of this study. 
Measurement One: Lack of Issue Coverage 
Result: This study found that in news reports that included a description of the voter, less than 28 
percent included mention of an issue important to that voter in the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election. This measurement was coded to include any political issue attributed to either a group 





 Figure 9 
   
Examples of news reports that excluded the voice of the voter about issues were common 
in this study – more than 72 percent fell into this category. The lack of issue coverage was 
noticeable, for example, consider a report published in The Washington Post’s regular political 
column called The Fix. Published 15 days before the election with the headline, “Donald 
Trump’s chances of winning are approaching zero,” 59 the report focused solely on statistical 
analysis and lacked any sources at all. Another example was a report in USA TODAY about 
 
59 Cillizza, Chris and Aaron Blake. (2016, October 17). Donald Trump’s chances of winning are approaching zero. 




Clinton’s targeting of Republican voters that ran October 15 with the headline, “Clinton Courts 
Trump’s Core: White Men.” Despite featuring White men in the lead, no voters were included in 
the report but three professional political observers speculated about what might motivate these 
voters to switch parties. 60 
Measurement Three: Voters as a Source 
Result: This measurement examined whether political sources were used as a source in 
news article and if so, if those sources outnumbered voters as a source in a news report. In 
addition, it measured whether voters were placed after political sources in a news report that 
featured both. The study found that more than 66 percent of the news reports analyzed in this 
study included professional political observers such as politicians, pollsters, political analysts 
and academics. When professional political observers were included as sources, they 
outnumbered voters as a source in 82 percent of the reports. And, when both types of sources 
were featured, voters were included in the report after the political observers in more than 63 
percent of those reports. 
As the previous findings on the use of the voter in a news report has explained, 
professional political analysts were often used to explain or predict potential voter behavior in 
place of actual voters. Normatively, this is a customary practice and a practical one. It is time-
consuming, potentially inaccurate, and expensive to conduct on the ground reporting of voters. 
Political analysts spend their time and resources conducting research that can sum up voting 
trends and explain polls. Turning to these types of sources makes sense for the journalist on 
deadline. However, as the 2016 election found, the polls and the analysis by experts was 
 
60 Przybyla, Heidi. (2016, October 14). Clinton Courts Trump’s Core: White Men. USA TODAY. 
Retrieved from: https://www.pressreader.com/usa/usa-today-us-edition/20161014/281479275935196 
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misleading and suggested that Clinton would win the election.  Relying on the analyst as 
opposed to the challenging work of on-the-ground reporting of the voter in different 
communities may have contributed to the misunderstanding of the electorate in 2016.  
The findings of this study supports Patterson’s (2016) finding, which measured the topic 
of news coverage in the election year. That study found that only 10 percent of the news reports 
focused on policy issues. This study differed from Patterson in that it measured whether voters 
were given the chance to discuss issues in a report that featured voters, but it supports the general 
finding that issues are not a focus of election coverage. Given that the articles studied came from 
the last six weeks of a presidential election, during a time when there were three presidential 
debates and a vice-presidential debate and that most articles were reported from political events 
involving voters, the lack of voters discussing issues is disappointing. Coupled with the high rate 
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In addition, when voters were included as a source in media reports, they usually were 
placed at the end of an article. This placement is interesting when considered through the lens of 
journalistic practice. As defined by Mindich (2006), use of the inverted pyramid is a key element 
in the pursuit of objectivity and is defined as “a system of ordering facts in descending order of 
importance” (p.65). Mindich writes that it is impossible to overstate the importance of this 
practice in the pursuit of objectivity because it requires to the journalist to avoid chronological 
reporting and determine what is most important for the news consumer to learn first. Understood 
this way, the practice of placing a fact or source at the end of the news report signals that it is the 
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least important element of the article. Of course, the ranking of facts is a subjective exercise and 
can reveal what the journalist considers most important. 
Measurement Four: No Good Choice 
Result: The final finding of this study was that a significant percentage of news articles 
examined for this study included language that suggested that the presidential election of 2016 
offered voters “no good choice.” More than 25.9 percent of the news reports included in this study 
were found to include this suggestion. The term “no good choice” was coded to include language 
that suggested that the two major party candidates in the U.S. presidential election, Trump and 
Clinton, did not offer voters a choice they could support. As the findings indicate, this was a 
common theme present in the news reports and was either attributed to political analysts or 
observers, in quotes from voters or stated unattributed by the reporter. 
Examples of framing that suggested that the election offered voters no good choice 
included this unattributed statement included in an October report from The New York Times: 
“For voters across party lines, the presidential race was already ugly, already exhausting 
and already dominated by two candidates many voters found deplorable.”61  
 
And this example, also from USA TODAY with the headline “A Sharpened Debate: Many 
are Asking if it’s Ethical not to vote this year for President?”  
  “It’s not: ‘How much do I like these people?’” says Jan Leighley, an American University 
professor and co-author of Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality and Turnout in 
the United States. “It’s: Does it make a difference between this person I do not like opposed to 
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The following examples from a report in The Washington Post, presents this theme 
through a quote from Rep. Paul Ryan, then Speaker of the House: 
 “While Ryan did not mention Trump by name Friday, he suggested that he understood 
voters may feel there is no good choice for president this election. 
“I know some people are avoiding making any choice at all,” he said. “I don’t begrudge anyone 
that.”63 
Other reports framed the presidential election as a “joke.” This report ran in the style 
section of the The New York Times: 
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 “There is another way to appropriately view this election: as farce. That’s the spirit the 
online magazine Slate will channel at the Gist,” read the report that included the headline, 
“Worst Party of the Year? Election Night.”64 
 
A final example, also from The New York Times, was published in September of the 
general election: 
 “As students stopped at sidewalk A.T.M.s to prepare for parents' weekend, they 
expressed lukewarm support for Mrs. Clinton. Paula Atfield, a freshman from Cleveland, said 
she was voting for Mrs. Clinton because, “she’s not Trump,” but added that the election was seen 
as a “joke” on campus. 
 “Neither of them are suitable,” she said. “Most people aren’t even voting.” 
 
Framing the presidential election as offering no good choice to the voter sends a message 
to the news consumer: why vote? However, the results of the election suggest that the voters did 
not agree with this assessment. According to a report by the American Presidency Project at the 
University of California Santa Barbara, the voter turnout in 2016 was slightly higher than in the 
previous two presidential elections. In 2016, approximately 59.2%of the voting age population of 
the U.S. participated by voting, compared to 58 % in 2012 and 57% in 2008. 65 As these statistics 
suggest, the American voter showed up at the polling place in similar percentages as they have in 
recent presidential elections. As Iyengar and Krupenkin (2018) found, it is possible that the 
motivations for voting are shifting from support for a candidate to opposition against another. 
But the end result seems to be the same, similar numbers of voters feel compelled to participate 
in the election. 
 From a normative perspective, this finding raises the question of how why this theme was 
present in the coverage. Was this something expressed often on the campaign trail or was it the 
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perspective of members of the media? If it was not a reflection of the mood of the electorate and 
was a perspective shared by elite political actors, did this theme affect the outlook voters had for 
the candidates? This study suggests further research into election coverage that frames the race 
as offering voters “no good choice.” It is unclear whether this suggestion was unique to the 2016 
election and the candidates presented or is part of a trend in coverage. In addition, it is unclear 
how this type of framing impacts the election. Future research on language included in election 
reports that suggest ‘there is no good choice” might suggest changes in normative practice that 
improves election coverage.   
Conclusion 
The results of this study, quantitative and qualitative, support the hypothesis that Trump 
voters were framed as deviant in the coverage of the 2016 election. Taken alone, each of the 
delegitimizing categories could be considered minor details in the election coverage. Clearly, 
Trump’s campaign rallies were rowdy events attended by thousands of voters, some dressed in 
costumes, chanting ugly insults. Yet taken together, the list of delegitimizing cues built into the 
framing of the Trump voter by the news reports examined in this study suggest that journalists 
were operating outside the sphere of legitimate controversy. The framing cues paint a picture of 
the Trump voters as odd, silent, fearing conspiracies, insulting other candidates, uneducated, and 
lacking diversity. Add that to coverage that rarely quotes any voters as interested in issues, relies 
on political analysts to speak for voters and routinely places the voice of the voter at the end of 
the story. The result is a description of Trump voters that are easily dismissed as a deviant 
element of the American electorate that is not recognized as the political force it became.  
According to The New York Times election coverage, more than 62 million Americans 
voted for Donald Trump in the 2016 election, nearly 3 million fewer voters than cast a ballot for 
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Hillary Clinton. Of course, the location of the voters meant that Trump won 306 votes in the 
Electoral College, compared to Clinton’s 232.66 As reported by The New York Times, Trump’s 
total – 62,985,106 – was more votes than Obama received in 2012, but less than Obama won 
with in 2008.67 In other words, Americans voted for Trump in numbers that were not unusual to 
turnout for a presidential candidate. When more than 62 million voters support one of two major 
presidential candidates, those voters can not all be dismissed as deviant.  
Sphere theory holds that when journalists are confronted with actors or actions they 
consider deviant, professional norms and practices shift. Understanding Trump voters as deviant, 
the media stuck to professional practices and labeled the voters through their framing in details 
such as their clothing, odd behavior, conspiracy theories, insults and homogenized race. 
However, this study suggests that a greater understanding of differences would encourage the 
media to accept many different types of voters into the sphere of legitimate controversy and out 
of the sphere of deviance  
The danger of this type of framing is that it does not encourage an exploration of the 
voter and, as a result, the media and their news consumer fail to understand the motivations of 
the electorate. In 2016, the informed voter went to the polls (or stayed at home) believing that 
Hillary Clinton would win the election and that the deviant Trump voter could not or would not 
amass in numbers strong enough to carry their candidate to victory. When Trump won, not only 
was the media surprised but they were also at a loss to what could have motivated millions of 
voters to support Trump (for a greater exploration of the media response, please see Chapter 6). 
 
66 https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president. 




In many ways, the election coverage of Trump voters was a missed opportunity for the media to 
highlight and explore the differences within the electorate. 
The results of this study suggest that media coverage of elections could be improved by 
recognizing the shift of normative practices in the sphere of legitimate controversy to the sphere 
of deviance. Voters in general are ignored as an important source. When they are included in a 
news report and framed as deviant, they are even easier to disregard as an important part of the 
election process. For the media, framing the voter as deviant led to a lack of deeper investigation 
into the Trump voter that might have led to greater insights about the electorate as a whole. As 
Billard found, framing any large element of society as delegitimized, or “othering,” leads to 
misunderstanding.  
Future research into election coverage using Hallin’s Sphere Theory could be expanded 
in many ways. The most obvious is to expand the number of news reports included the sample. 
This could be accomplished by including stories for a longer period of time or increasing the 
number of media outlets that are studied. In addition, this study could expand the types of cues it 
measured. For example, this study did not measure the mention of gender. It could more fully 
explore the mention of race. The coding scheme could be refined to measure how many 
delegitimizing cues are included in an article. The qualitative study could move on to include a 
discussion with the political reporters assigned to cover Trump voters to explore the forces that 
encouraged the framing of Trump voters as deviant. Taken together, studying the impact of 
deviant framing could lead to improved media coverage of elections that accurately describes the 




Chapter Five: Local Media Results 
 
 This chapter explores the differences between local and national coverage of the Trump 
voter during the 2016 election. Based on the results of a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
media reports produced during the last six weeks of the presidential election of 2016, this study 
finds there is a difference in how voters were framed in local media as compared to the framing 
in national media outlets. The results did not present dramatic differences in all areas of study, 
yet they do support the hypothesis that local journalists may have been more nuanced in their 
understanding of their communities and less likely to use the deviance model outlined in Hallin’s 
Sphere Theory when covering these voters during the election.  
In general, the results suggest that local media adopted similar normative practices when 
confronted with deviance that national media adopted (or, perhaps that local media took cues 
from national media). However, local media included delegitimizing cues in the coverage at a 
lower rate and often balanced these cues with additional information that helped frame Trump 
voters as a legitimate part of the electorate. These added details, which included  such as 
biographic information, motivations, as well as discussion of issues that the voter cared about, 
often moved the coverage from Hallin’s sphere of deviance to the sphere of legitimate 
controversy. 
This study also found that local media was less likely than the national media to favor  
political analysts over voters in media reports about the election. The quantitative analysis 
included a count of source types, defined as political analyst, political academic, party official, 
pollster or anyone else paid to analyze as compared to voters quoted as sources. There was a 
large disparity here between local and national results. Local media outlets were far less likely 
than the national media to use political analysts instead of voters as sources. This is not to 
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suggest that the political analyst is not a valuable source for election coverage. Rather, this study 
found that the use of political analysts as a source in a news report often meant that the voice of 
the voter was minimized and came at the end of a news report. As Mindich (2006) explains and 
was explored in Chapter 4, the use of the inverted pyramid to rank the importance of facts and 
sources is normative practice in journalism. This suggests that when voters are placed as the last 
source of a news report or after other sources, they are considered less important. Local coverage 
was less likely to rank the voter a source in this manner. (For more on this point and the 
combined results of this study, please see Chapter 4: Results).  
Finally, out of step with the other findings, local media was more likely than the national 
media to frame the election as offering the voter “no good choice” in the selection of candidates 
in the U.S. presidential race. This theme was common in both the local and national coverage, 
but this study found that local outlets were even more likely than larger outlets to suggest that 
neither Trump nor Clinton were strong candidates. 
 Local News As an Important Source of Election Information 
  Local newspapers tend to offer a different style of journalism than national outlets. They 
are often the source of hyperlocal information that can inform and build a sense of community. A 
2019 Pew Research Report on local news outlets described them in this way: “(p)erhaps the most 
basic function of local journalism is to provide residents with news across a range of topics in a 
way that helps them live their daily lives and take part in the community.” 68 The Pew study 
found that Americans are divided about their opinion of national news outlets but are united in 
thinking local news outlets are “doing a good job.” The study found that Americans consider 
 
68 Pew Research Center, Journalism and Media. (2019, March 26). “For Local News, Americans Embrace Digital 




local news outlets overwhelmingly successful at reporting the news accurately, keeping an eye 
on local political leaders and dealing fairly with all sides. 69  
At the same time, local newspapers and local bureaus of national news outlets are 
disappearing. According to a comprehensive study by University of North Carolina scholar 
Penelope Muse Abernathy (2020), the newspaper industry in general is losing outlets: since 2004 
more than 2,100 newspapers have closed, including 70 daily papers and 2,000 weekly or non-
dailies. Abernathy reported that at end of 2019, the U.S. had lost more than 25 percent of its 
newspapers in the past 15 years. This has resulted in areas of the country that she termed “news 
deserts,” where no newspaper or credible form of journalism exists. According to Abernathy’s 
study, more than 200 counties in the U.S. have no newspaper or “source of credible and 
comprehensive information on critical issues” (2020). Abernathy also found that many of the 
communities where local newspapers have closed were economically depressed and/or isolated 
from other communities. In addition, the trend seems to have accelerated. Since 2018, more than 
300 newspapers have closed, 6,000 journalists employed by newspapers no longer are employed, 
and print newspaper circulation declined by 5 million (Abernathy). 
The effects of these closures are still being measured. Abernathy found that larger media 
organizations, and therefore society, suffers when the smallest outlets close. The study describes 
a “news eco-system” where small local newspapers feed stories to the larger city media outlets, 
with this news often picked up by the largest national circulation newspapers.  
“National and state papers have historically relied heavily on journalism done at small 
local papers to initially report on events and decisions that later become state and national 





of daily life – they can also change the course of history by reporting on a shooting or a local 
protest. The larger papers then amplify the initial work done by the small newspaper. But as 
hometown papers disappear – and the state and regional papers lay off veteran journalists and 
pull back on coverage and circulation in outlying communities – the news ecosystem is 
imperiled,” (Abernathy, p. 13).   
Media scholar Michael Schudson and Leonard Downie Jr., former Executive Editor of 
The Washington Post, studied the effect of reduced local media in 2009 and wrote, “(w)hat is 
under threat is independent reporting [emphasis in original] that provides information, 
investigation, analysis, and community knowledge, particularly in the coverage of local 
affairs.”70 Other studies have found a variety of negative effects stemming from the decline of 
local journalism. For example, Darr, Hitt and Dunaway (2018) suggest that decreasing number of 
local news organizations has added to greater polarization in the electorate. They found a 
decrease in party ticket-splitting, which can indicate a lack of political nuance, in counties where 
local news organizations had closed. Similarly, Matherly and Greenwood (2020) measured 
federal corruption charges in districts where newspapers have closed and found a positive 
correlation between the closure of media organizations and criminal charges of corruption among 
government workers and elected officials. In other words, without the media watching, 
corruption flourished. These studies link systemic community problems to the closure of the 
local media outlet.  
In a related study, Mathews (2020) studied the impact of one newspaper, the Carolina 
Progress, and the effect it’s closure had on Carolina County, Virginia. Residents of the rural 
 
70 Downie, Leonard Jr. and Michael Schudson. (2009, November/December) “The Reconstruction of American 




community reported increased isolation, decreased sense of community pride, as well as a lack of 
information about community events that led to them missing public gatherings. Mathews 
reported that residents understood life to be harder without the newspaper. Collectively, these 
studies point to the value of local media outlets on the communities they cover.  
However, other studies suggest that the closure of small newspapers has a ripple effect 
that hurts all media outlets. Hermida (2016) argues that big changes in how Americans, including 
the closure of local outlets and the need for residents to look elsewhere for their news has failed 
to inform the voter. The gatekeepers of news have been undermined by economic realities and 
technology and the result is a “contested, chaotic and circular environment” (p. 75). Proximity to 
the voter by news organizations is gone, Hermida argues: “As newsrooms across Middle 
America are hollowed out, most new digital media outlets are concentrated along the blue-tinged 
coasts of east and west. The result is a media that only sees a wide swathe of voters from 35,000 
feet” (p.76).  
As an example of Lewis and Carlson’s point, Chuck Todd, political director for NBC 
news and host of Meet the Press, hosted a round table discussion about why the media failed to 
recognize the widespread support for Trump immediately following the 2016 election. Todd 
highlighted the comments of an editor at Progressive Farmer, a publication aimed at rural 
Americans. The editor said this: “Every time you heard about these polls, you had heard that 
educated white voters were, were going for Clinton, while people, with-- without college degrees 
or had no college, supported Trump. I think they took some of these things that were said over 
and over throughout the last four, five months of the campaign, also very personally themselves. 
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That rural America is not uneducated, even though maybe there are fewer people with college 
degrees than there might be in the metropolitan areas.”71 
 Todd’s point was that the national media was not only not probing the viewpoints of 
American voters outside the metropolitan areas, they were affecting the race by their coverage. 
And they were unaware of this effect because they were removed from these news consumers 
because national news organizations have cut local bureaus and local news organizations are 
failing. (For a more in-depth examination of the media’s response to the election, please see 
Chapter Six: Mea Culpa.)  
Media scholar Lance Bennett (2016) argues that coverage of Trump supporters in the 
2016 election falls into his theory of indexing, defined as the “tendency of mainstream news 
organizations to index or adjust the range of viewpoints in a story to the dominant positions of 
those whom the journalists perceive to have enough power to affect the outcome of a situation” 
(p. 16). Trump supporters were outside the mainstream, so their perspective could be dismissed 
as unlikely to succeed under indexing theory. Bennett suggests that many in the media fail to 
understand working-class or  middle-class Americans and have “long rendered these folk nearly 
invisible,” (2018, p. 75). Graber and Dunaway (2017) draw parallels between the election of 
2016 and the Brexit vote in the U.K. They argue both events served as “a wake-up call” for the 
media and prompted months of debate about journalism practices within the news media to 
determine how they “failed to anticipate two major political upsets in their own backyards” 
(2016, p. 152). The solution, they argue, is greater attention to local coverage, where the voice of 
the voter is understood in the context of their community.  
 




Taking this suggestion further, Rosen (2016) argues that journalists were “sucked into” 
covering Trump’s agenda objectively because they did not have their own agenda. That agenda 
should be a well-developed understanding of the issues important to voters in their home 
communities. Journalists should have been asking candidates about issues important to voters, 
Rosen argues, and those issues should come from locally-based reporting on what topics matter 
to citizens. Rosen argues that an in-depth understanding of the issues that voters want discussed 
is the only way to properly cover a campaign and fight against a candidate that wants to hijack 
the debate.  
Based on this scholarship, this study explored the following research question (a list of all 
research questions can be found in Chapter One, Introduction): 
R2: Did local journalists cover local Trump supporters in a manner different from 
national reporters? If so, did this coverage reflect a greater understanding of issues important to 
the local voter? 
That question suggested the following hypothesis: 
H3: Local journalists may have been more nuanced in their understanding of their 
communities and less likely to use the deviance model when covering these voters during the 
election.  
Method 
Building on this scholarship, this study compared national and local reporting to 
determine if either was more likely to employ delegitimizing cues, as defined by Billard. The use 
of these cues implies a disrespect for the subject being covered or interviewed by the journalist 
and suggests to the reader that the source is deviant and therefore not reliable. As Billard 
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demonstrates, the framing of a subject or source by a media representative involves choices in 
language, details and facts. What is included is often as important as what is not. When choosing 
to use delegitimizing cues, such as quoting the voter when he or she is insulting other voters or 
describing a lack of education, the journalist is also choosing not to include facts such as what 
issues are important to the voter.   
This chapter separates  the local and national results in this study, including the 
quantitative and qualitative coverage of Trump voters. (For a discussion of the combined results 
and a sample of the coding sheet, please see Results, Chapter 4.) To analyze the differences 
between local and national media, this study identified and then measured the following 
delegitimizing cues using a coding framework and qualitative analysis in the framing of the 
Trump voter: support for the candidate of choice is socially unacceptable; the voter lacks a 
college education; the voter insults other voters or candidates; the voter is described as having 
unusual habits, clothing or speech; the voter believes in conspiracy theories; the voter’s race. 
Media reports were identified using a keyword search on Nexis Uni and included three 
national newspapers: The New York Times, The Washington Post and USA TODAY and five local 
Pennsylvania newspapers: The Philadelphia Inquirer, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Public Opinion 
(Chambersburg), Lebanon Daily News, and The Evening Sun (Hanover). These reports were 
produced during the last six weeks of the 2016 election, between September 25 and November 8, 
2016. 
The sample was small but representative. Of the total 387 reports, 91 were produced in 
the local Pennsylvania outlets. The majority, 52 news reports, were published in The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, the largest circulation newspaper in Pennsylvania. Far fewer were 
published in the other four local newspapers: 19 in the Pittsburg Post-Gazette, 9 in the Lebanon 
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Daily News, 6 in the Evening Sun and 5 in Public Opinion. The latter three small newspapers 
were all owned by Gannett in 2016, which also publishes USA TODAY. The Lebanon Daily 
News  and Public Opinion were published daily, while the Evening Sun (with a staff of 5) was 
published three days a week. Each newspaper included in the local study covered a different 
region of Pennsylvania, with small overlaps.72 There were 296 national news reports included in 
this study with 189 published in The New York Times, 59 in The Washington Post and 48 in USA 
TODAY. 
This chapter addresses the difference between local Pennsylvania and national media 
outlets’ coverage of voters during the 2016 election. Chapter 4, Results, gives a fuller description 
of the delegitimizing cues that were measured in these results. This chapter focuses on the 
analysis of local coverage. 
Quantitative Results 
 The quantitative results support the qualitative finding that local media was less likely to 
use some delegitimizing cues than national media. While the numbers of this study are small, the 
local media was significantly less likely to quote the voter as insulting Clinton or her supporters, 
describing Trump voters as afraid to express their support for the candidate, and espousing 
conspiracy theories. Local media was not significantly different from national media in using 
odd details to describe clothing, habits or speech of the voters or when describing the race of 
voters. Interestingly, local media were somewhat more likely than national media to describe 
Trump voters as lacking an education than national media.73  
 
72 Lebanon Daily News covered the Lebanon Valley, in southeastern PA. Evening Sun covered Hanover and Adams 
County in central PA. Public Opinion covered the Cumberland Valley in southern PA. The Pittsburg Post-Gazette 
covered Pittsburg and its suburbs in western PA. The Philadelphia Inquirer covered the city of Philadelphia and its 
suburbs in eastern PA. 
73 The coding scheme is Appendix A. It can be found at the end of Chapter 4. 
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Using Billard as a model, this study developed a coding scheme of delegitimizing 
indicators and found a pattern of six delegitimizing cues in the framing of Trump voters by the 
local and national media in the coverage of the 2016 election. Those cues have been grouped into 
the following categories: Insults, Socially Unacceptable, Conspiracy Theories, Odd Descriptors, 
Uneducated, Rallies as Dangerous. (For a greater exploration of these indicators, please see 
Chapter 4, Results).  
Local coverage differed significantly from national coverage in the framing of voters in 
three categories: Insults, Socially Unacceptable and Conspiracy Theories. Supporting the 
hypothesis of this study that local newspapers might offer a more nuanced framing of the voter, 
the results suggest that local newspapers were much less likely to include a description of Trump 
voters insulting Hillary Clinton and her supporters, as shy in announcing their support of Trump 
and espousing conspiracy theories about the election than national news reports were. 
Sample Size 
The sample size of the local/national comparisons was unexpectedly small. This study 
started with a strong number of news reports published during the last six weeks of the election 
in the local Pennsylvania newspapers included in this study: 91 articles were produced by the 
keyword search. These were coded to determine if they included the voice of the voter and, if so, 
how were those voters framed. An unexpected result of this study was how few articles about the 
voter also included a description of the voter and/or the voice of the voter. Even though all these 
stories included the term “voter” or “supporter” and were published in the front section of a 
newspaper in the last six weeks of the general election of a presidential race, fewer than half the 
articles included any facts about the voter or an interview with individuals. This was also true of 
the national news reports. These articles were about the voters but less than half included 
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interviews with or descriptions of real voters. This fact was a finding in and of itself: the media is 
writing about the electorate but not interviewing them. 
  As an operational consideration of this study, though, this finding meant relying on 
smaller sample sizes. In addition, the coding sheet used in the quantitative design (Appendix A) 
was designed as a series of cascading questions that produced smaller samples as it moved on. 
The results allowed this study to fulfill its goal of comparing local and national news to 
determine whether community news was more nuanced in its coverage of voters. A comparison 
does not always require large numbers and the qualitative results were rich. However, future 
research should increase the number of local media included in the study by expanding the 
number of news outlets included and/or creating a coding sheet that did not eliminate reports as it 
moved on. For each delegitimizing cue included in the qualitative examination, the number of 
articles included in the study are included.  
Comparison of Delegitimizing Cues 
Delegitimizing Cue One: Insults  
Results: This study measured how often a Trump voter was quoted as insulting Hillary 
Clinton or her supporters. This study found that local news reports were less likely than the 
national news organizations to quote voters as insulting Clinton or her supporters. This category 
was the area of greatest disparity between national and local coverage: 24.1 percent of local news 
stories included Trump voters insulting Clinton and her supporters compared to 59.2 of national 





 Figure 13       
Explanation: Including the voter using an insult is considered a delegitimizing cue 
because it highlights a negative perspective on the voter. Insults were coded to include strong 
words such as “liar,” “criminal,” “rapist” and were not included if the voter was quoted as simply 
disagreeing or disliked the other candidate. This delegitimizing cue reflects the tendency of the 
news reports to use the voter as an interesting detail or entertainment within the article rather 
than as a source of information.  
 In addition, as found in the combined results reported in Chapter Four, when voters are 
quoted insulting the candidate or supporters of the other party, it often means that voters are not 
quoted discussing issues. Consider this coverage of a Trump rally November 7, 2016 that ran in 
The Philadelphia Inquirer: 
“Trump’s supporters in attendance were thrilled by the opportunity to see him in person 













Percentage of News Reports that Described 
Trump Voters as Insulting Clinton 
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“Based on Trump’s speech it was not an accident he chose to come to Gettysburg,” John 
Minton, of Aspers, said.  
 Betsy Hower, chairwoman of the Adams Republican Committee, wore a white button 
that read, “I’m a ‘deplorable’ Trump supporter.” 
 “It blew me out of the water,” Hower said of Trump’s appearance in Gettysburg. “Never 
did I think it would happen.” 
 John Lucas, of Perry County, had opportunities to attend larger Trump events closer to 
where he lives, but wanted to attend the speech in Gettysburg because of its focus on foreign 
policy.  
 “I like what I’ve heard,” he said. “Those are the policies I’m looking to see 
implemented.”  
 The report included the detail of the “deplorable” pin worn by Betsy Hower but did not 
focus on it. Instead, these three Trump supporters each added a new element to the report -- a 
response to Trump’s localized themes, an enthusiastic response coupled with a sense of 
excitement about having a national political candidate in town, and the mention of foreign policy 
as an issue important to the voter. The report was only 693 words but the reporter, Chris 
Brennan, focused on the response of voters to the content of Trump’s speech and gave the article 
a feel for local voters. (The article actually included one quote from a voter who said he was 
motivated by Trump’s stand on jobs and sanctuary cities.)  
Delegitimizing Cue Two: Support for the Candidate of Choice is Socially Unacceptable 
Results: Local news media were significantly less likely to use this delegitimizing cue 
than national media: 13.7 percent of news reports in local media included this cue compared to 
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24.3 percent of national news reports. (Local news reports: 4 yes/ 25 no. National news reports: 
42 yes/ 29 no.)  
Explanation: This category measured whether Trump voters were described as reluctant 
to announce their support for the candidate. The terms “shy” or “squeamish” were sometimes 
used in the media coverage to describe these types of voters. It is included as a delegitimizing 
cue because the premise is that supporting Trump was not socially acceptable so voters who did 
support him hid their support. Including that descriptor in a news report would also serve notice 
to those unaware of the social implications that supporting Trump was considered deviant in 
some communities. (For a fuller discussion of this cue, see Chapter 4).  
Local reports did not focus on voter's reluctance to announce their support and rarely 
dedicated much copy to explaining the phenomena. For example, an October 6 report in The 
Philadelphia Daily News focused on how millennials would vote. Using the first person, reporter 
John Baer interviewed college students at Gettysburg College and Lebanon Valley College. This 
report included:  
“I found many Clinton supporters, some Trump supporters (and assurances that there are 








Figure 14     
Another report titled “You can split your vote on Nov 8,” seemed to be reacting to this 
phenomenon. While it lacked attribution or even a reason the report was written, the suggestion 
is that either Republicans did not like Trump, or they should not like him. It read: 
 “Otherwise loyal Republicans across the nation are expected to opt for someone other 
than Donald Trump in the Nov. 8 presidential election. Some Democrats, too, may 
abandon Hillary Clinton.” 75 
 





As these reports suggest, local media included the suggestion that Trump supporters were 
reluctant to announce their support for the candidate. However, local reports did not include this 
suggestion as often as national reports did, perhaps because it was not as common idea in 
Pennsylvania. When it was included, it was often a mention or reference rather than the focus of 
a report. 
Delegitimizing Cue Three: Conspiracy Theories  
 Results: Conspiracy Theories were a part of the 2016 election. Trump regularly threw out 
ideas and reasons for events that were untrue and not based in fact. Voters often repeated these 
theories. This study was interested in how often voters were quoted as believing in these theories 
and whether conspiracy theories were a reason cited by voters for supporting Trump. The 
implication is that when conspiracy theories are featured regularly in the coverage of voters not 
only are they more easily dismissed as deviant, but it displaces an examination of issues that 
voters care about. (Local news reports: 9 yes/ 19 no. National news reports: 28 yes/ 40 no).  
Explanation: Some examples of these theories included in the coverage were: Clinton 
would confiscate guns if elected, the election was rigged to favor Clinton, or Trump supporters 
would respond violently if their candidate lost. Like the delegitimizing cue of including insults, 
this cue signaled deviance as well as reflected a choice by the journalist. The combination of 
highlighting conspiracy theories and ignoring public policy issues important to voters are 
normative choices that make a strong formula for deviant framing. Local news reports likely than 
national media to include the delegitimizing cue of conspiracy theories in their coverage of the 
Trump voter of local media stories included the conspiracy theory cue as opposed to 41.2 percent 





Figure 15     
 The most repeated conspiracy theory in the local coverage was that the election was 
rigged. Trump talked about this possibility when visiting Pennsylvania, a great deal and it was 
echoed in the local coverage. Local coverage often took pains to describe history of voter fraud 
and how it was remedied, such as this report in The Philadelphia Inquirer that ran October 21: 
“The most notorious voting fraud in recent Philadelphia history involved a different 
approach, bogus absentee ballots in a 1993 state Senate race. A federal judge threw out all the 
absentee ballots in that race, ruling that election officials had illegally given them to campaign 
and party workers to fill out for voters. The Democratic candidate who won that race with 79 
percent of the absentee vote was later removed from office.” 
 




 “Porto won't be watching the polls in Philadelphia during the Nov. 8 general election. 
She recently moved to Bensalem and so is ineligible to be a poll watcher in the city. But she 
thinks Trump supporters should show up. 
"They could stand outside and just watch who is coming in," Porto said. "They could be 
looking for those vans who are busing people in. I've been told that happens."76 
 
  And this report in The Philadelphia Inquirer: 
 “Tom Large, a 71-year-old Vietnam veteran - he was a member of the Air Force's elite 
Pararescue special-operations unit - expects more twists and turns in the few days left in the 
campaign. 
He's convinced that billionaire liberal donor George Soros owns a company that makes 
voting machines in 16 states. This alleged conspiracy, spread on several right-wing websites, has 
been debunked. 
"I fear for my country if Hillary wins," Large said. "I truly fear. It's not going to be pretty. You 
talk to people, and they're scared."77 
 
 National coverage that included descriptions of conspiracy theories held by voters were 
more likely to focus on violent reactions to the election if Trump lost. For example, a report in 
The New York Times that ran October 28 titled “Trump Backers See Revolution if Clinton 
Wins,” focused on the belief by some supporters that an armed uprising would follow if Trump 
lost.78 While the idea that the election might be “rigged” was a common theme, it was 
highlighted more often in the local Pennsylvania media than in the national media. 
Delegitimizing Cue Four: Unusual Details  
 Results: Local media were nearly the same in their use of the delegitimizing cues of using 
odd details to describe voters. ‘Unusual details’ was coded to include descriptions of odd 
 
76 Brennan, Chris (2016, October 21). Trump's 'rigged election' claim resonates with some GOP poll workers in 
Philly. The Philadelphia Inquirer. Retrieved from: 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/20161022_Trump_s__quot_rigged_election_quot__claim_resonates_
with_some_GOP_poll_workers_in_Philly.html. 
77 Fitzgerald, Thomas. (2016, October 22). In Ohio, Trump faithful believe new Clinton emails will lift their man. 
The Philadelphia Inquirer. Retrieved from: https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/presidential 
78 Parker, Ashley and Nick Corasaniti. (2016, October 28). Trump Backers See Revolution if Clinton Wins. The 




clothing, behavior or speech by Trump supporters. (Local reports: 6 yes/ 23 no. National news 
reports: 13 yes/ 53 no).  
 
Figure 16 
Explanation: Like the delegitimizing cues of insults and conspiracy theories, the 
inclusion of odd details to describe Trump voters was sometimes balanced out in local reporting 
by biographical information that served to mitigate the deviant nature of the coverage. Details 
such as descriptions of costumes or odd clothing was still there but also included was 
information about the voter that offered balance to the odd details such as a job description or 
issues that motivated them.  
As an example, consider this from an October 7 report in The Evening Sun: 
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 “The supporters in attendance were not shy about their opinions and let it show, 
particularly in their wardrobe. T-shirts with lines like “I am a deplorable” and “Liar, liar, pantsuit 
on fire,” as well as a camouflage hat reading, “Hillary for prison,” were among the bold garb.”79 
 This passage reads similarly to reports of Trump supporters in national media. The old-
fashioned term “garb” was a polite, neutral description of clothing that was most likely worn to 
gain attention and local reports tended not to focus on this regular feature of the crowds at Trump 
rallies. The biggest difference with national reports is that The Evening Sun article report also 
included interviews with four Trump supporters, some of whom discussed their reasons for 
attending including this: 
 “Those in attendance gave the town hall high marks, and Pence appeared to win over 
those who supported the ticket for the Trump name. 
 “I think he is a strong, solid leader,” said Rebecca Makdad, of Gettysburg. 
A retired member of the Navy, Makdad explained she believed the Trump ticket would 
“have the backs of the military.” 80 
Delegitimizing Cue Five: Lack of Education 
Results: This is the one delegitimizing cue that local media was more likely to employ than the 
national media. When covering Trump voters, local media included a negative descriptor of their 
education level in nearly 6 percent more of the news reports than national media reports did. 
(Local news reports: 7 yes/ 22 no. National news reports: 11 yes/ 8 no). 
 









Explanation: Local reports included descriptors such as this in The Philadelphia 
Inquirer:  
“Trump leads among whites with no college degree, 46 percent to 39 percent, as he has 
throughout the race, but Clinton has the advantage among college-educated white voters, 54 
percent to 32 percent.”81 
Or this, from The Pittsburg Post-Gazette: 
 “Ohio, which has picked the national winner in 17 of the past 18 presidential contests, is 
less of a bellwether than it has been in the past. That's because it has a greater percentage of non-
 
81 Fitzgerald, Thomas. (2016, October 4). After debate, Clinton widens lead over Trump in Pa. The Philadelphia 
Inquirer. Retrieved from:  
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college-educated whites (41 percent) than the country as a whole (33 percent), and that 
demographic tends to favor Mr. Trump.”82 
 
 Both reports included a negative description of the education of local Trump supporters. 
The language was similar to the type of framing this delegitimizing cue would receive in national 
reports and may have been influenced by those reports. It is unclear in this study why this type of 
delegitimizing cue was more common in local reports than national reports. This is a question for 
further study. For example, do local papers more generally discuss education levels? Is the 
education level of residents an area of public concern? This might suggest reasons that local 
media included this detail more often. A larger sample might disprove this finding. Or perhaps 
national organizations have impacted the style of coverage at the local newspapers and it has 
become more recognizable. Many scholars have established that larger, prominent news 
organizations affect the agenda of smaller news organizations. Harder (2017) found that 
organizations like The New York Times and The Washington Post were “highly regarded” and 
impacted the choices made at other news media. This study did not examine the impact of larger 
news organization on the smaller, local medium but it suggests an area for future research. (For 
more on intermedia agenda studies, please see Chapter Two: Literary Review.) 
Delegitimizing Cue Six: Race 
Results: Local and national news organizations included race as a descriptor of Trump 
voters in nearly equal percentages. More than 51 percent of national reports and 34 percent of 
 
82 Mauriello, Tracie. (2016, October 11). Polls: Swing States Toward Clinton: Democrats Solidifies Prominence in 






local reports included race as a descriptor of Trump voters.   (Local news reports: 10 yes/ 19 no. 
National news reports: 24 yes/ 47 no) 
 
Figure 18 
Explanation: As described in Chapter Four, race was a delegitimizing cue in both the 
national and local media reports in the description of Trump supporters. Race was coded as a 
delegitimizing cue for several reasons. First, the race of Trump voters did not vary much (if at 
all) from the race of Republican presidential candidates in the past three elections. The regular 
use of this descriptor, however, suggested that the make-up of Trump supporters include more 
White voters than in other races. It also ignored the fact that most of Clinton’s support came 
from White voters, although this is possibly because Clinton also attracted widespread support 
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from minority voters. Secondly, the race descriptor was often paired with terms such as “angry” 
or “resentment” to suggest that the Trump voter was motivated by anger about racial divisions. 
However, little coverage explored this motivation or possible motivation.  
Finally, race was considered a delegitimizing cue because several reports – all in national 
organizations – suggested that Trump supporters accepted the views of racial hate groups. 
Several news reports focused on members of White supremist organizations or quoted Trump 
supporters as using racist language without exploring how many Trump supporters shared these 
views and whether this was a fringe element of the movement or an accepted belief. For these 
reasons, this study found the descriptor of race to be one of the most powerful delegitimizing 
cues in the election coverage. (For a deeper discussion of race as a delegitimizing cue, see 
Chapter Four: Results). 
 The framing of race in local media was like the framing in national outlets. Consider this 
language included in a November report int The Philadelphia Inquirer: 
 “Polls show white college-educated women backing Clinton by double-digit margins, a 
voting bloc that could offset turnout by white non-college-educated men for Trump, said William 
Frey, a demographer and senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 
An ABC News/Washington Post poll released last week found white college-educated 
women favored Clinton over Trump 59 percent to 32 percent. In contrast, white college-educated 
women voted in 2012 for Republican Mitt Romney by a six-point margin, although they have 
voted Democratic by modest margins in previous elections, Frey said. 
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"We don't really know yet whether this is just a Trump effect, because of the kinds of 
signals he's given to women," or whether the white college-educated female vote will become a 
reliable Democratic voting bloc in the future, along with racial minorities, Frey said.”83 
 Compare it to this November report from The New York Times: 
“There is also a wide class divide: Mrs. Clinton has the support of 48 percent 
of whites with college degrees -- a constituency that historically votes for a Republican 
presidential nominee -- while Mr. Trump is backed by 41 percent from the same voters. But 
Mr. Trump receives 55 percent from whites without college degrees, while Mrs. Clinton captures 
just 30 percent from that group.”84  
 As with the education cue, local and news reports used the race descriptor in similar 
numbers, with a slightly larger percent in local news reports. It is possible that the inclusion of 
this cue reflects racial discord in Pennsylvania. Many residents were quoted discussing national 
issues such as immigration, trade, and the economy from the perspective of race. Trump raised 
these issues at each of his Pennsylvania rallies. It is also possible that local outlets were simply 
mirroring practices in national organizations and poll measurements, an indicator of intermedia 
agenda setting (as discussed above.) 
 
83 Hanna, Maddie. (2016, November 7). Trump’s ‘Locker Room’ Talk Eclipses Clinton’s Historic Moment. The 
Philadelphia Inquirer. Retrieved from https:// 
www.inquirer.com/philly/news/polics/20161106_Trump_s__locker_room__talk_eclipses_Clinton_s_historic_mom
ent.html. 
84 Martin, Jonathan, Dalia Sussman and Megan Thee-Brenan. (2016, November 4). In Poll, Voters Express Disgust in 





Descriptions of the Voter 
Politicians as sources 
Results: A significant percentage of news reports included professional political analysts 
as a source in election coverage about voters. National outlets were more likely to include this 
type of source than local outlets. This study found that nearly 70 percent of the national news 
reports included in this study used at least one professional political analyst as a source. That 
compares to 59 percent of local news reports that included professional analysts as sources. 
















Percentage of News Reports that included 
Political Analysts as a Source
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When both professional political observers and voters were included as sources in news 
reports, national organizations were more likely than local media to include more professional 




If both types of sources were included in a news article, national news organization were 
more likely to introduce the professional political observer sooner in the news report than voters. 
National news organizations placed voters after professional political analysts in 68 percent of 
the news reports as compared to 58 percent of local news reports. Did voters come after 
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Explanation:   Professional political analysts were coded to include pollsters, political 
scientists, party officials or other professional political observers. In news reports about voters, 
journalists relied on professional observers more often than voters to explain how the electorate 
would respond to the candidates. As explained in Chapter Four, the placement of sources in a 
news reports reflects professional practice that ranks facts and sources according to their 
importance to the report (Mindich 1998). The lower the fact or source is in an article can mean 
that it is less important. Comparing national and local practices, national organizations relied on 
professional analysts in news reports about the voter, included them in numbers greater than 
voters were used as a source and placed them higher than voters as a source more than local 













Percentage of News Reports that included 
Voters as a Source AFTER Political Analysts
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as a source. This suggests that the voice of the voter was present more often in local news reports 
than in national news reports.  
Result: National media reports included the suggestion that there was “no good choice” 
among the two political candidates in the 2016 presidential race at a higher percentage than local 
media reports did. Nearly 30 percent of the national news reports that described voters also 
included the suggestion that voters had no good choice in the election, compared to 15 percent of 
local reports. (Did news reports include the suggestion that the election offered voters no good 
choice? Local reports: yes 7/ 39 no. National reports: 42 yes/102 no.) 
Explanation: The final area of comparison between local and national news reports was 
the measure of whether the report suggested that neither candidate was a desirable choice in the 
election. This was measured using language in the report that suggested neither Hillary Clinton 
nor Donald Trump were strong candidates. This measure was coded to include quotes from 
voters that suggested that the presidential race offered no good choice or language used by the 
journalists and unattributed to a source that suggested this. 
Examples of this type of language included phrases such as “the election was seen as a 
‘joke’ on campus,”85 or “In a race between two deeply polarizing candidates,”86 or “In interviews 
across the country, whether they’re voting for Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, anyone but them 
or no one at all, Americans almost uniformly say that the politicians are clueless but that the 
people will eventually do what needs getting done.”87 This type of language was found in both 
 
85 Martin, Jonathan. September 30, 2016. Ohio, Long a Bell weather, Is Fading on the Electoral Map. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/30/us/politics/ohio-campaign-trump-clinton.html. 
86 Peters, Jeremy. And Matt Flegenheimer. October 31, 2016. Democrats See a Turnout Edge in Swing States. The 
New York Times. 
87 Hernandez, Arelis R., Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Marc Fisher. November 6, 2016. Standing Divided Today but Bullish 
on America’s Promise for Tomorrow. The Washington Post. This article was retrieved through a Nexis Uni search. 





national and local media reports. However, local media were significantly more likely to use 




 Figure 22 
Based on the premise that local media were more in touch with the communities they 
were covering than national reporters may have been, it is possible that local media were 
reflecting a disappointment with Clinton as a candidate among voters. Trump was an unusual 
candidate, plagued by scandal, unafraid to insult his opponents, and suggesting policies outside 
the mainstream. It is therefore not as surprising that his candidacy was framed in negative terms 
by the media. Clinton, on the other hand, campaigned in a traditional manner, was a member of 
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public sentiment in framing Clinton’s candidacy as "no good choice,” this was potentially an 
important harbinger that she would not perform as well as expected in Pennsylvania during the 
2016 election. 
Qualitative Results 
 A qualitative examination of the local reports as compared to national reports yielded 
greater insights into the different framing of both mediums than the quantitative examination did. 
One finding was that local reports often contained more details about the community, the voter 
and the mood of the electorate. These details were often not recognized by the quantitative 
measure but contributed a great deal to the understanding of the source in the news report. 
Another difference identified by the qualitative study was the style of the writing in local media. 
It was often less normatively sophisticated: they expressed shared emotions or using antiquated 
language, employed the use of the first person, mixed strong opinions of the writer with factual 
reporting, or relied on cliches or goofy images. For example, consider this lead from an October 
report published in the news section of the Pittsburg Post-Gazette:   
 “That giant clunking sound you heard during the presidential debate Wednesday night? It 
may have been the heads of Pennsylvania Republicans striking their desks when Donald Trump 
said he would ‘keep you in suspense’ about whether he would accept the outcome of the Nov. 8 
election.” 88 
Despite these differences in writing style, the local reports were also often full of details 
and descriptions that offered a fuller picture of the Pennsylvania electorate. Examined as a body, 
they painted a picture of communities open to the ideas of Trump because of a depressed 
 
88 Potter, Chris. (2016, October 21) Trump Election Remark During Debate Surprises Republicans. Retrieved from: 




economy and a feeling of being ignored in previous elections. The coverage showed two major 
cities firmly in support of Clinton, while support in the suburbs was more wavering. Across the 
state, there were college campuses interested in the election and small towns excited by 
politicians coming to town. The following section provides a deeper exploration of the three 
major qualitative findings.  
More Biographical Details 
 Qualitatively, the overall tone of the small newspapers was more polite and respectful to 
voters and the candidates than the coverage found in national reports. While many local reports 
included delegitimizing cues, they also often explored the reasons that voters supported a 
candidate. Unlike Billard, this study found that delegitimizing cues can be balanced out with 
legitimizing details. For example, similar to national media outlets, local media reported on the 
fact that Trump rallies were rowdy, voters were dressed in costumes or clothing with anti-
Clinton messages and the crowds chanted obnoxious slogans. But local media usually also took 
the time to ask voters why they were there and included more biographic information about their 
sources (as opposed to information that encouraged an understanding that the voter was deviant). 
For example, The Lebanon Daily News covered a Trump rally in Hershey, PA  on November 5, 
2016 this way:  
“Those in attendance broke into another frenzy chanting something that they were 
already chanting prior to Trump taking the stage.  "CNN Sucks!" was the chant.”  
 
Then, later in the article:  
“Steven Wolfe, a Lebanon resident, was in attendance Friday night for his third Trump rally and 
he said there's one particular reason he is a supporter of Trump. 
‘Based on the fact that the Supreme Court is on the line,’ Wolfe said. Having spent six years in 
the Army National Guard and another in the Army Reserve, Wolfe said that he took an oath to 
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protect and follow the Constitution, and that's why he said if Clinton wins, the path of the 
country could take a turn for the worse.”89 
 
 This is a good example of how local outlets included delegitimizing cues – namely that 
the use of the word “frenzy,” and the inclusion of the anti-media chant including the word 
“sucks” – but added the interview with a Trump supporter where he explained his reason for 
being there. This creates a more balanced approach. The local newspapers would have been 
remiss not to cover the fact that the chanting happened. But the reporter also chose to dig further 
and presented the reader with voter Steven Wolfe, his driving force in supporting Trump and his 
background. National outlets, by comparison, often included the chanting or delegitimizing cues 
but left out the short interview with the voters that explored their support.  
 Another example of this balance between delegitimizing cues and increased biographical 
detail includes this report from The Philadelphia Inquirer coverage of a Trump rally in Scranton 
the day before the election:  
 “Rewarding him at times with deafening roars, the crowd was textbook Trump: Men, 
women and children in hats proclaiming “Make America Great Again,” and toting signs that said 
“Trump Pence” and “Women for Trump.” Waiting for their nominee, the crowd erupted into 
chants of “U-S-A,” “Build the wall!” and “Lock her up!” 
 “He fills up every place he goes to,” said Dan Dwyer, 56, who drove from Lehigh County 
to attend his fourth Trump rally. 
 Dwyer, who lives in Macungie and owns an air-duct cleaning business, said he is a 
registered Democrat who voted for President Obama in 2008. 
 But, “we need a change in our government so desperately,” Dwyer said. “When I saw 
Donald Trump, I said ‘He’s it. That’s the man right there.”90 
 
 
89 USA TODAY and The New York Times did not publish coverage of this rally. The Washington Post included the 
fact that Trump would end his day at the Hershey rally but did not quote any voters in the report. See:  
Wagner, John, Sean Sullivan and Abby Phillips. (November 5, 2016). In Final Appeals, Focus on Turnout. The 
Washington Post.  






 What made this description of a Trump rally different from many national reports were 
the mix of delegitimizing and legitimizing details. Describing the rally, reporter Michealle Bond 
featured chants that included “Lock her up!” which was insulting to Clinton and featured at most 
rallies, “Build the Wall,” which reflected anger at U.S. immigration and support for Trump’s 
policy but also “U-S-A.” She highlighted signs that did not include insults or sensationalized 
language but simply the candidates’ names and “Women for Trump.” Speaking to a supporter, 
the report included the unusual fact that voter Dan Dwyer had attended four Trump rallies but 
also his age, job, hometown, and the fact that he was a registered Democrat who voted for 
Obama in the previous election. Dwyer’s quote does not explain the issues motivating him, but it 
does offer some explanation for why he was switching parties to vote for Trump. Taken together, 
the article reads as a neutral, fact-based report that informs the reader of who was at the rally, 
why they attended and what happened. It also pointed to an unusual, but potentially important, 
element of the 2016 election in Pennsylvania – the Obama voter turned Trump supporter. 
Evidence of widespread Trump support 
 Another qualitative difference between local and national reports was that local 
newspapers often included details that suggested Trump’s support was locally stronger than the 
polls were reflecting. This is not to say that local media wrote about this disparity or accurately 
predicted Trump would carry Pennsylvania in the election results. They did not. It would have 
taken a sophisticated political analyst to ignore national polls that consistently suggested Clinton 
would win Pennsylvania. No major news organization suggested Trump would carry 
Pennsylvania. However, there were often clues in the local reporting that the full range of 
Trump’s support was not reflected in the polls. 
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 An example included a September report in The Evening Sun with the headline: “GOP 
gains in York, but will it matter?” 
 “If recent history holds true, York County will vote for Donald Trump in November and 
Hillary Clinton will enter the White House in January.  
 The Republican Party has made steep gains here since the April primary, signing up more 
than four times as many voters as the Democrats.”91  
 
 As scholar Abernathy suggested, this type of reporting could have fed the “news eco-
system” and offered information that paired with other local media reports could have suggested 
that Pennsylvania might swing away from Clinton. 
  Another example is this report in the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette on Vice President Joe 
Biden’s visit to a steel mill to support Clinton also suggested Trump support was stronger than 
polls suggested:  
 “But while the crowd waited for Mr. Biden to get to the union hall, Brandon Urban, 29, a 
grievance manager in the maintenance and machine shop at the U.S. Steel Irvin plant, said in an 
interview that part of his get-out-the-vote effort has been trying to counter some of his own 
fellow steelworkers who say they see Mr. Trump as their candidate, not Ms. Clinton. 
"I've been telling them don't believe the lies he's been putting out. He doesn't support 
union workers," he said. But some steelworkers can't be swayed, he said, and "they tend to think 
Trump is the answer."92 
 Or this interview with the local Republican Party chair in the Lebanon Daily News:  
“Hillary Clinton’s campaign is spending a lot more money than the Donald Trump 
campaign. But if you look at the local effort and the enthusiasm, we given away 3,000 Trump-
Pence signs. It something no one involved in the party has ever seen. Anyone driving through 
Lebanon County can see the Trump signs out-number the Hillary signs by at least 25-to-1."93 
And finally, this in The Pittsburg Post-Gazette: 
“Mr. Barley, 67, and his wife Joanne, said they were loyal Democrats and union members 
until this year, when they changed their voter registration to Republican to support Mr. Trump. 
 
91 Lee, Rick., (2016, September 27). GOP Gains in York, but will it matter? The Evening Sun. p.A5. 
92 Hamill, Sean. (November 6, 2016). VP Biden Tries to Counter Trump’s Appeal to Working Class Voters. 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette. Retrieved from: https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-nation/2016/11/05/Biden-
praises-union-support-of-Clinton-McGinty/stories/201611050166. 
93 Lattimer, John. (November 7, 2016). Lebanon County Election Officials Prepared for Large Turnout. Lebanon 




“I just think the country is headed in the wrong direction, and neither the Democrats or 
the Republicans are going to fix it,” Mr. Barley said. “It’s going to take an outsider, like 
Trump.”94 
 
These local reports and others suggested that Trump’s support in Pennsylvania was much more 
widespread than the polls and national media were reporting. Hindsight suggests that reading 
these reports, national outlets could have seen that more on-the-ground reporting might have 
offered a more complex framing of Pennsylvania voters and even the suggestion that Trump 
might have carried the state. It might have encouraged the media to question polls such as an 
October 27 poll by The New York Times that had Clinton leading Trump by 7 percentage points 
in Pennsylvania.95 
Sense of community 
 Local newspaper reports also included very community-based features. For example, 
some news reports included tips on how voters could find transportation to the polls on election 
day, while many others included the reporters’ cell phone numbers at the end of the report.  
When candidates came to town, the report often included a “star-struck” quality to the coverage 
that members of the community felt interacting with famous politicians. For example, Public 
Opinion covered Mike Pence’s campaign stop on October 6, 2016 in this way:  
“Pence autographed a campaign sign for Rita Kline on her birthday. She and her husband, 
Robert, said they were proud that Pennsylvania was going to play an important role in the 2016 
election.”   
Later in the report: 
“Linda Shatzer dropped her scissors and comb and walked outside her hair salon. Some 
customers followed her. 
 
94 Majors, Dan. (2016, October 7). Democrats Engage in ‘Happy Talk,’ Pence says in Johnstown. Pittsburg Post-
Gazette. Retrieved from: https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-state/2016/10/21/Pennsylvania-Republicans-
react-to-Trump-s-election-outcome-debate-remarks/stories/201610210127. 
95 Cohn, Nate, (2016, October 27). Hillary Clinton Leads by 7 Points in Pennsylvania Poll. The New York Times. 
Retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/10/27/upshot/pennsylvania-poll.html. 
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“I want to get a hug, or at least shake his hand,” said Betty Bowman, who was getting her hair 
done. “I wish him luck.” 
“It’s so exciting to have something like this happen in a little town,” Shatzer said. 96 
 
The story concluded with reporter Jim Hook’s phone number.  
 Another report in The Philadelphia Inquirer was headlined, “Trump Wows the Crowd in 
Bucks County” and included: 
 “On Monday, a Quinnipiac University poll had Clinton with a 6-point lead- 47 to 41 
percent. 
 But the thousands who turned out Friday seemed unfazed by reports of Trump’s grasp on 
the region slipping.  
 Hundreds hoisted signs in the air, and Hunter Tirpak, the 2-year-old “Baby Trump” who 
stole the show at the rally in Wilkes-Barre last week, scurried around on the floor of the club for 
his third rally for the candidate.” 97  
 
These details are community-building – a shared sense of excitement at the candidate’s 
appearance and details that residents could picture. It offers an example of a newspaper 
participating in community life that is lost when local newspapers close.  
Conclusion 
 This chapter explored the results of a quantitative and qualitative study of local 
Pennsylvania media outlets and national outlets to compare coverage of the voter during the 
2016 election. Based on the hypothesis that local media might cover voters in a more nuanced 
manner and less likely to frame the voters as deviant, the study explored whether local and 
national outlets did frame voters differently. It found that local media did cover voters differently 
than national outlets did. The evidence is mixed -- not all delegitimizing cues pointed to this 
 
96 Hook, Jim. (October 6, 2016) Mike Pence Drops By Local GOP HQ. Public Opinion. Retrieved from: 
https://www.publicopiniononline.com/story/news/local/2016/10/06/mike-pence-drops-local-gop-hq/91683022/. 
97 McCabe, Caitlin. (2016, October 22). Trump Wows the Crowd in Bucks County. The Philadelphia Inquirer. This 





conclusion -- but weighing the results of the quantitative and qualitative study it is fair to point to 
the local media as more objective in their coverage of the voter.  
 What made local reports more objective than national reports was the additional 
information included about voters that local media often included and national media often left 
out. Voters were often allowed to explain their support for a candidate and express opinions 
about issues in local media, described their backgrounds. Delegitimizing cues were present but 
were balanced by these additional details.  
 There were some findings that are difficult to explain and it is fair to point out that the 
sample size was much smaller (particularly outside of content in The Philadelphia Inquirer, 
which covers a large city). It is unclear why the local media were more likely to highlight the 
lack of education of Trump voters, for example. However, most of the quantitative and 
qualitative evidence points to a local media that offered voters the opportunity to express their 
opinions and be presented in a more holistic manner than the framing of national reports did. 
Reading these reports closely, a news consumer could pick up clues that Trump’s support was 
widespread in Pennsylvania, even in traditionally Democratic strongholds.  
 As local news organizations fold and bureaus of national organizations are consolidated 
or closed, it is insightful to recognize the contribution of local media to the election process. As 
Abernathy suggests, local media could and should be a part of the news eco-system. Covering a 
community, local media often can offer larger organizations an understanding and nuance that 
can be lacking when outside reporters parachute in. Reading the Pennsylvania media reports 
from the 2016 election, there are important clues that Trump’s support was deeper than polls 
reflected. Many reports suggested that voters were looking for a candidate from outside the 
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traditional political offerings and the energy that Trump brought to these communities was 
exciting to voters.  
 Future research could expand the number of local media or combine reports produced in 
several swing states to gather a larger sample. However, the stories analyzed for this project did 
offer a rich sample of differences between local and national coverage and suggests areas in 
which larger outlets not linked to local communities could improve election coverage. In 
addition, this research suggests that the U.S. democratic system is losing a significant resource 
when smaller outlets close, reduce publication or eliminate a newsroom. This study highlights 
the key role local media play in the news eco-system and the need to research their value before, 




Chapter Six: Mea Culpa 
 
In the weeks following the 2016 election, the media engaged in a public debate to 
determine what was wrong with their coverage of the election. Dozens of journalists participated 
in a spontaneous discussion that began Election Day, during the television coverage of election 
results, and continued until Inauguration Day. Hundreds of articles and broadcasts were 
produced in this time period,98 creating a self-reflective body of content that includes the 
immediate response of journalists to the question of what was wrong with the media coverage of 
the election. Most journalists recognized the public debate that followed the election as an 
important moment of self-reflection about their profession. Dean Baquet, executive editor of The 
New York Times, called the discussion in the weeks following the election a ‘mea culpa,’ John 
Cassidy, staff writer at The New Yorker, changed it to a ‘Media Culpa,” Liz Spayd, public editor 
of The New York Times at the time, simply called it a “period of self-reflection.” Brian Stelter, 
anchor of CNN’s Reliable Sources, summed up the mood of the media this way: “This was a 
collective failure – a failure of imagination. In some ways, a mass delusion. And the media 
contributed to it. So now, it’s time for some serious soul searching.”99 
 This chapter aims to do several things. It outlines the content of the self-analysis, 
categorizes the problems and solutions identified by members of the media, and it explains how 
the media understanding of the events can be understood through the lens of Hallin’s Sphere 
Theory. The media recognized that the coverage of the election did not yield the results they 
 
98 As an example of how many media reports were produced focusing on this topic, a Nexis Uni search of news 
sources using the keywords “media or journalist w/10 fail or miss and election” limited to Election Day 2016-
Inaugural Day 2017 resulted in 1,958 results. And the Nexis Uni database is limited in the sources it includes. For 
example, the Wall Street Journal is not in this database. 
99 Stelter, Brian. (Host). (2016, November 13). CNN Reliable Sources. [Television Program]. New York: CNN. 




hoped for but there was no clear-cut consensus on why. Sphere theory offers a solution that fits 
with most of the problems identified during the self-analysis.  
This chapter is included in this study because it supports the idea that the media followed 
normative practices and traditions when confronted with the Trump voter and that was to cover 
those voters as deviants, a threat to democracy. That type of coverage, however, does not 
encourage an investigation of those voters to determine what their motivations are, how 
widespread their beliefs are, and what issues are important to them. This study suggests that 
many of the points raised in the media reflection support the idea that journalists shifted into the 
sphere of deviance during the election, away from an examination of voters and the issues they 
support. Awareness of this practice might lead journalists to include a wider range of voters 
within the sphere of legitimate controversy, where normative practices encourage a nuanced 
coverage of voters. It is therefore appropriate for this study to include a summary and analysis of 
the professional debate that followed the election. 
Description of the Post-Election Discussion 
 
This study examines the media discussion that followed the 2016 presidential election 
and focused on mistakes in the coverage of the electorate. The analysis appeared in a wide 
variety of mediums: opinion essays, news articles, broadcast discussions, published surveys of 
journalists, radio call-in shows, and roundtable political discussions on television. It was 
produced online, in print and on air, as well as in local and national forums. The media debate 
lasted approximately 73 days. For this study, the debate is defined as starting November 8, 2016, 
and ending January 20, 2017. These dates were chosen because they reflect the rise and fall of 
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the spontaneous discussion that started as the results were reported on Election Day 2016.100 The 
discussion naturally fell off once Donald Trump took office and began his first 100 days with a 
push for new policy initiatives. Journalists were forced to start covering the fast-paced flow of 
news and the professional debate was shut off. The majority of the discussion occurred in the 
first week following the election, in fact much of it was produced as election results were rolling 
in and the media realized that the prediction that Hillary Clinton would win the presidency was 
wrong. However, some of the studies that included the voices of many members of the media 
were produced closer to the Inauguration. (For example, Melody Kramer’s report published in 
December 2016 for Poynter.Org included interviews with 86 different sources asking them what 
lessons journalists should take from the election.) So the time period was adjusted to include the 
early rush of reports produced after the election and the longer surveys produced weeks after. 
It is painful for any profession to publicly debate reasons for failing to meet expectations. 
Myers and Russell (2019) identified the only comparable moment as the aftermath of the 1948 
presidential election when Truman defeated Dewey. Yet as the debate occurred so spontaneously 
and was often framed in emotional language, it is reasonable to suggest that it felt necessary to 
the media. For example, headlines of news stories and columns that addressed the media 
coverage of the election used words such as “wreckage,”101 “blew it,”102 and “unbearable 
smugness.”103 The New York Times published a letter to the readers from the publisher and editor 
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on November 13 saying they were “rededicating ourselves to the fundamental.”104 Martin Baron, 
Washington Post executive editor, gave a commencement address in December 2016 to the 
CUNY Graduate School of Journalism that focused on the lessons learned from the election 
coverage. As Wang et. al. (2017) described, members of the media seemed to understand that the 
future of journalism in a democracy was at stake. “(T)he disconnect between journalists’ and 
editors’ perceptions of the American electorate and the reality reflected in the election outcome 
brought into stark relief the need for the institution of American journalism to look inward, 
explore the reasons why the news media were so blindsided by this election outcome,” wrote 
Wang et. al. (2017, p. 1244-1245). 
The results of this study found a widespread understanding by members of the media that 
their normative practices in covering an election were inadequate and that change is required to 
accurately report on the electorate. The starting premise of this discussion was that the media did 
not cover the 2016 presidential election accurately. “To put it bluntly, the media missed the 
story. In the end, a huge number of American voters wanted something different. And although 
these voters shouted and screamed it, most journalists weren’t listening. They didn’t get it,” 
wrote Margaret Sullivan, the Washington Post’s media columnist, the morning after the 
election.105 Or, as Jim Rutenberg, the media columnist for The New York Times, wrote the same 
day: “It was clear that something was fundamentally broken in journalism, which has been 
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unable to keep up with the anti-establishment mood that is turning the world upside down.”106 
Both perspectives reflect one point the media seemed to agree on: the coverage of the electorate 
in the 2016 election was flawed. From that premise, many different problems were identified and 
solutions offered. This study is a summary of those problems and solutions. 
Literature Review 
 
The content of the media’s self-analysis is worthy of scholarship because it includes 
many problems and root causes identified by journalists within the profession (outlined below). 
This self-identified list of what is malfunctioning in U.S. political coverage captures the response 
of the practitioners themselves. The journalists and editors who covered the campaign examined, 
very publicly, what they did wrong.  It also makes clear that journalists knew something was 
wrong with their coverage of the 2016 election, in part because the media response was 
spontaneous and emotional in nature. As Wang et. al. wrote “(t)his sudden, and broadly shared, 
desire to look inward was spurred by the widely acknowledged failure of most journalists and 
pundits to anticipate this election outcome” (2018, p. 4). This study adds to the existing literature 
by studying the content of the debate and summarizing the problems and solutions offered by the 
media. Finally, it applies Sphere Theory to the variety of problems that were offered and 
suggests understanding the dissatisfaction of the media through this lens. 
Scholarship examining the media response to the 2016 election is relatively limited. For 
example, Bent, Kelling and Thomas (2020) examined this content to identify which ethical 
issues were raised in the debate. The study found those issues to be: “failing to exercise 
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independent judgment; failing to provide a representative picture of the electorate; and 
underestimating new and emerging technologies” (Bent et. al. 2020). Others, like Boydstun and 
Van Aelst (2018) did not evaluate the content produced in the weeks after the election. Rather, 
they used the debate as a springboard for additional analysis, interviewing 24 members of the 
media and asking them why they “were caught off guard in 2016” (Boydstun and Van Aelst, p. 
1). Similarly to Bent et. al., their study identified a disconnect between journalists and the 
electorate as an important reason the media failed to report on the 2016 election accurately. 
Wang, Napoli and Ma (2017) mined the content to evaluate five levels of analysis that influence 
media content, as defined by Shoemaker and Reese (2013). They defined the debate as 
“metajournalistic discourse” and found that the media identified its routines as the most 
problematic area, including reporting techniques and journalistic value-related issues. Taken 
together, these studies reflect the importance of this election in understanding the challenge of 




This study is a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the content produced during the 
media debate following the 2016 campaign. The content includes the opinions of political 
journalists and editors from a wide range of mediums addressing the question of what was wrong 
with the coverage of the presidential election. It does not include the opinions of journalism 
scholars, political scientists, pollsters, political analysts or others that were often a part of these 
debate forums. The reason for limiting the analysis to the opinions of journalists and editors is 
that this study is focused on the normative practices of the media during the campaign. It was 
considered  more relevant to gather and reflect on the thoughts of the journalists who have 
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experience implementing these practices during the often deadline-driven coverage of an 
election. In addition, this study was limited to the opinions of journalists as opposed to media 
observers, because the debate reflected a dawning realization for many who covered the election 
that normative practices are flawed and should be examined and improved. Understanding your 
own normative practices to be in need of change is a pivotal moment for any profession. This 
study hoped to capture this moment through the voices of those who practiced journalism. 
The content included in this study was identified through an advanced keyword search on 
Google. It is not intended to be representative of all of the content produced nor all of the 
opinions expressed. Rather it is a representative sampling of the content in which journalism 
professionals offered their reflections on the election. The keywords used in this search were 
“election, media or journalist, fail or miss.” Those results were then limited by the “News” filter, 
a custom range date of November 8, 2016, to January 20, 2017 found under Tools, as well as a 
regional filter of “United States.” That search produced 328 results. Sorted by relevance, this 
study selected the first reports generated by the search that were produced by a U.S. media 
organization and included journalists and/or editors offering reasons the media did not predict 
Trump’s victory. In addition to this sample, this study included several reports that included 
surveys with many different journalists, including transcripts of roundtable discussions and 
surveys by Poynter.Org. While this was a subjective choice, this content was included because it 
increased the number of media members included in this survey, greatly expanding the variety of 
voices that are heard in this study. As a result, this content analysis includes 27 titles and the 
opinions of 81 journalists or editors speaking out within weeks of the election. After examining 
the content, seven answers garnered consensus and these were then used as filters through which 
to discuss the conversation. Once the most common answers were listed, the study tallied which 
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journalist identified with those answers and extracted quotes from the content that best explained 
this aspect of journalism identified as a problem area.  
Results 
 
The media debate that occurred after the 2016 election was a dynamic discussion 
happening over time and in many different forums. That meant the problems and answers 
suggested in this discussion all varied slightly because the question being asked differed slightly. 
For example, Sara O’Brien of Poynter.Org reported that she asked journalists to answer this 
question: “How did the media miss the wave of support for Donald Trump?”107 Politico’s Joe 
Pompeo, Peter Sterne, Hadas Gold and Alex Weprin framed the question as, “What went wrong? 
How did everyone in the media miss the Trump phenomenon?”108 Chuck Todd, on NBC’s Meet 
the Press asked, “Well, what the heck just happened, right?”109 When examining the content 
produced through the keyword search, this study looked at the question asked of the journalists 
and determined if it was similar enough to other questions to be included. It is fair to summarize, 
based on this analysis, that the media was grappling with the same key topic that was often 
framed slightly differently.  
Within the media debate there were several points of consensus, as well as many 
disagreements. Both agreements and disagreements are outlined below. This study found seven 
common answers to the generalized question: What was wrong with the election coverage?  
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Those seven answers were labeled as Reliance on the Polls, Normative Practices, Out of Touch, 
Unthinkable, Newsroom Diversity, Lack of On-the-Ground Reporting/Budget Cuts, Reduced 
Local Media. Many journalists identified multiple reasons and those are included in the totals. 
Each of these “reasons” is an umbrella for a range of perspectives, some contradicting each 
other. The explanation of each these answers is offered below, including the variety of responses 
it embodies.  
When analyzing the content of the media discussion, it was occasionally unclear which of 
the seven categories identified by this study it belonged in.  Some were obvious, such as “the 
polls were misleading.” Others were more complicated, such as the differences between 
Unthinkable and Out of Touch. These categories are very similar and in some ways are ‘mega’ 
answers compared to the other categories. Both answers describe a media that did not fully 
understand the mood of the electorate. However, the tone of these two answers is very different. 
Unthinkable, the most popular answer, included a range of responses that suggested electing 
Trump was so far outside the expectations of journalists and the society they live in that it was 
“unthinkable,” even when confronted with evidence to the contrary. Whereas Out of Touch, the 
second most popular answer, is a grouping of answers that suggested that the media did not see 
or understand the mood of the electorate. This study viewed these two answers as “mega” topics 
because many of the reasons the media offered for being out of touch or in a society that 
Trump’s election was unthinkable became the other categories in this study: lack of on the 
ground reporting, lack of newsroom diversity, reduced local media, budget cuts and normative 
practices. 
Chart One shows the seven problems cataloged in this study that were identified by the 
media and the frequency of that answer. This study included the thoughts of 85 members of the 
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media (for a list, see Appendix B and C). Some offered more than one answer, so the total 
number of answers is higher than the total number of journalists included. This graph reflects the 
following tallies: Unthinkable 24; Out of Touch 23; Reliance on the Polls 18; Lack of Newsroom 
Diversity 13; Normative Practices 14; Lack of On-the-Ground Reporting 10; and Reduced Local 
Media 8.  
 
Figure 23   
 Appendix B is a list of the transcripts, columns, surveys and newspaper articles that were 
examined for this study. This content included the opinions of 81 members of the media. 
Appendix C is a chart of these members of the media listed alphabetically and includes the 
journalists’ name, where they worked in 2016, their position, the reasons they cited and where 
their opinion was found.  
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Description of the answers offered by the members of the media 
 
The following is an analysis of each of the seven identified problems, including the wide 
range of answers that were included in each topic.  
Problem 1: Reliance on the Polls  
 
The polls were a common topic in the media discussion and often the starting point of 
discussions.  On election night during the televised results coverage, many in the media 
immediately pointed to the polls when they realized Clinton might lose the election. “I don’t 
know one poll that suggested that Donald Trump was going to have this kind of night,” said Jake 
Tapper, an anchor on CNN. Megyn Kelly at Fox News said “The pollsters were dead wrong.” 
Later in the night, Kelly asked “You tell me if the polling industry is effectively done?”110 Dylan 
Byers, a columnist at CNN Money, wrote the day after election that it was misleading to lump all 
polls as wrong. He identified FiveThirtyEight and the USC/Los Angeles Times poll as “outliers” 
that gave Trump a greater chance of winning that most others. Byers said the danger of relying 
on polls that get it wrong is that it fuels the growing mistrust that many Americans, especially 
Republicans, have of the media.111 Brian Stelter, CNN host of Reliable Sources, said the media 
takes its cues on election coverage from sources such as the stock market and candidate 
campaign staff expectations, as well as the polls.112 Others suggested that the dominant narrative 
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suggested by polls, that Clinton would win, steered media coverage. Suki Dardarian of The 
Minneapolis Star Tribune, said the polls were hard to ignore. “I think I would have to credit the 
national polling with sending everyone in the wrong direction,” Dardarian said.113 John Cassidy, 
a contributor to The New Yorker, said the effort to keep up with the hundreds of polls produced 
in the last few weeks of the election stole energy and resources from the coverage of voters and 
the issues important to them. In addition, Cassidy wrote, the polls were unrepresentative because 
many of Trump’s supporters viewed pollsters as part of the establishment they were voting 
against and did not participate in polls. Some journalists, like Evan Osnos, staff writer at The 
New Yorker, suggested that polls have to prove to be more accurate or the media should learn to 
ignore them in the future. Jill Lepore, also a contributor to  The New Yorker, went further and 
suggested that government should regulate the creation and explanation of election polling so the 
media does not misunderstand them again. 
Many of those that conducted the polls pushed back at the criticism and did not accept 
blame for the surprise nature of the election results. Nate Silver, editor of FiveThirtyEight, said it 
is a “myth” that the election “represented some sort of catastrophic failure for the polls.” Trump 
outperformed national polls by one to two percentage points which actually made the polls more 
accurate than they were in 2012, Silver wrote. The problem was a lack nuance in the analysis and 
reporting of the polls, he argued. “Overconfidence in Clinton’s chances wasn’t just because of 
the polls,” Silver wrote. “National journalists usually interpreted conflicting and contradictory 
information as confirming their prior belief that Clinton would win.”114 Sean Trende, editor of 
RealClear Politics, wrote that even when aggregating polls, the predictions were within an 
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acceptable margin of error. Like Silver, Trende said reporters were looking for a confirmation of 
what they believed the outcome would be, rather than recognizing that Clinton’s lead fell within 
the margin of error of nearly every major poll. Trende said journalists “gravitated toward 
unreliable approaches such as reading the tea leaves on early voting or putting faith in Big Blue 
Walls, while ignoring things like the high number of undecided voters.”115 
Problem Two: Normative Practices 
 
Normative Practices is the title given to the range of answers that identified some aspect 
of journalism practice involving reporting and writing as a problem in the 2016 coverage. This 
covered a wide range of answers. The most common was the concept of “false equivalency,” 
which is based on the practice of objectivity, where both candidates are offered a chance to 
explain their perspective. The premise was that when Trump said something untrue on the 
campaign trail, failed to explain a policy position, or did not have a policy position on an issue, 
and it was then paired with a statement from Hillary Clinton, who expressed a detailed policy 
position. Journalists suggested that was unfair to Clinton because Trump was often lying, 
exaggerating or using partial truth and this went unacknowledged. “(M)any journalists were 
flummoxed at how to cover a campaign in which one of the candidates was demonstrably 
unqualified for reasons of experience, temperament and truthfulness,” wrote Dan Kennedy, in 
USNews.com.116 In addition, many argued that the dynamic of objectivity designed to create 
fairness and neutrality, pushed many journalists to cover the scandal surrounding Clinton’s email 
 








server as equivalent to the many scandals involving Trump, including the allegation that he had 
multiple affairs with pornography film actors and paid them to remain quiet and his admission 
caught on tape that he attempted to grope women. Poniewozik, of The New York Times, summed 
it up this way: “I hope Mr. Trump’s asymmetric, weirdly brazen dishonesty has broken 
journalists of the bad habits of false equivalency, euphemism and forced balance.”117 Others saw 
objectivity as a barrier to standing up to Trump when they identified him making false claims or 
exaggerations. Normative practices encourage journalists to simply report Trump’s comments 
and not investigate or identify them as false. David Folkenflik, a political reporter at National 
Public Radio, said he saw news organizations struggling “over how to translate basic journalistic 
values of fairness, balance and impartiality into coverage of Trump.”118 Still others did not blame 
the unique nature of the Trump campaign. They pointed to long-standing practices in journalism 
practice. FiveThirtyEight Editor Silver said that the media has moved away from fact-based 
reporting and this is the real problem in election coverage. Campaign coverage has become a mix 
of facts and analysis as well as both explicit and implicit predictions. “Usually, these take the 
form of authoritatively worded analytical claims about the race, such as declaring which states 
are in play in the Electoral College,” Silver wrote.119 
This general category of “normative practices” also incorporated the idea that journalists 
covered Trump because his antics were good for ratings. Some journalists pointed to the 
sensationalized nature of Trump’s campaign as easy to cover and more interesting than policy 
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debate. NPR’s Folkenflik said Trump, “owned the press”120 and that the media was willing to 
cover him so extensively because it was good for ratings. Dan Rather, former CBS news anchor, 
argued that this gave Trump a clear advantage because of the increased amount of free media 
journalists gave his campaign over Clinton’s campaign. Others, such as CNN’s Stelter and 
political correspondent Greenfield, disagreed and argued that the coverage of Trump met 
professional standards. 
Problem Three: Out of Touch with the Electorate 
 
Problem Three was the most common reason most journalists participating in the debate 
cited for why they did not predict the election of Donald Trump. Journalists repeatedly said the 
biggest obstacle to coverage of the 2016 election was that the media does not understand the 
perspective of voters who are different from the journalist’s own perspective. Some journalists 
pointed to geography and the fact that the majority of the media live and work in New York City 
and Washington, D.C. During the election results broadcast on MSNBC, anchor Brian Williams 
said, “when New York and Washington-based journalists either accidently take the wrong turn 
on GPS and drive into America, drive through America to visit as relative, come back and report 
‘the place is covered with Trump signs!’ They are just amazed to find this.” Williams called it 
Margaret Mead journalism, implying that it was similar to anthropology among a distant and 
relatively unknown tribe.121 On the same broadcast, former CBS anchor Rather suggested that 
the media is still “pretty confined to the Eastern Seaboard.” Jim Rutenberg, media critic at The 
New York Times, explained it this way: “Flyover country isn’t a place, it’s a state of mind -- it’s 
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in part of Long Island and Queens, much of Staten Island, certain neighborhoods of Miami or 
even Chicago. And yes -- it largely -- but hardly exclusively -- pertains to working class white 
people.” 
 Others suggested that the status of journalists has changed over time, that journalism no 
longer draws from the middle class and this has led to a limited perspective. Andy Alexander, 
former ombudsman of The Washington Post, said the media and their sources live “in an echo 
chamber where faulty assumptions can be reinforced and amplified.” Operating from big cities, 
most members of the media do not socialize with people who supported Trump, some argued. 
Joel Christopher, vice-president of news for USATODAY Network-Wisconsin, said “(I)f we are 
introspective and honest, we have to admit that we as journalists probably weren’t associating 
with enough voters across the spectrum.”122 This bubble was usually outlined as innocently 
forming, not deliberately isolating. “(J)ournalism has become an enclave of the college-educated, 
inhabited by the sons and daughters of lawyers and professors,” wrote Kay Hymowitz, 
contributing editor at City Journal.123 Living on the coasts, socializing with like-minded people 
and filling newsrooms with journalists that come from similar backgrounds can lead to a myopia, 
said journalists such as Dean Baquet, executive editor of The New York Times, and Margaret 
Sullivan, media critic of The Washington Post. Similarly, Baron, executive editor at The 
Washington Post, defined the problem as a failure of assumptions based on a lack of 
understanding about shared values. “It is our job to hear all people. And to listen closely. And to 
 
122 O’Brien, Sara. (2016, November 10). 
123 Hymowitz, Kay S. (2016, December 18) How Women in the Media Missed the Women’s Vote. City Journal. 
Retrieved from https://www.city-journal.org/html/how-women-media-missed-womens-vote-14906.html. 
184 
 
give the people of America insights into each other. We will have to work harder at that,” Baron 
said. 124 
Problem Four: Unthinkable 
 
This category of answers is closely related to “Out of Touch with the Electorate.” The 
category was labeled “Unthinkable” because it encompasses a range of answers that stated or 
implied that members of the media dismissed the support of Trump because they could not 
imagine that others could support him. When coding answers, this study occasionally found it 
difficult to distinguish Problem 3 (Out of Touch) from this one. The difference was the use of 
language that described the media as rejecting what they saw or were told. For example, Amy 
Hollyfield, senior deputy news editor at The Tampa Bay Times said: “Don’t ignore what the 
public wants.”125 Her answer implies an action – hearing and choosing not to report on what the 
voters are saying. James Hohman, national political reporter at The Washington Post, called it a 
“confirmation bias” and said that despite many red flags that Clinton’s support was not as strong 
as imagined, the media tended to value reporting that confirmed their pre-existing idea that 
Trump would lose.126  
Many journalists described being unable to imagine Trump as president and assumed the 
public shared their values. Margaret Sullivan, The Washington Post media columnist, summed it 
up this way: “(F)or many well-educated, socially liberal, city-dwelling journalists, the idea of the 
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intemperate Trump as president -- given his racist, xenophobic, and sexist utterances, and trail of 
bad behavior – was unthinkable. Literally unthinkable. So we engaged in our very own year of 
magical thinking. It couldn’t happen, therefore it wouldn’t happen. Until it did.”127 Brian Stelter, 
CNN host, said journalists saw the wave of support for Trump but mismeasured it, he said. 
“Groupthink. Acela corridor bias, which is a specific subset of liberal media bias. Some wishful 
thinking. A failure of imagination. This was a rural roar, and journalists on the coast had a hard 
time hearing it,” Stelter told Poynter.org.128 Similarly, Sean Trende, of RealClear Politics, 
described a homogenous political environment that reinforced its own values. He said the 
campaign coverage grew out of a “media environment that made it almost taboo to even suggest 
that Donald Trump had a real chance to win.”129 Freelance journalist Chris Arnade wrote many 
profiles of Trump voters during the election and his reporting was hailed afterward as an 
example of nuanced reporting in Columbia Journalism Review. In that interview, Arnade 
described a national press corp that reinforced the assumption that Clinton would win. Observing 
national reporters travel to “Trump country,” Arnade said they “went in with an expectation of 
what they would find, and they found it.”130 Using stronger, more detailed language but making a 
similar point, Silver identified the “shortcomings in how American politics are covered” to 
include: “pervasive groupthink among media elite, an unhealthy obsession with the insider’s 
view of politics, a lack of analytical rigor, a failure to appreciate uncertainty, a sluggishness to 
self-correct when new evidence contradicts pre-existing beliefs, and narrow viewpoint that lacks 
perspective from the longer arc of American history.” 131  
 
127 O’Brien, Sara. (2016, November 10). 
128 Ibid. 
129 Trende, Sean. (2016, November 12). 
130 Gourarie, Chava. (2016, November 15). Q&A: Chris Arnade on His Year Embedded with Trump Supporters. 
Columbia Journalism Review. Retrieved from : 
https://www.cjr.org/covering_the_election/chris_arnade_trump_supporters_america.php. 
131 Silver, Nate (2017, January 19). 
186 
 
Some journalists also pointed to a sense of arrogance in the coverage. Will Rahn, 
managing director of politics for CBS News Digital, wrote a column titled “The Unbearable 
Smugness of The Press,” published two days after the election. Rahn said journalists mocked 
Trump voters and rejected their perspectives. “It’s a profound failure of empathy in the service of 
endless posturing,” Rahn wrote. He said the majority of the media supported Clinton and 
believed that “Trump supporters are backward, and that it is our duty to catalogue and ultimately 
reverse that backwardness.” Labeling Trump’s victory a product of racism and sexism allows the 
media to avoid blame, he said. “This is all ‘whitelash,’ you see. Trump voters are racist and 
sexist, so there must be more racists and sexists than we realized,” Rahn wrote.132 Put in a milder 
form, Dean Baquet, Executive Editor of The New York Times, said the media failed to understand 
the depth of anxiety that many Trump voters felt: “I think it’s too simplistic to just see them as 
crazy people or deplorables. There aren’t that  (sic) many deplorables in the United States.”133 
Marty Baron, Executive Editor of The Washington Post, put it even more delicately. He called 
for greater fairness when covering voters with different perspectives, with the implication that 
fairness was lacking at times in the 2016 coverage.  
This ‘lack of imagination’ interfered with the coverage of the Trump voter and 
contributed to a misunderstanding of the mood of the electorate, some journalists said. For 
example, Liz Spayd, public editor of The New York Times, said coverage of the Trump voters 
“often amplified the voices of the most hateful.” Caricatures of voters do not explain their 
perspective, Spayd said. The danger, she wrote, is that those stories “drowned out the kind of 
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agenda-free, deep narratives that could have taken Times readers deeper into the lives and values 
of the people who just elected the next president.”134 Andi McDaniel, senior director of content 
and news at WAMU in Washington, D.C., said the media should “listen to the station like a 
deplorable” suggesting that media coverage doesn’t understand how negatively painting Trump 
supporters alienates the audience.135 From a slightly different perspective, Chuck Todd, political 
director and host of NBC’s Meet the Press, included part of an interview with a reporter from 
Progressive Farmer on his political roundtable talk show. Chris Clayton, the reporter, said that 
the media repeatedly stated that educated voters were supporting Clinton, while voters without 
college degrees in rural America supported Trump. “(R)ural America is not uneducated, even 
though maybe there are fewer people with college degrees,” Clayton said. Rural voters took this 
“very personally,” Clayton said. On the program, Todd said he was “stung” by the interview.136 
Put another way: Kay S. Hymowitz, a contributor to City Journal, criticized young women 
reporters for mistaking their support of Clinton as a universal. “They had heads full of academic 
theory and millennial angst but little life experience with – and virtually no interest in – military 
wives from South Carolina or Walmart managers from Staten Island,” Hymowitz wrote.137 
Without knowledge of the depth of Trump’s support, voters may not have realized how 
important their votes might have been, argued Katty Kay, the anchor of BBC World News 
America. Kay compared the election coverage to the coverage of the Brexit vote in the U.K. She 
suggested that many voters might not have voted for Trump if the media had informed them that 
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the race was close. Instead, she suggested many voters were just issuing a protest and the media 
missed the danger of this.138  
Problem Five: Newsroom Diversity 
 
Diversity was defined in different ways during the post-election debate. Many called for 
greater economic diversity in the newsroom in an effort to understand and represent the 
electorate better. Ju-Don Marshall Roberts, former managing editor at The Washington Post, said 
that the media often fails at covering “people who feel marginalized.” Having reporters of 
different economic backgrounds would help “to get the ‘why’ of what is happening in the 
country,” Roberts said. 139 Isaac Lee, Univision chief of news, digital and entertainment, defined 
it further, “We live in the age of inequality. One of the outcomes of inequality is that we wall 
ourselves off and resent each other.”140 Baquet, executive editor at The New York Times, said that 
the media must work to understand “the working class voters who feel like the forces of 
globalization and the rise of technology have left them behind. We need to understand that world 
better before there is another election.”141 Gawker Media founder Nick Denton put it more 
bluntly. He said the media is “no longer a national institution, but the representatives of a 
class.”142 
In addition to economic diversity, some called for other forms of diversity -- such as 
educational, geographical and political. For example, Diana Marcum, a writer at Los Angeles 
Times, suggested hiring reporters who have not attended college.143 Raquel Rutledge, 
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investigative reporter at the Milwaukee Journal-Sentinel, suggested ‘bipartisan collaboration’ on 
news reports.144 Baron at The Washington Post said “The face of America is changing, and that 
means that the faces of our newsrooms should change too.”145 Perry Bacon, senior political 
reporter for NBC News, agreed by saying the media is not “fluent” in talking about news stories 
that are based in race, identity and culture and this contributed to the failure to understand the 
Trump voter. Others pointed to the reduced number of bureaus and local newspapers that have 
narrowed the perspectives of different regions in the larger media market. Liz Spayd, The New 
York Times public editor in 2016, suggested that the media needs to find new ways to cover the 
“half of America” that often gets ignored. Speaking to her newspaper, she said “the next question 
is whether The Times is interested in crossing the red line to see what this America wants 
next.”146  
Problem Six: Lack of On the Ground Reporting/Budget Cuts 
 
 The first part of this answer focuses on the idea that the national media did not cover the 
electorate with enough on-the-ground reporting. Many journalists, especially those based in local 
media outlets, argued that national reporters covered the election remotely, dropping in for rallies 
or big campaign events and as a result they failed to understand the issues motivating Trump 
voters. Some, like Chris Arnade, the freelance political reporter who travelled to small towns 
during the election, called this “parachute journalism” and said that type of reporting made it 
difficult to shed a big city perspective. Phil Boas, editorial page editor of The Arizona Republic, 
said “the real story is out among people, not inside the campaign bubble.”147 Others like Andrew 
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McGill, a reporter at The Atlantic, said the concentration of jobs in big cities means reporters no 
longer work their way up through smaller media markets, where they absorb different 
perspectives. The Washington Post’s  Sullivan, who wrote a great deal about the election, 
suggested that on-the-ground reporting was never considered an important part of the coverage: 
“(A)lthough we touched down in the big red states for a few days, or interviewed some coal 
miners or unemployed autoworkers in the Rust Belt, we didn’t take them seriously.”148 This 
thought was echoed and expanded by Alec MacGillis, political reporter for ProPublica who 
started his career at The Baltimore Sun: “The media are so, so far removed from their country. 
The gaps have gotten so large. The media are all in Washington, D.C. and New York now thanks 
to the decline of local and metro papers. And the gaps between how those cities and the rest of 
the country are doing have gotten so much larger in recent years.”149  
Other journalists cited newsroom budget cuts as the reason the media missed Trump’s 
support in the electorate. This is related to the lack of on-the-ground reporting because budget 
cuts were often cited as the reason there was a lack of travel or investigative reporting. 
Journalists referred to restricted travel budgets, fewer reporters in the newsroom, greater pressure 
to produce copy, and the elimination of bureaus as changes that have negatively affected 
campaign reporting. As Brooke Binokowsi, managing editor of Snopes.com, said, “I don’t think 
journalism failed: I think journalism was failed. If they’re not given the resources and space they 
need to do their job, the job won’t get done.” 150 
Problem Seven: Reduced Local Media 
 
 
148 Sullivan, Margaret. (2016, November 9) 
149 Byers, Dylan. (2016, November 9) 
150 Kramer, Melody. (2016, December 7) 
191 
 
 Once again, this answer was closely related to another answer. Many journalists who said 
the lack of on-the-ground reporting was a problem also pointed to the reduced number of local 
media outlets. Alex Stonehill, editor of The Seattle Globalist, said that national news outlets 
cannot fill the hole left with the closure of community-based media: “These national outlets are, 
almost by definition, out of touch with local audiences. But the local newspaper, where readers 
might have known and trusted a columnist or editorial board is long gone.”151 Another local 
editor agreed. Mark Jurkowitz, editor of the Outer Banks Sentinel, said local media “create those 
ongoing community conversations” because the reporters and editors are willing to be the 
driving force behind local discussions. 152 
 Freelance reporter Arnade, who spent the election in small towns and cities, said that 
local reporting often understands the nuances of a community in a manner an outsider never 
could. During the election, Arnade said, national reporters would travel to smaller cities and 
“went in with no context, almost like anthropologists going on expedition.” He said national 
newspapers should have written about the frustration of “white working class” communities 
years before the election. “It crept up on people this year, but it has been out there for years, the 
sense of a town feeling frustrated and left behind; the loss of town centers; the loss of mills; the 
loss of factories; the loss of jobs. There just hasn’t been continued reporting on what impact that 
has had on these communities,” Arnade said. In addition, Arnade said, the loss of local media 
outlets means the national media has lost a source of information. Not only did local newspapers 
serve their towns and cities, but they were read by journalists at the wire services and picked up 
by national media.153 
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Sphere Theory  
 
This study is included in a larger examination of the media content in the 2016 election 
for several reasons. First, the post-election discussion by the media confirms the fact that 
journalists and editors recognized they had failed to accurately report on the electorate. While 
many reasons were offered for this miss, the media discussion never questioned the fact that 
something went wrong that resulted in a failure to recognize the mood of the voters. This 
discussion was often emotional, angry and revealing, which suggests that it was important to 
these media professionals to understand their mistakes. Second, the problems identified in the 
post-election discussion support the idea that the media shifted its normative practices when 
confronted with the Trump voter. No longer was objectivity and fact-based reporting the key. 
Instead, the Trump voter was an unexpected shock. Each of the seven identified problems 
suggested by the media rely on the fact that the media did not write about the electorate in a 
manner that revealed the depth of support for Trump and each of the answers suggest a different 
reason why they did not. This study suggests that those answers, taken together, show a media 
that is struggling to understand its role in a nation that is undergoing political change. Hallin 
posited that moments of political upheaval are often moments when parts of society are labeled 
deviant, only to become better understood with time. In Hallin’s original study, that part of 
society was war protestors. He found as the war continued and society began to shift away from 
its early sense of patriotic duty and toward a more critical understanding of the conflict, media 
coverage of the protestors changed. Journalist shifted their identification of protestors from 
deviant to acceptable, or from the sphere of deviance to the sphere of legitimate controversy. It 
suggests that the coverage of voters such as Trump’s supporters might also change in the future. 
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Understanding the election coverage through the lens of Sphere Theory offers an 
explanation for how and why the media reports did not explore the Trump voter in depth. Sphere 
theory suggests that the media identified the Trump voter as a threat to democracy, a deviant part 
of society. This identification encouraged journalists to shift their normative practices. As 
journalism scholar Carlson suggested just weeks after the election, Trump “struck a nerve” in the 
media during the election coverage that encouraged them to identify his candidacy as deviant and 
outside the norm. When covering a deviant event or actor, normative practices shift and that 
actor or event is considered outside the sphere of legitimacy and in the sphere of deviance where 
“objectivity is supplanted by shared loathing,” Carlson (p. 11) wrote. In other words, journalists 
aim to call out the threat and no longer cover it with neutrality or balance when confronted with 
deviance. Carlson cited several moments of irregular press coverage as proof that the media was 
shifting out of the sphere of legitimate controversy, where normal political debate resides, and 
into the sphere of deviance in their coverage of Trump. This study suggests that Carlson’s 
observation can also be applied to the coverage of the Trump voter. 
Conclusion 
 
Examining the media discussion following the presidential election of 2016 recognizes 
the importance of the moment for journalism in the U.S. Collectively, the media mostly agreed 
that they had made a mistake and looked inward for explanations. It was an unusual and candid 
moment for a profession that has struggled with technological change and economic upheaval. It 
also highlighted problems within journalism that can and should be addressed to improve future 
election coverage. The most common problems the media addressed were that they saw the 
election of Trump as unthinkable and that they are out of touch with the electorate. Fixing those 
problems can involve changes to normative practices but also changes to personnel, attitudes, 
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even lifestyles. Those are difficult changes to implement. However, those types of changes might 
result in a more nuanced approach to reporting and writing about all kinds of voters and an 
increased appreciation of the media by the electorate. This study suggests that future studies 
should examine the media’s response to this discussion, whether change occurred and/or what 
obstacles are present to prevent change. It also would be beneficial to talk to many of the 
journalists and editors featured in this study to more fully understand their answers and explore 
the different perspectives of local and national media that this study suggests. Finally, this study 
is a hopeful sign for a profession central to the U.S. democracy and the willingness of the media 
to air their concerns publicly suggests an openness to change. This study aims to be a helpful part 










This study started with a look back at election night 2016 but it aims to look to the future 
of election reporting. The election results in 2016 were a self-identified difficult moment in 
journalism history: a presidential election that caught members of the media by surprise because 
most failed to recognize the mood of the electorate. That does not happen often and the media 
responded with a public debate about normative practices that was thoughtful, chagrined and full 
of promise. Dozens of political journalists called for change in how they covered the voter in 
order to remain relevant to the democratic process. 
As this study is completed, the 2020 U.S. presidential election is coming to a close and 
the coverage does not suggest much has changed since 2016. Most of the media coverage 
predicts a Biden landslide and major news outlets appear to once again dismiss the Trump voter 
as a deviant part of the democratic debate. Some news organizations have made changes in their 
coverage since 2016. Journalists such as Margaret Sullivan, The Washington Post media critic, 
and Nate Silver, editor in chief of FiveThirtyEight and frequent contributor to The New York 
Times, have written numerous columns during the past four years urging changes to the 
normative practices of election coverage. Organizations such as ProPublica have created 
election sites that pool the resources of local newspapers.154 Others have improved or added to 
 
154 Electionland is a site dedicated to reporting “voting access, cybersecurity, misinformation and election integrity 
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their election coverage. The New York Times election 2020 page includes links such as How to 
Vote and Disinformation; The Washington Post and USA TODAY  have election pages with tabs 
for issues and where candidates stand. The Washington Post even adopted a new motto following 
the 2016 election: “Democracy Dies in Darkness.”155 
Despite this, there is little mention of the voter in the current election coverage but there 
is a reliance on professional political analysts and an overwhelming theme of the election as a 
horserace rather than an exploration of issues. As the results of this study found in 2016, today’s 
coverage continues to include few voters as sources and often places them at the end of a news 
report, offering little more than a colorful addition after the analysis offered by professional 
political observers. It seems little has changed since Hallin observed in 1989 that “(i)n general 
the media place a low value on political involvement by ordinary citizens,” (p. 196). The same 
delegitimizing cues that were identified in this study in the 2016 coverage are regularly included 
in election coverage this year. As an example, consider this paragraph that ran on the online front 
page of The New York Times on October 20, 2020: 
“Mr. Trump retains a few important bastions of support, most notably among white 
voters without college degrees, who continue to favor him over Mr. Biden by 23 
percentage points. But that lead is far narrower than the advantage Mr. Trump held 
among less-educated whites in 2016, when those voters preferred him over Hillary 
Clinton by 37 points.” 156 
 
The headline for the news report read: “Voters Prefer Biden Over Trump on Almost All 
Major Issues, Poll Shows.” Despite the mention of voters and issues in the headline, this story 
only includes two voters as sources, neither of whom address issues or support Trump. The 
article does not include a description of issues at stake in the election, the debate about how to 
 
155 Whether this is a comment on failing to understand the voters or concerns over the Trump administration can 
be left to the reader to decide.  
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solve them nor why they support their candidate of choice. Finally, it frames Trump voters in a 
very similar manner as they were framed in 2016, with delegitimizing details such as race and 
education level. This is just one example, of course, and future research should explore how 
representative it is of the 2020 election coverage. This study is based on the premise that by 
understanding the choices in normative practice – language, reporting, sourcing – journalists can 
improve their election coverage. 
Sphere Theory as a Lens 
 
This study aims to help identify why the media missed the mood of the electorate in an 
effort to suggest improvements in future election coverage. As Chapter Six of this study outlines, 
the media lacked clarity and agreement on what went wrong with the 2016 election coverage. 
Despite a debate period that lasted nearly six weeks and included the voices of dozens of 
members of the media, there was no overarching consensus. The post-election media debate 
suggested many, sometimes contradictory, reasons offered by journalists for why the coverage 
failed to understand the voters in 2016.  
As working journalists, however, the media’s opportunity for inspection was short-lived 
as Trump was sworn in and deadline demands churned back up. Published contemporaneously 
with the professional discussion was a collection of essays by scholars that offered their 
perspectives on the election. One essay, by media scholar Matt Carlson, suggested understanding 
the coverage of Trump through the lens of Daniel Hallin’s Sphere Theory. Carlson identified that 
normative practices shifted when journalists were confronted with Trump’s candidacy. 
Understanding this shift in practices, from the sphere of legitimate controversy to deviance,  adds 
clarity to the “dilemma” over objectivity that occurred during the election, Carlson wrote. The 
essay highlighted moments in the 2016 election when journalists publicly questioned whether 
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Trump should be covered with objectivity, such as Jim Rutenberg’s August 9, 2016, front-page 
column in The New York Times157 and The Huffington Post’s editor’s note that accompanied 
every story on Trump.158 Carlson identified these moments as the shift from the sphere of 
legitimate controversy to the sphere of deviance, as defined by Sphere Theory. In other words, 
Carlson argued, the media was struggling with whether to cover Trump using the normative 
practice of objectivity and neutrality. Hallin recognized that when confronted with deviance, the 
media shifts away from these norms and toward the identification of a threat to democracy. 
However, Carlson suggested, this intuitive shift in practice was difficult for many in the media 
during a presidential election. “(T)o place the nominee of a major party into the sphere of 
deviancy requires a clear-eyed argument and commitment to parting with precedent. It asks 
journalists to break with ingrained ways of thinking and acting—a difficult request, even in the 
face of Trump’s transgressions,” wrote Carlson (p. 11). Carlson said that this “difficult request” 
was what made covering the election so challenging because journalists instinctively shift 
between normative practices without recognizing it. Carlson argued that journalists should 
choose how to cover Trump, either as deviant or as legitimate, or risk the same shift of practices 
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Carlson’s understanding that Sphere Theory helps to explain the media coverage of 
Trump in 2016 was an insight that contributed greatly to this study. The early stage of this study 
was designed to examine the relationship of voters and the media. Identifying the shifting nature 
of normative practice for the media when covering Trump as the root cause of difficulty in 2016, 
Carlson’s explanation seemed like the right lens to examine the coverage of voters as well. 
Therefore, instead of questioning whether Trump belonged in the sphere of deviance as Carlson 
suggested, this study looked to the millions of voters who supported Trump and how they were 
covered. If the media was shifting from objectivity to the identification of deviance for Trump, it 
seemed logical that this practice might spill over into the coverage of voters. For this study, it 
seemed more important to understand if millions of Americans were framed as deviant by the 
media than one, strange political candidate. 
This study embraces the electorate as a critical part of election coverage, making the 
assertion that covering Trump voters as deviant contributed to the misunderstanding of the 
electorate as a whole by the media. Shifting practices to identify Trump voters as outside the 
sphere of legitimate controversy would not be deemed unprofessional under Sphere Theory. But, 
this study suggests, it was the wrong choice. Professional practice that worked to inform the 
public about the size of Trump’s support, the issues motivating those voters, and the root reasons 
for the rise of this cause might have better served democracy. As many scholars have 
documented, polarization among the electorate had increased since the 2016 election (Faris 
2017; Benkler 2018; Druckman and Levendusky 2018). These studies suggest that the views of 
the opposing political parties are increasingly alarming to Democrats and Republicans. However, 
this study argues that the media cannot participate in this trend and continue its information 
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providing role during an election. Framing large segments of the electorate as deviant works to 
increase polarization and distrust.  
In an essay titled “The Vital Role of the  Media in a Democracy,” published in October 
2020, media scholar Michael Schudson argues that the U.S. democratic system needs checks and 
balances from “the tyranny of the majority,” as Alexis de Toqueville159 famously warned. 
Schudson writes that “50 percent plus one can be misled. They can be an angry majority, angry 
enough to strip the other half of the population of civil, political, and social rights.”160 This is 
why our system is not a pure democracy, he argues: “Of course, in a democracy, numbers matter 
— and they should, although the founders created the political system that they did because they 
distrusted numbers and they perfectly despised the multitudes.” Despite this, Schudson argues 
that the media’s most important role is to embrace the professional practices of journalism that 
encourage balanced reporting, “digs for contrary evidence” and reports against assumptions. In 
an era of disinformation circulated on social media, attacks on journalism, false equivalencies 
and other threats to the truth, professional journalists should focus on the rules of “their craft,” 
Schudson argues. Responsible journalists “do not subordinate honest reporting to ideological 
consistency or political advocacy,” Schudson wrote. At the risk of paraphrasing a very clear and 
concise writer, it is fair to say that Schudson is advocating for more investigation of the many 
elements that make up the U.S. electorate – a similar conclusion that this study suggests.  
 In a more pessimistic essay on the future of journalism in the U.S. and the U.K, media 
scholar Barbie Zelizer (2018) makes a similar argument for improved professional practice 
during an election. Zelizer argues that the British media and the U.S. media have both failed in 
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their democratic roles. The misunderstanding by the British press of the public sentiment during 
the vote over Brexit in the U.K and the U.S. media coverage of Trump’s candidacy “makes 2016 
and 2017 one of the worst periods in recent memory,” Zelizer wrote (2018, p. 150). The 
problem, Zelizer argues, is that both media systems lost sight of their role in a democracy, which 
must always include serving the public by providing information about the issues important to 
voters. Zelizer calls this “not serving and not reflecting” the public (p. 150). She argues that the 
media systems in both countries, while different in many ways, are similar because they focus on 
the viewpoints of the elite: “Whether it was the post-industrial towns of Northern England and 
the poorer parts of Wales or the Rust Belt and so-called flyover zones of the United States, 
journalism in both countries failed to reflect the public – with its multiple variations, 
complexities and contradictions,” (p.150).  
Bennett (2016) used the term “indexing” in a way that parallels what Zelizer (2018) calls 
“shrinking the imagined public to its smallest possible size” (p.150).  Bennett defined indexing 
as the “tendency of mainstream news organizations to index or adjust the range of viewpoints in 
a story to the dominant positions of those whom the journalists perceive to have enough power to 
affect the outcome of a situation” (p.16).  They both are describing a media environment that 
limits the voices and perspectives included in news reports to those who hold power, sometimes 
described as the political elite. This would include individuals such as elected officials, high-
ranking members of the political parties, professional political analysts, pollsters, and 
government officials. It does not include the voice of the voters. (For a fuller explanation of 
indexing, please see Chapter Two).  
In Hallin’s Sphere Theory, indexing would be used to limit the size of the Sphere of 
Legitimate Controversy. The issues important to those in power and the opinions of elite political 
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actors define the boundaries of this sphere. Other sources, such as the average citizen voter, are 
either ignored or relegated to a minor role in the media coverage. Vocal groups that are not 
recognized by those in power are covered in the sphere of deviance and framed with 
delegitimizing cues. Hallin described it in this manner: “In political situations where political 
consensus seems to prevail, journalists tend to act as ‘responsible’ members of the political 
establishment, upholding the dominant political perspective and passing on more or less at face 
value the views of authorities,” (1989, p. 10). When a topic becomes more controversial, the 
media becomes “becomes more adversarial” to those in power but stay “well within” the 
boundaries of the debate “going on within the political establishment” (p. 10).  
Each of these scholars is describing something similar that is at the root of what went 
wrong in 2016. By focusing on the voices of those in power, this study suggests that the media 
missed the voices of those who collectively had the power to vote out the establishment. This 
study measured how often the voters were included as a source in a story and how that measure 
compared to the voices of professional political analysts. In 82 percent of the stories examined 
for this study, the news report included more professional political analysts explaining how 
voters felt rather than the voices of actual voters. In 64 percent of the stories included in this 
study, professional analysts were quoted before the voters. As explained in Chapter Four, this 
ranking of sources suggests that the media understood the voice of the voters as some of the least 
important elements in the report. For Trump voters, this lowly ranking was often also coupled 
with delegitimizing details that identified these sources as a deviant part of the electorate. 
Understanding the coverage of voters in this light, it is little wonder that the perspective of the 




According to Sphere Theory, if the media understood Trump voters as deviant, the shift 
of practices is normative because it is accepted practice to switch reporting styles when 
confronted with deviance. As Carlson’s essay identified about the coverage of Trump, this study 
suggests that the media should make a “clear-eyed argument and commitment to parting with 
precedent” (p. 11) when placing nearly half the voting public in the sphere of deviance. In 
addition, the choice to cover voters as deviant can come with a cost, primarily that the coverage 
will alarm rather than enlighten readers. The practices associated with legitimate controversy and 
the sphere of deviance are at odds with one another. Under Sphere Theory, deviant framing 
forgoes investigation, exploration of motives or ideas and the attempt to create a political 
conversation, as media scholar James Carey (1997) described. Only when covered as a legitimate 
part of the democratic debate are political actors, such as voters, fully explored by the media.  
Cycle of Delegitimization 
 
This study aimed to contribute to the field of media studies by applying Sphere Theory to 
the framing of the voters in election coverage. In summary, this study found that the media did 
shift into the sphere of deviance when covering Trump voters, that voters were quoted less often 
than political analysts and placed at the end of the news reports, supporting Trump was framed 
as socially unacceptable and that, in general, the media suggested that the election was not 
offering voters a good choice with either candidate. The results are not a positive picture of the 
relationship between voters and the media. The brightest spot in the findings, that the local media 
offered a more nuanced framing of voters and might suggest a path for national outlets, is 
diminished by the fact that local newspapers and bureaus are closing at a depressingly rapid clip.  
 Understanding these findings through the lens of Sphere Theory, the media did not 
violate normative standards by framing the Trump voter as deviant. But Hallin makes clear that 
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deviant framing can come at a cost. As Billard demonstrated in his study of newspaper coverage 
of transgender people, media framing of large segments of society as deviant can be problematic. 
From a political perspective, the media identification of which elements of the electorate deserve 
delegitimizing cues can run counter to the ideals of a democracy. In a society that values the vote 
of each individual, albeit filtered through the Electoral College and subject to Supreme Court 
decisions, systematic framing of 62.5 million voters who voted for Trump as deviant seems to 
stretch the idea that deviance is a small segment of society that operates outside the norm.  
Deviance as an Attention Seeking Tool 
 
 As a candidate for president in the 2016 U.S. election, Trump seemed to encourage 
deviance. He ignored expected norms of typical political candidates and was plagued by scandals 
that would have eliminated others in previous election years. He used language that was racist 
and sexist. His policy suggestions, when they were articulated at all, were outside the 
mainstream and shocking to many. This study does not suggest that Trump was or was not 
deviant. That is a different study. This study looks solely at the media coverage of voters who 
were offered two major party choices in the general election of 2016: Trump or Clinton.  
  Clearly, many Trump voters did act in a manner that encouraged deviant framing and 
this may have come from the example of a candidate who garnered significant media coverage 
for his antics. The media did not invent the strange clothing, the rowdy behavior, the chants and 
taunts that all were factors of  Trump rallies. It is a fact that polls showed that more White, 
uneducated voters supported Trump than Clinton. Voters did tell the media that they believed in 
conspiracy theories, insult the other candidates and their supporters, and echo many of Trump’s 
most sensational claims.   
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In The Uncensored War, Hallin describes how early anti-war Vietnam protestors also 
acted in a manner that encouraged deviant framing. Hallin described this as a cycle that the 
media helps to create and perpetuate. He wrote: “Not being recognized as a part of the normal 
political process, the antiwar movement could rarely become news except by playing the deviant 
role, usually by “provoking” violence or charges of aiding the enemy. So the factions that played 
this role the best were the ones that grew most rapidly, and the movement increasingly defined 
itself (sic) according to the deviant role in which it was cast by the media. This is no doubt a 
major reason the antiwar movement was hated by most of the public even when the public had 
turned away from the war” (p.194). The cycle that Hallin describes begins with political actors 
that support a cause. As Bennett (2019) describes in indexing theory161 and Hallin seems to 
support,162 political actors that are not in power are often ignored by the media. In Hallin’s study 
these actors were anti-war protestors. In Billard’s 2016 study, these actors were the transgender 
community and in this study they were Trump supporters. Hallin observed that the next step in 
this cycle was that  a small portion of the anti-war protestors tried to attract media attention 
through behavior that was outside the accepted range of political behavior. For example, Hallin 
cites a television news report on a march in the streets of New York City in December 1967 that 
featured protestors carrying a flag with the Vietcong symbol. This was considered a provocative 
act at a time when American families were sending their sons overseas to fight the Vietcong. As 
Hallin explains, the protest garnered the attention the anti-war movement was seeking, but 
 
161 Bennett (2016) defines “indexing” as “tendency of mainstream news organizations to index or adjust the range of 
viewpoints in a story to the dominant positions of those whom the journalists perceive to have enough power to 
affect the outcome of a situation,” (p.16). For a greater exploration of indexing and its relationship to Sphere 
Theory, please see Chapter Two- Theory. 
162 In a later work, Hallin writes that he views Bennett’s definition of indexing to be “now one of the basic 
conclusions of research on political communication,”  (p.11). From Hallin, Daniel C. (1994) We Keep America on 




triggered a shift in normative practices by the media away from objectivity and toward the 
identification of deviance.  
The following chart demonstrates the cycle Hallin described. It begins and ends with 
political actors being rejected or ignored by the public and the media. The role of the media in 
the cycle is to identify deviant elements within a political group and sound the alarm about this 
group to the public. Understanding this cycle through the lens of Sphere Theory, the media 
responds to the “acting out” of the political group by understanding the group to be outside the 
sphere of legitimate controversy and in the sphere of deviance. Therefore, normative practices 
shift away from objective reporting and towards the identification of something that threatens 
community norms.  
As the chart below demonstrates, political actors can get stuck in the circle of 
delegitimization. The end result is that they are ignored or rejected by the public and the media 
until the cycle starts over. Of course, this is not an endless loop. Many factors can break the 
cycle, including a change in normative practices by the media or a significant shift in public 
opinion by society. Looking again at the same cycle through Sphere Theory, if the political 
actors are understood through the lens of legitimate controversy, the media shifts its practices to 
adopt a neutral tone and objectively report on the political actors, which informs the public. 
This study aims to help illuminate some of the practices of the 2016 election coverage 
with the goal of contributing to a path forward for future elections. As many other scholars have 
suggested (Aday, Livingston, and Herbert, 2005; Luther and Miller, 2005; Billard, 2016), today’s 
deviant actor is often a part of tomorrow’s legitimate debate and news organizations that choose 
to label parts of society as deviant run a few risks. As Billard found in the exploration of 
delegitimizing cues of transgender people in newspaper coverage and Luther and Miller and 
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Hallin  in the coverage of war protestors, the media does not lead society away from deviant 
framing. Rather, it reflects and follows societal cues. And the risk here is that the media’s 
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Trump. In news reports where the voters were quoted directly, only 28 percent of those reports 
mentioned issues that the voter was concerned about. (A qualitative examination of those reports 
found that these mentions of issues important to the voter were almost never followed by a 
broader discussion and were limited to one or two words such as “immigration” or “the 
economy.”) Less than 30 percent of the reports quoted the voters as discussing the qualifications 
or lack of qualifications of the candidate to serve as president. Instead, voters were quoted 
insulting the other candidate, describing conspiracy theories about the race, and expressing 
disgust over the process.  
Negativity and Polarization  
 
Another conclusion of this study is that media reports of election coverage may 
contribute to the polarization of the American political system, as other scholars have found. 
Patterson’s comprehensive analysis of the 2016 media coverage concluded that news reports 
about the election are overwhelmingly negative in tone, part of a pattern that started in the 1980s. 
Patterson wrote that the media reports “all the ugly stuff they can find and leave it to the voters 
to decide what to make of it” (p. 19). Coupled with decreased coverage about issues, Patterson’s 
conclusion was that “when journalists turn their eye to society, they highlight the problems and 
not the success stories. The news creates a seedbed of public anger, misperception, and 
anxiety— sitting there waiting to be tapped by those who have a stake in directing the public’s 
wrath at government” (2016, p. 19). Similarly, the Pew Research Center published a report the 
day before the 2016 election that found the American public had grown more polarized along 
party lines and held increasingly negative views about the candidates of other parties.163  
 




In this study, the most obvious evidence that the media might contribute to polarization 
was the difference in the framing of Trump and Clinton voters. This study found that Trump 
voters were far more likely than Clinton supporters to be framed as deviant. For example, more 
than 18 percent of news reports described Trump supporters with unusual details such as 
clothing, habits or language as compared to less than 1 percent of reports that featured Clinton 
supporters. Nearly 38 percent of news reports described Trump voters as believing in conspiracy 
theories compared to less than 2 percent of reports that described Clinton voters. More than 20 
percent of reports described Trump supporters as reluctant to admit their support for the 
candidate versus 6 percent of reports that included Clinton supporters. Applying Sphere Theory 
to these findings, Trump voters were placed in the sphere of deviance while Clinton supporters 
tended to fall into the sphere of legitimate controversy.  
One measure that came out nearly equally between Trump and Clinton voters was the use 
of insults to describe the other candidates or his/her supporters. In news reports that included 
Trump voters as a source, 49.5 percent included that source using an insult to describe Clinton or 
her supporters. That compares closely to 42.3 percent of news reports featuring Clinton 
supporters who were quoted using an insult about Trump or his supporters. These quotes were 
often the most colorful part of a news report as they were creative, funny and mean. As a 
reporter, it must have been very tempting to include them when offered up and ask for them 
when they were not. They reflect a deep emotional connection to the election and an entertaining 
element to the news report. Yet, these quotes were often the only opportunity voters were offered 
to present their views in the article. Inserting a provocative quote instead of a thoughtful 
reflection, the journalist seems to be trading the short-term success of the article for the long 
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term civility of political debate and the exploration of what motivated the voters to such harsh 
language.  
Another measure included in the coding scheme was whether the news report suggested 
in tone or directly that neither candidate was qualified or that the election offered voters “no 
good choice.” The results found that nearly 25 percent of the news reports measured for this 
study included that suggestion. The democratic process had produced two candidates for 
election. Millions of voters cast a ballot for each of them. Yet many news reports chose to 
suggest that both candidates were poor choices. This was one of the most surprising and perhaps 
disappointing findings of this study in terms of assessing the performance of the media in the 
2016 elections.  
To develop a coding scheme to measure these delegitimizing cues, this study followed 
the example of Billard and looked to industry standards and guidelines. One source for this was 
The Handbook for Journalists During Elections164, published by Reporters Without Borders. 
This guidebook was developed mostly for members of the media who travel to foreign lands to 
cover elections. After reading the media comments about election coverage (outlined in Chapter 
Six), the handbook seemed very appropriate for reporters who often travelled from Washington 
D.C., or New York City to interior parts of the U.S. as many described this practice as 
“parachuting” into an unfamiliar land. In the introduction to the guidelines, the editors of the 
election handbook offered the following basic advice:  
“A journalist plays a major part in the expansion and strengthening of democracy and 
peace, and his or her role is even more important in times of political tension. Sharp powers of 
observation and analysis are essential. These will enable a journalist to grasp the socio-political 
complexities of a political moment and the issues at stake. A journalist should make every effort 
 





to lessen social tensions instead of increasing them – a task in keeping with the profession’s 
fundamental moral standards,” (p.7). 
 
This advice, “to lessen social tensions instead of increasing them,” was not highlighted in 
the public debate that members of the media engaged in after the election (and is documented in 
Chapter Six). Yet this point is perhaps one of the most unintended consequences of deviant 
framing. Journalists are not creating the social tension, but they are reflecting it, highlighting it, 
maybe even selling their products by using it. This study found that in 2016 voters in both parties 
were described as distraught about the possibility of the other candidate winning. Voters were 
often quoted saying that if the other candidate won they would take up arms, spark violence, start 
a revolution, leave the country, fall into a deep depression, lose their life’s savings and other 
extreme responses. Not one news report analyzed for this study quoted a voter or political analyst 
as predicting that after the election the two political parties might work together to solve the 
problems confronting the nation.  
The Role of the Media 
 
 One bright spot in the findings of this study was that local coverage seemed to understand 
local voters in a slightly more nuanced manner than the way they were covered by national 
organizations. Organizations such as The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Lebanon Daily News, The 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Public Opinion and The Evening Sun included delegitimizing cues such 
as the lack of education, homogenized race (white), descriptions of unusual clothing but they 
often balanced this cues by offering the voter more space in their news reports. Local voters 
sometimes were described in greater detail, including a short biography and issues that they 
cared about.  
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Chapter Four highlights many examples of the differences between local and national 
coverage. One example was report published in The Lebanon Daily News on November 5, 2016, 
describing a Trump rally in Hershey, Pennsylvania. The rally included many of the 
delegitimizing details included in many local and national reports: crowds chanting insults, 
supporters dressed in outlandish costumes or t-shirts, and voters expressing concern for the 
future if Clinton won. Yet this short story took the time to include a few extra sentences in the 
interviews with local voters. The report featured a voter named Steven Wolfe, who was attending 
his third Trump rally. Wolfe is described was quoted as believing that the “country would take a 
turn for the worse” if Clinton were elected. But, as outlined in Chapter Four, it also quotes Wolfe 
as stating that he supported Trump because he considered the appointment of Supreme Court 
nominees as the most pressing issue facing the country. The article goes on to include a 
description of Wolfe as an Army veteran, serving a dozen  years in active duty and the Army 
Reserves, who values his oath to uphold the U.S. Constitution. These small details that could 
have been left out or framed differently offered a more complete picture of the voter and a 
degree of respect for his position. In the language of Sphere Theory, it worked to move the 
coverage away from deviance and toward the sphere of legitimate controversy. 
A few of the most interesting local articles read like the narrative of a conversation – one 
voter and his or her description followed by a different voter and slightly different view from 
locations such as local restaurants and beauty parlors. In addition, there was also often a sense of 
pride in location. When politicians came to town, the citizens were often described as excited 
that their community was garnering attention. This greater focus on individuals and a recognized 
sense of community delivered a more nuanced picture of local voters.  
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This is not to overly praise local coverage or ignore the shortcomings that smaller 
budgets and staffs often produce. Local media produced far fewer reports than national outlets, 
their reports were often shorter and the style was often not as readable as national reports. Yet 
this study found a qualitative difference that suggested a greater respect for the differences 
within a community – a lesson that could help national coverage. In addition, local media often 
included details that suggested national polls were inaccurately measuring local support for 
Trump and Clinton. Reading through these reports after the election, there were clues that Trump 
would carry Pennsylvania: local Democratic party chairs stating they were worried, record 
requests for Trump lawn signs from Republican headquarters, persistent long lines for Trump 
rallies, as well as union workers who supported Clinton stating they had a hard time convincing 
fellow workers to vote Democratic. In sum, local media still seem to have much to contribute to 
the democratic process and are a valuable resource for both readers and national media outlets.  
 In a very different era, media scholar James Carey (1991) suggested that the most 
important role for the media was the facilitation of a conversation about the issues facing the 
country in an election. “Republics require conversation, often cacophonous conversation, for 
they should be noisy places,” Carey wrote in an essay titled “A Republic, If You Can Keep It.” 
Carey argues that the role of the media is to inform the public so they can have an educated 
debate. But, he argued, the conversation must begin with the public. “The ‘public’ is the God 
term of the press, the term without which the press does not make any sense,” Carey wrote (p. 
218, 1997). In Carey’s view, the media is not meant to set the agenda. Rather, it is there to listen 
and then explore issues suggested by the public through professional standards. Carey’s 
suggestion seems like an optimistic solution for an era of heightened negativity and polarization. 
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When citizens in a democracy can’t agree on the identification of the most important issues they 
are facing, it is difficult to imagine civility in the debate over the solutions.  
  In hindsight, it was clear that there were some very interesting “conversations” that the 
media could have facilitated in the 2016 election. For example, according to a report in The 
Washington Post, 209 counties in states across the U.S. voted for Barack Obama in 2008 and 
2012 and then voted for Trump in 2016.165 A large number of these counties were in states that 
Hillary Clinton was predicted to win and Trump carried instead. As The Washington Post 
reported, these counties were predominantly white and their residents hold fewer college degrees 
than other counties in those states. But those facts don’t explain what motivated those voters in 
the past three presidential elections. Identifying them with delegitimizing cues that suggest 
deviance does little to understand the importance of this large segment of the electorate. Labeling 
these voters as deviant was a lost opportunity to spark conversation and fight against the divisive 
nature of the current political environment. 
 Like Hallin, Carey’s observations date from a different political environment yet, they 
offer insights for future journalism practice. They encourage the media to facilitate discussion 
and debate among competing political factions rather than encouraging practices that heighten 
polarization and negativity. Applying Sphere Theory to the study of the coverage of voters in an 
election offers clarity about the daily choices journalists make when preparing news reports and 
the effects those choices can have. Recognizing a detail as a delegitimizing cue might discourage 
the use of a sensational quote by a member of the media despite the fact that the quote is colorful 
or funny. Identifying the costs of deviant framing – even when confronted with a voter that 
 
165 Kevin Uhrmacher, Kevin Schaul and Dan Keating (November 9, 2016). These Former Obama Strongholds 




violates the personal values of a reporter – might encourage the media to offer a deeper 
investigation of that voter and an exploration of the issues that may or may not motivate them. 
Understanding the shifting normative practices associated with topics and actors that the media 
understand to be legitimate -- as opposed to deviant -- might aid the reporter who is confused by 
the urge to abandon objectivity and sound the alarm.  
 Moving forward, this study suggests future research into media coverage of the wide 
range of opinions that make up the U.S. electorate. The relationship between news organizations 
and the voter is a cornerstone of the election process in the U.S. democracy. This study is 
optimistic that the relationship can continue to improve and even facilitate changes in the nature 
of political discussion in the U.S. It suggests that scholarship that illuminates current practices 
and analyses the effect of these practices on the democratic system will help to improve the role 
of the media in an election. And with that lofty goal in mind, it urges continued research on the 





Appendix A: Coding Form  
 
(Conducted via Google Forms) 
1.Please identify the newspaper by initials: PI, PP-G, PTR, PO, LNP, LDN, PDN, ES, WP, 
USAT, NYT. 
2.Date of publication: dd/mm 
3.First three words of the headline:  
4.Does the article describe voters?   




5.Are voters quoted directly?  
Mark only one answer. 
yes 
no 
6.Does the voter(s) mention an issue(s) that he/she is concerned about in the election such as 
health care, the economy, trade, immigration? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
7.Does the voter(s) discuss either candidates' qualifications or lack of qualifications to serve as 
president? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
8.Are the voters who are quoted identified as either Trump or Clinton supporters? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
If no, skip to question 33 
Trump Voters Part 1 
9.Are Trump supporters described? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
If no, skip to question 21 
10.How many Trump supporters are identified by name? Please type a number. 
Trump Voters Part 2 
11.Is the education level or lack of education of the voter(s) mentioned?  
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
12. Are Trump supporters described as out of work, unemployed or lacking a job? 





13. Are Trump supporters identified by a profession such as lawyer, teacher, firefighter? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
14. Please identify what professions are identified in the story and assigned to Trump voters? If 
none, type n/a. 
15. Are Trump supporters identified by race? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
16. If race is identified, please identify which races are associated with Trump supporters? Check 
all boxes that apply.  
White or Caucasian 
Black or African American 
Hispanic 
Non-whites 
17. Are Trump voters described or quoted as believing in conspiracy theories such as the election 
is rigged, that guns will be confiscated, the other party is engaging in fraudulent behavior or 
some other conspiracy? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
18. Are Trump supporters quoted as insulting the other candidate or candidate supporters? This 
would include the use of words such as liar, criminal, rapist to describe the candidate and his/her 
supporters. 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
19. Are Trump supporters described as "shy" or "squeamish" or unwilling to announce their 
support for the candidate?  
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
20. Are Trump supporters described using unusual details - such as clothing, habits, expressions? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
Clinton Voters Part 1 
21. Are Clinton supporters described? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
If no, skip to question 33 
22. How many Clinton supporters are identified by name? Please type a number.  
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Clinton Voters Part 2 
23. Is the education level or lack of education of the voter(s) mentioned?  
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
24. Are Clinton supporters described as out of work, unemployed or lacking a job?  
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
25. Are Clinton supporters described identified as by a profession such as lawyer, teacher, 
firefighter? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
26. Please identify what professions are identified in the story and assigned to Clinton voters? If 
none, type n/a. 
27. Are Clinton supporters identified by race? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
28. If the race is identified, please choose which races are identified with Clinton supporters? 
Check all boxes that apply. 
White or Caucasian 
Black or African American 
Hispanic 
Non-whites 
29. Are Clinton voters described or quoted as believing in conspiracy theories such as the 
election is rigged, that guns will be confiscated, the other party is engaging in fraudulent 
behavior or some other conspiracy?  
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
30. Are Clinton supporters quoted as insulting the other candidate or candidate supporters? This 
would include the use of words such as liar, criminal, rapist to describe the candidate and his/her 
supporters.  
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
31. Are Clinton supporters described as "shy" or "squeamish" or unwilling to announce their 
support for the candidate?  
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
32. Are Clinton supporters described using unusual details - such as clothing, habits, 
expressions? 





33. Does the article quote politicians, party officials, pollsters or anyone else that professionally 
observes or participates in politics?  
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
If no, skip to question 36 
34. Are more politicians or professional political observers included in the article than the 
number of voters who are quoted in the story? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
35. If both types of sources are included in the article, are voters quoted AFTER most of the 
politicians or professional political observers in the article? 
Mark only one answer. 
Yes 
No 
36. Does the article imply or state that voters believe that neither candidate is qualified or that 
there is "no good choice?" 
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